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I. INTRODUCTION: ORIGINALISM, MEANING, AND THE LAW 
What does the Constitution mean?  The United States Supreme Court has recently suggested 
that interpretations of the constitutional text are “guided by the principle that “[t]he Constitution 
was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and 
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ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.”1  The approach to constitutional 
interpretation articulated by Justice Scalia in the Opinion of the Court in District of Columbia v. 
Heller focuses on “original public meaning”: in other words, Heller’s theory of constitutional 
meaning is originalist.  This Article offers a theory of constitutional meaning that that provides a 
theoretical foundation for original public meaning originalism.  We can call that theory Semantic 
Originalism: it offers an account of the possibility of constitutional communication and explains 
how a written constitution can provide both fixed semantic content and a general framework that 
can be adapted to changing circumstances. 
A. What is Semantic Originalism? 
The central claim of Semantic Originalism is that constitutional law includes rules with 
content that are fixed by the original public meaning of the text—the conventional semantic 
meaning of the words and phrases in context.  This central claim is developed and supported 
through the elaboration of four theses.  First, the fixation thesis is the claim that semantic content 
of the Constitution (the linguistic meaning of the Constitution) is fixed at the time of adoption.  
Second, the clause meaning thesis is the assertion that the semantic content of the constitution is 
its original public meaning.  Third, the contribution thesis argues that the semantic content of the 
constitution contributes to the content of the law.  Fourth, the fidelity thesis maintains that 
because the semantic content of the constitution is the supreme law of the land, we are obligated 
by it, unless there is an overriding reason of morality to the contrary.2  Each of the four theses is 
clarified and argued for in the remainder of the article, but at this early stage, the arguments can 
be previewed in order to reveal the general shape of Semantic Originalism. 
1. The Fixation Thesis: The Semantic Content of Constitutional Provisions is Fixed at the 
Time of Framing and Ratification 
The family of originalist theories of constitutional interpretation includes many variants, 
ranging from views that emphasize the “original intentions” of the framers or ratifiers, theories 
that prioritize “original understanding,” and contemporary versions of the “New Originalism” 
that focus on “original public meaning.”  Despite this variation, it would be a mistake to 
conclude that “originalism” lacks core content.  Almost all originalists agree, explicitly or 
implicitly, that the meaning (or “semantic content”) of a given Constitutional provision was fixed 
at the time the provision was framed and ratified.3  We can call this idea the fixation thesis.4 
The fixation thesis is phrased in terms of “semantic content”: the semantic content of any 
given constitutional provision is fixed at the time of ratification.  The phrase “semantic content” 
refers to “meaning,” but we need to be careful because there is an ambiguity in the meaning of 
the term “meaning.”  When we refer to the meaning of a constitutional provision, we might refer 
to the linguistic meaning or semantic content.  Call this first sense of meaning, the semantic 
sense.  But the term “meaning” can also be used to refer to implications, consequences, or 
                                                
1 District of Columbia v. Heller, ___  S.Ct.___, 2008 WL 2520816 (June 26, 2008) (citations omitted). 
2 I will not make a fifth claim, that given current circumstances, there are no overriding reasons of morality that 
nullify our duty of fidelity to the Constitution, but I won’t deny this fifth claim either.  Much turns on the truth or 
falsity of the fifth claim, but that is a topic for another article and perhaps another author. 
3 This period may be extended over many years. See infra footnote 179, p. 61. 
4 The full argument for the fixation thesis is found below.  See infra Part III.E, “The Case for the Fixation Thesis 





applications.  Call this second sense of meaning, the applicative sense.  We might use the term 
meaning to refer to the purpose or function of a given constitutional provisions: call this third 
sense of meaning the teleological sense.  For the remainder of this essay, when the term 
“meaning” and related phrases like “constitutional meaning” are used, the term and phrases shall 
be used in the semantic sense.5 
The first claim is that the meaning of constitutional provisions is fixed at the time of 
ratification.6  Why is this the case?  After all, the meanings of words and phrases change over 
time.  Why is constitutional meaning fixed at the time of origination?  One common answer to 
this question focuses on the fact that the constitution is written and the notion that the function of 
a writing is to fix meaning through time.7 
But there is a more fundamental warrant for the fixation thesis.  That warrant can be seen 
most clearly if we focus on an example that does not involve the Constitution of the United 
States.  Suppose, for example, that we are attempting to determine the semantic content of a 
letter written in the twelfth century that uses the term “deer.”  Over time, the meaning of the term 
“deer” has substantially changed.  Today, “Deer” refers to a ruminant mammal belonging to the 
family Cervidae, and a number of broadly similar animals, from related families within the order 
Artiodactyla, are often also called deer.  But in Middle English, the word “deer” meant a beast or 
animal of any kind.8  An ordinary letter written between 1066 and the fifteenth century that 
employed the term “deer” can only be understood reliably in light of the conventional semantic 
meaning at the time of writing: reading the letter to use the term deer to refer exclusively to a 
mammal belonging to the family Cervidae would be make a type of factual error, i.e., a linguistic 
mistake.9  Although I have used an example involving a writing (a letter), this feature is not 
essential to fixation.  The semantic content of a twelfth century oral communication using the 
word “deer” would also be given by usage in Middle English.10 
                                                
5 The abstract distinction between different senses of meaning can be made more concrete with an example.  
Consider the question: “What is the meaning of the first amendment freedom of speech?”  One answer to that 
question could be: “The first amendment means that the state can outlaw shouting fire in a crowded theater, but it 
cannot criminalize sincere criticisms of public officials.”  This answer to the question would give us a meaning in 
the applicative sense.  Another answer to the question might be as “protection of political speech essential to a well-
functioning democratic polity.”  This answer to the question would give us a meaning in the teleological sense.  In 
the semantic sense, the meaning of the “freedom of speech” would need to spell out the semantic content of the 
phrase. 
6 The use of the root word “fix” to refer to the idea expressed by the fixation thesis has a long pedigree. See 
THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS 
OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 124 (Carrington's 8th ed. 1927) (“The meaning of the Constitution is fixed 
when it is adopted and is not different at any subsequent time.”). 
7 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. L. Rev. 611, 611-29 (1999); RANDY 
BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004). 
8 SOL STEINMETZ, SEMANTIC ANTICS: HOW AND WHY WORDS CHANGE MEANING 49-50 (Random House 2008). 
9 Of course, the term deer in Middle English included what we call deer in contemporary usage, and it might be 
clear in context that a particular letter used the Middle-English term to refer to a modern deer.  Such usages were, in 
fact, a part of the causal chain that resulted in the contemporary usage.  The mistake would be to assume that the 
Middle English term was limited to the modern usage.  The mistake would result in a gross misunderstanding where 
the Middle English term was used to refer to what we call a “cow” or a “pig.” 
10 Since there were no sound recordings in the twelfth century, we could only know of such an utterance through 
a contemporaneous written report. 





Similarly the Constitution of 1789 uses the phrase “domestic violence.”11  The contemporary 
semantic meaning of the “domestic violence” is “‘intimate partner abuse,’ ‘battering,’ or ‘wife-
beating,’” and it is understood to as “physical, sexual, psychological, and economic abuse that 
takes place in the context of an intimate relationship, including marriage.”12  But if that meaning 
was unknown in the late eighteenth century, it would simply be a linguistic mistake to interpret 
the domestic-violence clause of Article IV of the Constitution of 1789 as referring to spouse or 
child abuse.  The anachronistic reading of “domestic violence” would be mistaken because the 
semantic content is fixed at the time of “constitutional utterance,” where that phrase is 
understood as referring to the time of origin, encompassing the period roughly contemporaneous 
with the framing (or drafting) and ratification (or formal legal approval) of the particular clause 
or amendment.13 
The claim made by the fixation thesis is within the core content of originalism and the claim 
should be understood as neutral between most (or almost all) members of the originalist family.  
Original intentions originalists believe that the original meaning of the constitution is a function 
of the intentions of the framers. If this view of constitutional meaning were correct, then the 
semantic content of a constitutional provision would be fixed at the time of drafting; the fixation 
would be done by mental states (the intentions of the framers) and those states would be fixed at 
the time of constitutional utterance.  Similarly, original public meaning originalists believe that 
the original meaning of the constitution is a function of the original public meaning (or 
“conventional semantic meaning”) of a given constitutional provision at the time the provision 
was framed and ratified.  Once again, meaning is fixed by the general pattern of usage at the time 
of constitutional utterance. 
So far as I can discern all or almost all originalists agree with what I call the fixation thesis.14  
The fact of agreement alone should be enough to validate the claim that the core content of 
originalism includes the idea that the semantic content of constitutional provisions is fixed at the 
time of framing and ratification.  But this claim finds additional and independent support in a 
second warrant: the claim that semantic content is fixed at the time of origin plays a crucial role 
in all (or almost all) of the normative15 justifications for originalism.  For example, fixation at the 
time of origin is crucial for popular sovereignty justifications for originalism, because those 
arguments require that the meaning of the constitution be fixed by the semantic content of the 
document that was ratified by democratically legitimate procedures.  Likewise, fixation at the 
                                                
11 U.S. Constitution, Art. IV, Cl. 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a republican 
form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the 
executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence.”) 
12 Glossary, Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/nepal0903/3.htm (visited March 29, 2008). 
13 I owe this example to Jack Balkin. See Lawrence B. Solum, Blogging from APSA: The New Originalism, 
September 3, 2007, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2007/09/blogging-from-a.html  (live blogging at the 
meeting of the American Political Science Association and describing Balkin’s presentation). 
14 It is possible to imagine a form of originalism that would depart from the core content.  For example, one 
might believe that the Constitution of 1789 has no semantic meaning: it is an empty vessel.  One could then argue 
that contemporary interpreters should adhere to a legal fiction, treating the Constitution of 1789 as if its semantic 
content were determined by the reconstructed or imputed expectations of the framers regarding its application to 
particular issues or cases.  The existence of this logical possibility, however, is not a good reason for denying the 
claim that the actually existing family of views that call themselves originalist is not committed to the core content 
as identified in the text accompanying this note. 
15 I am using “normative” in the narrow sense in which “normative reasons” are moral or ethical reasons.  See 
infra Part III.A, “Semantics and Normativity,” p. 29; infra Part III.B.4, “Semantic Meaning as a “Fact of the 





time of origin is crucial for rule of law theories that require the fixation of content in order to 
ensure the predictability, certainty, and stability of constitutional rules.  In other words, the 
agreement among originalists about the fixation thesis is not a mere coincidence or accident.  
The fixation thesis plays a substantial role in the articulated theoretical content of a variety of 
members of the family of originalist theories. 
2. The Clause Meaning Thesis: The Semantic Content of the Constitution is Given by the 
Original Public Meaning of the Constitutional Provisions 
My second claim is that the semantic content of the constitution is given by its clause 
meaning--understood as original public meaning, elaborated as (1) conventional semantic 
meaning,16 (2) as modified by (a) context,17 (b) the division of linguistic labor,18 (c) constitutional 
implicature,19 and (d) constitutional stipulations.20  (Each of the components of clause meaning is 
explained in detail below.)  The argument that the semantic content of the constitution is given 
by its clause meaning is based on ideas drawn from the philosophy of language.  The central 
claim is that understanding the content of the constitution as focused on its conventional 
semantic meaning provides the only satisfactory account of the possibility of constitutional 
communication. 
The argument for clause meaning will be elaborated at length,21 but the intuitive idea is 
simple.  The constitution was drafted and ratified by a multitude: many different individuals at 
different times and places.  The intentional mental states of the multitude with respect to a given 
constitutional provision (their purposes, hopes, fears, expectations, and so forth) will themselves 
be multitudinous and inaccessible.  Multitudinous, because different framers and ratifiers had 
different intentions, with the consequence that intentions alone cannot fix consistent 
(noncontradictory and not radically ambiguous) semantic content.  Inaccessible, because those 
who were expected to engage in constitutional practice (the judges, officials, and citizens of the 
United States of American for an indefinite future) would have found the multitudinous 
intentions epistemically inaccessible. 
But the fact that the original intentions of the framers and ratifiers were multitudinous and 
inaccessible does make constitutional communication impossible.  The possibility of 
constitutional communication was created by the fact that the framers and ratifiers could rely on 
the accessibility of the public meaning (or conventional semantic meaning) of the words, 
phrases, and clauses that constitute the Constitution.  Not only can such public meanings enable 
constitutional communication at the time a given constitutional provisions is drafted, approved, 
and first implemented, such meanings can also become stable over time or be recovered if they 
are lost.  In other words, under normal conditions successful constitutional communication 
                                                
16 See infra Part III.C.2.a), “First Approximation: Clause Meaning as the Semantic Equivalent of Original 
Meaning Originalism,” p. 52 & Part III.C.2.b), “Second Approximation: Clause Meaning as the Constitutional 
Equivalent of Speakers Meaning,” p. 53. 
17 See infra Part III.C.2.c)(1), “First Modification: The Publicly Available Constitutional Context,” p. 54. 
18 See infra Part III.C.2.c)(2), “Second Modification: The Division of Linguistic Labor,” p. 56. 
19 See infra Part III.C.2.c)(3), “Third Modification: Constitutional Implicature,” p. 58. 
20 See infra Part III.C.2.c)(4), Fourth Modification: Constitutional Stipulations,” p. 59. 
21 See infra Part III.C.2, “Clause Meaning,” p. 52. 





requires reliance by the drafters, ratifiers, and interpreters on the original public meaning of the 
words and phrases.22 
3. The Contribution Thesis: The Semantic Content of the Constitution Contributes to 
Constitutional Law 
My third claim is that the semantic content of the Constitution contributes to legal content.23  
As formulated, the third claim is simple and noncontroversial: once the contribution thesis is 
understood, it becomes apparent that that it is compatible with almost every reasonable theory of 
the nature of law and most normative (moral or ethical) theories of constitutional practice.  The 
contribution thesis claims that the semantic content of the United States Constitution makes 
some contribution to the content of American law, and that is all that it claims.  The contribution 
thesis itself does not answer questions about the strength or structure of that contribution. 
Much of the confusion about originalism arises from the fact that there are several versions of 
the contribution thesis.  Critics of originalism might identify originalism with an extreme 
position about the contribution the semantic content of the Constitution makes to constitutional 
law.  Let us call the following view the extreme version of the contribution thesis: the semantic 
content of the constitution fully determines the content of constitutional law.  If this extreme 
version of the contribution thesis were true, then each and every valid rule of constitutional law 
                                                
22 Mitchell Berman has proposed an unhelpful distinction between what he calls “hard” and “soft” originalism.  
He writes: 
Briefly, originalism is “hard” when justified by reference to reasons that purport to render it (in some sense) 
necessarily true; it is soft when predicated on contingent and contestable weightings of the costs and benefits of 
originalism relative to other interpretive approaches. 
Berman, Mitchell N., "Originalism is Bunk" (December 30, 2007). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1078933, p. 3.  Berman then offers a second formulation that he believes is equivalent: 
Hard arguments contend that originalism follows logically or conceptually from premises the interlocutor can be 
expected already to accept; soft arguments aim to persuade readers to revise their judgments of value or their 
empirical or predictive assessments. 
Id. at 3-4.  As articulated by Berman, the distinction between Hard and Soft originalism is not coherent.  First, it is 
not clear what the criteria for “hard” and “soft” actually are.  Berman assumes that the category of the necessary and 
the category of the conceptual are identical, but that assumption involves metaphysical commitments that are among 
the most controversial in contemporary philosophy.  Quine!  Kripke!!  Not all conceptual arguments involve 
necessary truths, and not all judgments of value are supported by contingent weightings.  One can imagine a 
deontological argument for originalism grounded on “premises the interlocutor can be expected to accept” but which 
is sensitive to a weighing of these commitments in a process of reflective equilibrium.  Is this “hard” or “soft” 
originalism? 
Berman then suggests, “The arguments for hard originalism most commonly advanced today depend upon 
particular views either about what it means to interpret a text or about what it means to treat a constitution as 
authoritative.” Id. at 4.  But what Berman seems to be driving at here is not the distinction between conceptual 
necessity and persuasion, but is instead a distinction between arguments about meaning and legality, on the one 
hand, and normative arguments (or arguments from moral and political philosophy) on the other hand.  That 
distinction is important, but it does not cleave the world of originalist theories into two camps, hard and soft.  
Arguments about semantic meaning and legal significance can be conceptual or empirical, deductive or based on 
reflective equilibrium, as can arguments about political morality. 
23 The full argument for the contribution thesis is found below. See infra Part IV.C, “The Contribution Thesis 





would be derivable in some way from the semantic content of the constitution.24  So far as I 
know, no actual proponent of originalism has endorsed this extreme position. 
The implausibility of the extreme version of the contribution thesis becomes apparent once it 
is juxtaposed with some familiar facts about the relationship of the constitutional text and the full 
set of constitutional rules.  One of these facts might be called the fact of constitutional 
vagueness: many provisions of the constitution are vague, including, for example, the first 
amendment freedom of speech, the phrases “executive power,” “legislative power,” and “judicial 
power,” and the “just compensation” provisions of the Fifth Amendment.  Give the fact of 
constitutional vagueness, the semantic content of the Constitution cannot fully determine the 
application of the Constitution to particular cases.  Another such fact is the existence of a system 
of precedent, which at the very least creates doctrinal rules that are binding on lower courts.  Let 
us call this the fact of constitutional stare decisis.  Much of the content of what is called 
“constitutional law” (e.g., the doctrine of prior restraint in first amendment law) consists of 
implementing doctrines that are not equivalent to the semantic content of the constitutional text.25 
 Because the extreme version of the contribution is inconsistent with the facts of constitutional 
vagueness and constitutional stare decisis, it is an unreasonable interpretation of the contribution 
thesis and the principle of charity in interpretation suggests that it should not be attributed to 
originalists without strong textual evidence that cannot be reconciled with a reasonable 
interpretation. 
If we set the extreme version aside, then it becomes apparent that there are several reasonable 
versions of the contribution thesis.  For ease of discussion, we can one family of views, moderate 
versions of the contribution thesis.  Moderate versions maintain that the semantic content of the 
constitution has the force of law, and is part of “the supreme Law of the land.”26  The 
Constitution itself says, 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. 
When the Supremacy Clause refers to “this Constitution,” what does it mean?  The basic 
intuition behind the moderate version of the contribution thesis is that it is the meaning (in the 
semantic sense) of the constitution and not its typographical or syntactic form that provides a 
substantial and constraining portion of its legal content.  The indexical article “this” in the phrase 
“this Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall 
be bound thereby” makes a contribution to the meaning of the clause.  The use of “this” in “this 
constitution” points to the semantic content of the document itself—that is to the linguistic 
meaning of the Constitution of 1789. 
                                                
24 The derivation might be deductive; that is the picture of “mechanical jurisprudence.”  But other methods of 
derivation would be compatible with the extreme version of the contribution thesis.  For example, if it were the case 
that Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium were sufficient to generate fully specified constitutional content (that 
is, content that resolves all questions of constitutional interpretation and construction), then the extreme version 
would be correct, even though reflective equilibrium is not deduction. 
25 See RICHARD H. FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (Harvard University Press 2001). 
26 U.S. Const., Art. VI, Cl. 2. 





There are a variety of reasons for affirming the moderate version of the contribution thesis.  
One reason might appeal to legal positivism: for example, it could be argued that something like 
the rule of recognition for the United States identifies the semantic content of the Constitution as 
having the force of law.  Another reason might appeal directly to legal practice in the United 
States, which both explicitly and implicitly assumes that it is the Constitution’s meaning that has 
the force of law.  Both strategies converge on what the common sense idea that the meaning of 
the Constitution contributes to the meaning of American law. 
The moderate version of the contribution thesis claims that the semantic content of 
constitutional provisions furnishes rules of constitutional law.  This leaves open a further 
question, whether officials (paradigmatically, the Supreme Court) have the power to adopt 
amending constructions—supplementary rules of constitutional law that are inconsistent with the 
semantic content.  The moderate version of the contribution thesis claims that if there is such a 
power, it is narrow and not wide: that is, the power to adopt supplementary rules of constitutional 
law that contradict the semantic content of the constitution is limited to exceptional cases of 
constitutional necessity.  In particular, the Supreme Court does not have a general power of 
constitutional revision. 
The moderate version of the contribution thesis is contestable.  There are constitutional 
theorists and legal philosophers who deny the claim that the semantic content of the Constitution 
has the direct force of law,27 and instead affirm that only contribution that the semantic content of 
legal texts can make is indirect.  Such views affirm what we can call the weak version of the 
contribution thesis.  Three such theories will be examined in greater depth below, but at this 
stage we can examine the argument that direct contributions to legal content can only be made by 
rules contained in judicial decisions.  The semantic content of the constitution could contribute 
indirectly to legal content, because judges might consider or use that content when they make the 
law by rendering their decisions. 
The contribution thesis is widely accepted.  Indeed, so far as I know, no constitutional theorist 
rejects it.  In this essay, however, I go beyond the interpretation thesis itself and rely on what I 
have called a moderate version.  Although moderate versions of the contribution thesis are 
contestable, they are both intuitive and widely held.  Making the full case for a particular 
moderate version of the contribution thesis would require an extended excursus into debates over 
the nature of law—an enterprise that is beyond the scope of this Article.  Moreover, most of the 
claims made in this essay can be reconciled or restated without serious loss of content in ways 
that are compatible with plausible versions of the weak version. 
Just to be sure that we have not lost sight of the forest for the trees, the point of this discussion 
is to provide an introductory set of warrants for the contribution thesis: the semantic content of 
the Constitution contributes to the content of American law. 
 
* * * 
 
The first three theses share an important characteristic: they all make factual claims that do 
not rely on moral premises.  The fixation thesis and the clause meaning thesis make claims about 
the semantic content of the Constitution: as a matter of fact, the meaning of a given 
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constitutional provision is fixed at the time of origin by its original public meaning.  The 
contribution thesis makes a claim about the legal significance of the constitutions semantic 
content: as a matter of fact, the semantic content makes some contribution to American law.  
These factual claims are not based on arguments of political morality.  The semantic content of 
the Constitution of 1789 was fixed at that time because of the way that communication through 
language works, and not because it is a good idea to interpret the Constitution that way.  By way 
of contrast, the fourth thesis is based on moral premises: it is a claim about political obligation 
and civic virtue. 
 
* * * 
4. The Fidelity Thesis: There Is a Defeasible Obligation of Fidelity to Law 
The fourth claim is that because the semantic content of the constitution is part of the supreme 
law of the land, we are obligated by it, unless there is an overriding reason of morality to the 
contrary.28  The warrants for the fourth claim need to include an account of fidelity to law.  There 
are two strategies for providing such warrants: one based on comprehensive moral and political 
theory and the other based on public reasons. 
The first strategy relies on comprehensive moral doctrines.  The deontological case argues 
that there is a defeasible moral obligation to obey the law.  The consequentialist case argues that 
both from the perspective of individual action and from the perspective of the ideal moral code, 
fidelity to law leads to better consequences than lawlessness, absent special circumstances or 
overriding reasons.  The aretaic case argues that the virtue of justice is best understood as a 
virtue of lawfulness which includes a stable disposition to act in accord with and on the basis of 
the constitution of a well-functioning political community so long as the constitution bears the 
right relationship to the deeply held and widely shared social norms of that community. 
While the first strategy relies on comprehensive moral doctrines, the second strategy relies on 
public reasons—and in particular on the public values of fidelity to law and the rule of law.  The 
second strategy relies on the claim that there is an overlapping consensus on these public values 
and that they are part of the public political culture.29  The content of that overlapping consensus 
                                                
28 For the full argument, see infra Part IV.D, “The Fidelity Thesis Revisited,” p. 152. The discussion in text 
elides a deep question—whether the Constitution of the United Sates is legitimate.  The position that I shall take 
throughout this article is that laws, including the Constitution, can provide reasons for action (which we might call 
obligations) even if they are not legitimate.  Consider, for example, the case of traffic laws with reasonably just 
content in a state with an illegitimate government (a unelected dictatorship resulting from a military coup).  The fact 
that the regime is illegitimate does not entail that citizens d not have good reasons to obey the traffic laws.  The case 
of an illegitimate constitution is more complex, but it is not difficult to see how an illegitimate constitution can 
create obligations (to respect rights, to recognize official acts, and so forth).  Of course, these obligations may be 
overridden in appropriate circumstances by reasons related to the illegitimacy of the constitution.  For example, 
there may be overriding reasons to replace the constitution by extralegal means, such as revolution.  In the case of 
the United States Constitution, illegitimacy is not hypothetical: at the very least, a strong case can be made the 
Constitution of 1789 was illegitimate because it permitted slavery.  On constitutional legitimacy, see Richard Fallon, 
Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2005); Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution, supra 
note 7. 
29 For elaboration of the ideas of public reason, overlapping consensus, and the public political culture, see JOHN 
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (New York: Columbia University Press, revised paperback edition 2005); see also 
Lawrence B. Solum, Public Legal Reason, 92 Virginia Law Review 1449 (2006); Pluralism and Public Legal 
Reason, 157 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 7 (2006); Pluralism and Public Legal Reason, 157 William & 





includes both general and special constitutional fidelity.  The obligation of general constitutional 
fidelity applies to all citizens.  The obligation of special constitutional fidelity applies only to 
officials.  The question whether the general and special obligations of constitutional fidelity have 
identical content is an important one, but both obligations create (at minimum) a defeasible 
obligation of fidelity to the semantic content of the Constitution. 
Stepping back, we should observe that the question whether fidelity to law in general and the 
constitution in particular is virtuous or obligatory is a deep one.  Even if public reason converges 
on such an obligation, it is possible that the public political culture of our society is simply 
wrong about this matter.  For this reason, some readers may either reject or bracket the fidelity 
thesis.  It is important to note, however, that rejection of the fourth thesis does not entail rejection 
of any of the others: that is, denial of the fidelity thesis is, prima facie, consistent with 
affirmation of the fixation thesis, the clause meaning thesis, and the contribution thesis.  
 
* * * 
 
The central claims of Semantic Originalism are straightforward, but they are easily 
misunderstood.  In the end, I hope to convince you that the case for Semantic Originalism rests 
on arguments that are valid and sound, and that the reasons you might have for seriously 
doubting these arguments are rooted in widely shared but clearly erroneous assumptions about 
what is at stake in debates about originalism.  But this is the beginning and not the end.  In the 
beginning, I fully expect that some readers will think that I am obviously wrong, that my claims 
are politically motivated, or that originalism was laid to rest decades ago.  We need to get these 
possible reactions on the table right away, because I am asking you to pay very close attention to 
the arguments that I shall make and to read them fairly, bracketing your instinctive reactions, 
your assumptions about the ideological implications of originalism, and your preconceptions of 
what the originalism debate is actually about. 
Many of the claims made by Semantic Originalism move outside the preconceptions of some 
readers because they derive conclusions about constitutional meaning from nonnormative 
premises—that is, on the basis of premises that are not ethic or moral in nature.  Most of the 
conclusions reached by Semantic Originalism are justified by premises about legal semantics 
and the nature of law.  To the extent that Semantic Originalism does make a normative (moral or 
ethical) claim, it is simply that we have a defeasible obligation to respect the original meaning of 
the constitution to the extent that it is law.  The normative parsimony of Semantic Originalism 
may strike some readers as odd or even incomprehensible.  The reasons for that parsimony will 
be explicated in depth.  My request is that you withhold judgment about my claim that Semantic 
Originalism rests primarily on nonnormative warrants until you have seen the full argument. 
 
* * * 
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B. What’s in a Name, Take One:  Is it  “Originalism”? 
One possible reaction to the argument of this Article might be called the strategy of 
“confession and avoidance.”  An opponent of originalism might confess—yes, the semantic 
content of the constitution is given by its original public meaning at the time of origin—but 
avoid—no, that theory is not originalism, it is actually “living constitutionalism” or 
“constitutional pluralism.”  A final answer to the strategy of confession and avoidance will be 
provided near the very end of this rather Article. 30  At this stage, however, a preliminary answer 
is warranted.  Semantic Originalism is the view that the semantic content (or “meaning” of the 
constitution) is the original public meaning of the constitutional text.  Even if we reserved the 
term “originalism” as the name for some other view—perhaps the normative theory that the 
original public meaning of the constitutional text should be exclusive guide to constitutional 
interpretation and construction—that would be no objection to using the term “originalism” in 
the phrase “Semantic Originalism” as the name of the view that is defended here.  The phrase, 
“Semantic Originalism,” is neither misleading nor obfuscatory when used in this way.  The term 
“originalism” contributes to the meaning of the phrase by pointing to the role that “original 
public meaning” plays in “Semantic Originalism.”  Moreover, the use of the term “originalism” 
as the name of the view that “original public meaning” is “the meaning of the United States 
Constitution” is now standard.  It is the view associated with debates over “the New 
Originalism” and “original meaning originalism.”  Given these facts, no serious objection to the 
use of the phrase “Semantic Originalism” as the name of the theory advanced in this Article can 
be sustained. 
The use of the term “originalism” in the name of the theory “Semantic Originalism” is 
warranted by a second and more powerful argument to which we have already alluded.  
Originalism is best conceived as a family of theories.  Members of the family may differ on the 
question as to how the “origins” (the framing and/or ratification) fix meaning, but they agree on 
when it was fixed (the period of “origination”).  Originalists may disagree about why the original 
meaning is normatively significant and they may also differ on whether original meaning always 
trumps other considerations (such as historical practice or precedent), but they agree that the 
original meaning does and should have substantial normative and legal force.  Because the 
fixation thesis, expresses the core content that is shared by almost all of the members of the 
family of originalist theories, it plays a focal role in debates about originalism.  If the claim that 
the semantic content of the provisions of the Constitution were fixed at their times of origin were 
false, then the foundations of originalism would be shaken and all or almost all the members of 
the family of originalist theories would no longer be viable.  As Antonin Scalia put it, “the Great 
Divide with regard to constitutional interpretation is not that between Framers’ intent and 
objective meaning, but rather that between original meaning (whether derived from Framers’ 
intent or not) and current meaning.”31  Scalia’s great divide corresponds to the divide between 
those who affirm and those who deny the fixation thesis.32 
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Semantic Originalism affirms the fixation thesis.  The fixation thesis provides the unifying 
content of the family of originalist constitutional theories.  Therefore, use of the term 
“originalism” as part of the name of “Semantic Originalism” is warranted.  In the end, of course, 
the substance of the debate counts for more than the labels.  But labels can be important for 
reasons of rhetorical effectiveness, persuasive force, and affective resonance.  As a consequence, 
opponents of originalism may be tempted to argue that the label “originalism” should be reserved 
for views that are obviously false, that require massive disruptions in constitutional practice or 
even that are incoherent or internally inconsistent.  It seems obvious that the temptation to make 
such moves should be resisted, both on grounds of the principle of charity in interpretation and 
civility among scholars.  At the very least, attempts to deploy a stipulated definition of 
originalism that is contrary to usage of scholars who self-identify as originalists should be clearly 
articulated and identified.  Beyond this minimum, if a case can be made for the fixation thesis as 
the core content shared by almost all originalist theories, then this case should be acknowledged 
or refuted when the term “originalist” is used in a nonstandard way. 
C. Roadmaps 
“Semantic Originalism” has a tripartite structure that can be previewed by providing two 
roadmaps and an explanation.  The superstructure of “Semantic Originalism” has five parts, 
starting with Part I, this introduction.  Part II is entitled “An Opinionated History of 
Constitutional Originalism,” and it provides the context for all that follows. Part III is entitled 
“Semantic Originalism: A Theory of Constitutional Meaning,” and it lays out the case for 
original public meaning as the best nonnormative theory of constitutional content.  Part IV is 
entitled “The Normative Implications of Semantic Originalism,” and it articulates a variety of 
normative arguments for originalism.  Part V is entitled “Conclusion: Semantic Originalism and 
Living Constitutionalism,” and it explores the broad implications of Semantic Originalism for 
living constitutionalism and the future of constitutional theory. 
The superstructure of “Semantic Originalism” is complimented by an infrastructure—a 
complimentary outline of multipart arguments that unfold in stages.  The first of these arguments 
is identified by subsections entitled, “What’s in a Name?”:  this part of the infrastructure unfolds 
in five parts, building the cumulative case for careful use of the words “originalism” and 
“originalist.”33  The second element of the infrastructure is identified by a series of subsections 
                                                                                                                                                       
to specify the attitudes that theorists or interpreters on either side of the Great Divide take toward original 
meaning and current meaning, respectively, Scalia does not identify just where that divide is located. Does it lie 
between those who care only about original meaning and those who care only about current meaning (in which 
case, everybody who cares about both resides precariously on the divide itself)? Or between those who privilege 
original meaning as the default and those who privilege current meaning? Or between those who attend 
exclusively to original meaning and those who attend to current meaning too? Or between those who attend at 
least partially to original meaning and those who attend exclusively to current meaning? Or someplace else 
entirely? Scalia’s highlighting of the distinction “between original meaning . . . and current meaning” is too 
elliptical to supply the definition we seek. 
Berman, supra note 22, at 15.  In this passage, Berman displays a deep misunderstanding of Scalia’s articulation of 
the line between originalism and nonoriginalism: the divide is about meaning in the semantic sense, and given the 
context, that is the most natural interpretation of Scalia’s remark.  The ambiguities that Berman identifies go to the 
normative force of that meaning—a topic about which originalists disagree.  See also infra Part III.I, What’s in a 
Name, Take Three: Strong Originalism,” p. 122. 
33 See supra Part I.B, What’s in a Name, Take One:  Is it  “Originalism”?,” p. 12; infra Part V.B, What’s in a 





called “Triviality,” providing three related discussions that establish that Semantic Originalism 
has bite and significance.34  The third element is identified by the label “Monsters and 
Apparitions,” and these sections discuss the parades of horribles that can be conjured as 
objections to Semantic Originalism.35  The fourth element consists of two “Restatements of 
Semantic Originalism”—the restatements rigorously summarize the theory for ease of 
reference.36 
The superstructure and infrastructure are supplemented by a series of external remarks that are 
identified in two ways.  Each of these remarks is set off from the rest of the text by three 
asterisks and the use of Roman Italic as a typeface.  In the external remarks, I speak in my own 
voice and comment on the argument of “Semantic Originalism” and the way it is situated in the 
discourse of contemporary constitutional theory.  These external remarks are intended to 
illuminate and contextualize the more formal presentation from which they are distinguished.  A 
different kind of context is provided in the next Part, which situates “Semantic Originalism” in 
the long and strange history of originalist thought in and out of the legal academy. 
II. AN OPINIONATED HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM 
How does Semantic Originalism fit in the history of the contemporary theoretical debates 
about originalism?  A full telling of the tale would be the subject of a longish monograph, so the 
story that I tell here is, of necessity, partial and selective.37  Moreover, this history is limited to 
recent theoretical discourse; it ignores the pre-history of what we might call the “contemporary 
originalism debates,” debates over original meaning amongst judges, politicians, and scholars 
that pre-date the 1970s.38  This is an opinionated history of constitutional originalism: its purpose 
is to provide context that illuminates Semantic Originalism. 
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What’s in a Name, Take Five: The Topography of Constitutional Theory,” p. 170. 
34 See infra Part III.J, “Triviality, Take One: The Hard Wired Constitution,” p. 127; Part IV.E, “Triviality, Take 
Two: Normative Argument and Constitutional Practice,” p. 163, Part V.C, “Triviality Take Three, Truth as the Telos 
of Legal Scholarship,” p. 171. 
35 See infra Part III.K, “Monsters and Apparitions, Take One: Herein of Ink Blots,” p. 128; Part IV.G, “Monsters 
and Apparitions, Take Two: The Constitutional Big Bang,” p. 165; Part V.D, “Monsters and Apparitions, Take 
Three: The Colonization of Law by Philosophy, p. 172. 
36 See infra Part III.C.2.d), “The First Restatement of Semantic Originalism: Clause Meaning is the Original 
Semantic Meaning of the Constitution to the Relevant Audience in Context, Plus Any Implications or Stipulated 
Meanings,” p. 60; infra Part V.G, “The Second Restatement of Semantic Originalism,” p. 175.. 
37 For a different view from an earlier time, see Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the 
Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989); Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. 
Penn. L. Rev. 1, 11-33 (1999). 
38 Although the first appearance of the term “originalism” in the Westlaw JLR database is in Paul Brest, The 
Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 Yale 
L. J. 1063 (1981), scholarly usage of related phrases extends at least as far back as the 1930s. The phrase “original 
meaning” was used in the constitutional context in Edwin Borchard, The Supreme Court and Private Rights, 348. 47 
Yale L. J. 1051, 1063 (1938) (“There would be far greater advantage in restoring the original meaning of the 
“privileges and immunities” clause and by the process of inclusion and exclusion letting the country know what are 
now federal privileges, than in forcing the court to draw upon the fathomless depths of the “due process” clause to 
give effect to their personal convictions of economic and social propriety.”).  The phrase “original intentions” 
appears in Howard Jay Graham, The “Conspiracy Theory” of the Fourteenth Amendment: 2, 48 Yale L. J. 171, 189-
90 (1938) (“Wholly apart from Bingham's personal understanding of his phraseology, his original intentions in 
drafting it, or the relations existing between the Cleveland and Mahoning Railroad and other members of the Joint 





A. Original Intentions of the Framers 
One way to start our story is with Robert Bork, William Rehnquist, Raoul Berger and Edwin 
Meese.  In 1971, Robert Bork wrote Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,39 
the article that might be considered the opening move in the development or contemporary 
originalist theory.  In 1976, then Associate Justice William Rehnquist wrote The Notion of a 
Living Constitution, which explicitly criticized living constitutionalism and implicitly endorsed 
originalism based on the writings of the framers.40  In 1977, Raoul Berger wrote Government by 
Judiciary,41 which argued that the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution were contrary to the original intentions of its framers.  In 1985, 
then Attorney General Edwin Meese put originalism on the political agenda in a well-publicized 
speech before the American Bar Association.42  Meese’s speech included the following passage: 
In reviewing a term of the Court, it is important to take a moment and reflect upon the 
proper role of the Supreme Court in our constitutional system. The intended role of the 
judiciary generally and the Supreme Court in particular was to serve as the "bulwarks of a 
limited constitution." The judges, the Founders believed, would not fail to regard the 
Constitution as "fundamental law" and would "regulate their decisions" by it. As the 
"faithful guardians of the Constitution," the judges were expected to resist any political 
effort to depart from the literal provisions of the Constitution. The text of the document 
and the original intention of those who framed it would be the judicial standard in giving 
effect to the Constitution.43 
Bork, Rehnquist, Berger, and Meese implicitly endorsed what we now call “original 
intentions originalism,” the view that constitutional interpretation should be guided by the 
original intentions of the framers.  Neither Meese nor Berger explicitly considered the distinction 
between normative and semantic versions of originalism, and none of them seems to have been 
aware of the possible divergence between original intentions and original public meaning.  
Perhaps they assumed that it was obviously true that the semantic content of the constitution was 
given by the intentions of the framers.  Alternatively, they might have viewed originalism as 
primarily a normative theory.  It may be that the best explanation is that they did not grasp the 
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distinction, and hence that their claims are ambiguous, sliding between the normative and the 
semantic, intentionalism and textualism. 
B. The Misconceived Quest & the Original Understanding of Original Intentions 
Following Berger’s book, but five years before Meese’s speech, Paul Brest wrote The 
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding44 (one of the most cited articles on 
constitutional theory45).   Brest’s article advanced a variety of criticisms of original intentions 
originalism, including: (1) the difficulty of ascertaining the institutional intention of a multi-
member body in general46 and the particular problems associated with identifying the intention of 
the members of Philadelphia Convention and the various state ratifying conventions in the case 
of the original constitution and of Congress and the various state legislatures in the case of 
amendments,47 (2) the problem of determining the level of generality or specificity of the 
framers’ and ratifiers’ intentions,48 (3) the problem of inferring intentions from constitutional 
structure,49 (4) the difficulty of translating the framers’ and ratifiers’ beliefs and values given 
changes in circumstances over time,50 (5) the problem of the democratic legitimacy, i.e., that the 
Constitution of 1789 was drafted and ratified without the participation of women and slaves,51 (6) 
the problem of instability, that an inflexible constitutional order cannot adapt to changing 
circumstances.52  Brest had much more to say, and there were many other critics of originalism, 
but this list is sufficient to illustrate the reception that originalism received from constitutional 
theorists in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Brest also raised the problem of the framers’ and ratifiers’ interpretive intentions,53 and his 
remarks anticipated Jefferson Powell’s 1985 article, The Original Understanding of Original 
Intent.54  The premise for Powell’s article was the assumption that that original-intentions 
originalists believed that the framer’s themselves expected that the constitution would be 
interpreted to conform to their intentions.  Although Powell conceded that there were references 
to “original intention” and “intent of the framers” in the constitutional discourse of the founding 
era, those phrases did not represent an early version of original-intentions originalism.  Instead, 
“The Philadelphia framers’ primary expectation regarding constitutional interpretation was that 
the Constitution, like any other legal document, would be interpreted in accord with its express 
language.”55  Both the evidence for Powell’s thesis and its implications are controversial, but its 
effect on scholarly opinion was profound.  The strongest implication would be that original-
intentions originalism is a self-effacing theory: the theory requires that the framers’ intentions 
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regarding interpretation be respected, but those intentions require that the framers’ intentions be 
disregarded. 
Brest and Powell were hardly the only critics of original-intentions originalism, but their 
arguments, combined with others, helped form the scholarly consensus of the era.56  That 
consensus could be summarized as the claim that the original-intentions of the framers could not 
serve as the basis for a viable theory of constitutional interpretation and construction. 
C. Original Understanding of the Ratifiers 
During this period, the originalism debate took a brief detour into a variant of original-
intentions originalism—one that emphasized the understandings57 or intentions of the ratifiers 
(either the state ratifying conventions understood as corporate bodies or of the individuals who 
attended the ratifying conventions and voted in favor of ratification).58  As Charles Lofgren 
wrote, 
As a modern student of Madison asks, ‘Why should we assume that those who merely 
ratified the Constitution grasped its meaning better than those who wrote it-or those who 
have since seen how it works in practice?’ The answer from an ‘intentionalist’ perspective 
is that whether the ratifiers better grasped the instrument's meaning is beside the point; 
rather, how the ratifiers understood the Constitution, and what they expected from it, 
defines its meaning. The act of ratifying cannot be dismissed with the adverb ‘merely.’59 
We need not tarry long over this twist in the debate.  The move to ratifiers understanding or 
intent is best understood in conjunction with popular sovereignty as a justification for 
originalism.  The ratifiers (rather than the framers) could plausibly be viewed expressing the 
political will of “We the People.”  But all of the problems that attended the equation of 
constitutional meaning with framers’ intent seem to attach to ratifiers’ intent, but with respect to 
the latter type of intent, evidence may be even more difficult to obtain60 and the problems of 
group intention (of multiple conventions with multiple members) even more confounding.  To 
the extent that the ratifiers’ understanding is rooted in the public meaning, the emphasis on 
ratifiers is merely a way station on the journey from original intentions to original public 
meaning. 61 
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D. We the People 
The year before Meese gave his speech to the American Bar Association and Jefferson Powell 
wrote about the original understanding of original intent, Bruce Ackerman delivered his Storrs 
Lectures, entitled Discovering the Constitution, at Yale Law School.62  It was in these lectures 
that Ackerman’s theory of constitutional politics made its first wide impression on the 
community of constitutional scholars.  Recall that Ackerman’s theory distinguishes ordinary 
politics (what happens when state legislatures and Congress enact statutes, for example) from 
constitutional politics.  Here is the very first statement of Ackerman’s view, dualism, in the 
second lecture: 
The Federalist elaborates a dualistic conception of political life. One form of political 
action-I shall call it constitutional politics-is characterized by Publian appeals to the 
common good, ratified by a mobilized mass of American citizens expressing their assent 
through extraordinary institutional forms.  Although constitutional politics is the highest 
kind of politics, it should be permitted to dominate the nation's life only during rare periods 
of heightened political consciousness. During the long periods between these constitutional 
moments, a second form of activity-I shall call it normal politics-prevails. Here, factions 
try to manipulate the constitutional forms of political life to pursue their own narrow 
interests. Normal politics must be tolerated in the name of individual liberty; it is, however, 
democratically inferior to the intermittent and irregular politics of public virtue associated 
with moments of constitutional creation.63 
Ackerman’s theory was intended to answer the Bickel’s countermajoritarian difficulty.  
Judges as faithful agents of the “We the People,” who legislate in rare constitutional moments (or 
later “periods”) act more democratically than do legislators, who serve special interests and 
escape the people’s attention during the extended periods of ordinary politics. 
As told in the Storrs Lectures, Ackerman’s theory focused on three constitutional moments, 
the Founding (the Constitution of 1789), Reconstruction (the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments), 
and the New Deal (institutionalized in what I shall call the “reforming constructions” (we might 
use “amending interpretations”) of the Supreme Court).  Here is the initial appearance of that 
idea in the lectures: 
Speaking schematically, this historical story is dominated by three peaks of high 
importance that tower over valleys full of more particular meanings. The first peak, of 
course, is the Founding itself: the framing of the original Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights, Marbury v. Madison and McCulloch v. Maryland. The second peak is constituted 
by the legal events surrounding the Civil War: the judicial failure in Dred Scott and the 
constitutional affirmations of the Civil War Amendments. The third peak centers around 
the legitimation of the activist welfare state: the long Progressive struggle against judicial 
resistance and the dramatic capitulation by the Old Court before the New Deal in 1937. 
                                                                                                                                                       
(Oxford University Press, 2004); see also Larry Alexander & Lawrence Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 1459 (2005). 
62 Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984). 
63 See id. at 1022-23. 





Time and again, we return to these moments; the lessons we learn from them control the 
meanings we give to our present constitutional predicaments.64 
Because Ackerman’s theory purported to legitimize progressive New Deal constitutionalism, 
his view might have been construed as the polar opposite of originalism, but at a deep level, 
Ackerman’s theory seemed to require an account of original meaning—without that judicial 
enforcement of the Constitution could not be legitimized by democratic constitutional politics.  
Or to put it differently, a theory of original meaning is required for constitutional content to be 
determined by “We the People.” 
Although Ackerman’s development of popular sovereignty theory has been extraordinarily 
influential, important work in this vein has been done by many others,65 prominently including 
Akhil Amar,66 Ackerman’s colleague at Yale Law School.  Amar’s position was described by 
Cass Sunstein in the following terms: 
[I]n the law schools the most influential originalist may be Akhil Reed Amar, an 
ingenious and prolific scholar at Yale Law School. Describing himself as a "textualist" 
who is interested in history, Amar is methodologically quite close to Scalia. He is intensely 
interested in the text and in the historical record, and he is generally searching for the 
original meaning of contested terms. Amar wishes to know what the Constitution "really 
means," and he puts that question as if it were largely or entirely a matter of excavation.67 
Although Sunstein’s interpretation of Amar is surely plausible, characterizing Ackerman and 
Amar’s theoretical position in originalist terms is problematic, in no small part because they both 
eschew explicit theorizing about constitutional interpretation.  In both cases, we might say that 
they “practice, but do not preach.”  Or to be more precise, they do not preach either semantic or 
normative originalism.  But even if Ackerman and Amar do not describe their views as 
originalist, it is clear that their approaches to the constitution, which emphasize popular 
sovereignty and the constitutional text, have had both direct and indirect influences over 
contemporary theoretical debates that are explicitly concerned with originalism.68 
E. Original Public Meaning and the New Originalism 
This sets the stage for what is sometimes called “the New Originalism”69 and is also labeled 
“Original Public Meaning Originalism.”70  Whatever the actual origins of this theory, the 
conventional story identifies Antonin Scalia as having a key role.  As early as 1986, Scalia gave 
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66 See Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights; Akhil Amar, Biography of the Constitution. 
67 See Cass Sunstein, Originalism for Liberals, New Republic, September 28, 1998, at 31, available at 
http://home.uchicago.edu/~csunstei/originalism.html. 
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a speech exhorting originalists to “change the label from the Doctrine of Original Intent to the 
Doctrine of Original Meaning.”71  The phrase “original public meaning” seems to have entered 
into the contemporary theoretical debates in the work of Gary Lawson72 with Steven Calabresi as 
another “early adopter.”73  The core idea of the revised theory is that the original meaning of the 
constitution is the original public meaning of the constitutional text. 
Randy Barnett74 and Keith Whittington75 have played prominent roles in the development of 
the “New Originalism.”  Both Barnett and Whittington build their theories on a foundation of 
“original public meaning,” but they extend the moves made by Scalia and Lawson in a variety of 
interesting ways.  For the purposes of this very brief survey, perhaps their most important move 
is to embrace the distinction between “constitutional interpretation” understood as the enterprise 
of discerning the semantic content of the constitution and “constitutional construction,” which 
we might tentatively define as the activity of further specifying constitutional rules when the 
original public meaning of the text is vague (or underdeterminate for some other reason).76  This 
distinction explicitly acknowledges what we might call the fact of constitutional 
underdeterminacy.77  With this turn, original-meaning originalist explicitly embrace the idea that 
the original public meaning of the text “runs out” and hence that constitutional interpretation 
must be supplemented by constitutional construction, the results of which must be guided by 
something other than the semantic content of the constitutional text. 
Once originalists had acknowledged that vague constitutional provisions required 
construction, the door was opened for a reconciliation between originalism and living 
constitutionalism.  The key figure in that reconciliation has been Jack Balkin, whose influential 
2006 and 2007 essays Abortion and Original Meaning78 and Original Meaning and 
Constitutional Redemption79 have argued for a reconciliation of original meaning originalism 
with living constitutionalism in the form of a theory that might be called “the method of text and 
principle.” 
Predating much of the American work on the New Originalism was Jeffrey Goldsworthy’s 
work, addressed to the Australian Constitution, but developed with an explicit awareness of the 
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theoretical debates swirling around American constitutionalism.  Goldsworthy’s first major 
statement, Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation,80  was published in an Australian law 
review in 1997. 
F. Original Applications and Original Methods 
Two very recent ideas deserve particular mention: “original applications” and “original 
methods.”  The phrase “original applications” or “original expected applications” seems to 
originate with Jack Balkin,81 but the role of expectations in original-intentions originalism was 
discussed by Ronald Dworkin, among others.  Mark Greenberg and Harry Litman articulated a 
similar distinction between “original meaning” and “original practices” in their important 1998 
article, The Meaning of Original Meaning.82  Although Greenberg and Litman deserve the credit 
for the deepest and most thorough discussion of the issues, my account will focus on Balkin’s 
formulation, which brings the idea of original expected applications into the New Originalism—
not as a component but rather by way of exclusion. 
The distinction is a simple one.  The meaning of a text is one thing; expectations about the 
application of that meaning to future cases are a different thing.  Balkin makes use of the 
distinction to argue that some “originalists” have conflated meaning with expected applications: 
Originalists generally assume that if we do not apply the constitutional text in the way it 
was originally understood at the time of its adoption we are not following what the words 
mean and so will not be faithful to the Constitution as law. But in focusing on the original 
understanding, they have tended to conflate two different ideas– the expected application 
of constitutional texts, which is not binding law, and the original meaning, which is. 
Indeed, man originalists who claim to be interested only in original meaning, like Justice 
Antonin Scalia, have encouraged this conflation of original meaning and original expected 
application.83 
That original expected applications are distinct from original meanings does not entail that 
there is no relationship between the two.  Expected applications may be evidence about 
meanings, even if they are not decisive evidence. 
Of course, some originalists may contest Balkin’s move and argue that original expectations 
originalism is viable.  It might even be argued that reliance on original expectations is the 
distinctive characteristic that marks originalist theories as originalist.84  But this view is incorrect 
as a matter of the history of originalist thought, and it is certainly not true of the New Originalists 
like Balkin, Barnett, and Whittington; as will become apparent, direct reliance on original 
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expected applications as the criterion for constitutional meaning is completely inconsistent with 
Semantic Originalism. 
Another very recent development is the emergence of what might be called “original-methods 
originalism,” the view that the original meaning of the constitution includes the methods of 
interpretation and construction that the framers, ratifiers, and/or public of the founding era could, 
would, or should have expected to guide constitutional practice.  This view is strongly associated 
with Michael Rappaport and John McGinnis.85  They write: 
[T]he focus of originalism should be on how a reasonable person at the time of the 
Constitution’s adoption would have understand its words and thought they should be 
interpreted. The Constitution’s provisions were based on commonly accepted meanings 
and the interpretative rules of the time. Some of the provisions had clear meanings. Others 
may have seemed ambiguous, but the enactors would have believed that their future 
application would be based the interpretive rules accepted at the time. Thus, their 
assessment of the meaning and the desirability of the Constitution would depend on the 
interpretive rules that they thought would apply.86 
We can call this approach “original methods originalism,” reflecting its commitment to the 
methods of interpretation and construction that characterized the founding era.  Notice that 
McGinnis and Rappaport’s formulation of their idea does not observe the distinction between 
interpretation and construction (in the Whittington/Barnett sense).  That is, they do not make it 
clear whether they would use original methods to justify a departure from original public 
meaning (if the methods led to that result) or if they would confine original methods to 
construction (that is, to cases in which the original public meaning was vague, ambiguous, 
gappy, or contradictory). 
In a different vein, an important contribution to understanding of the implications of the New 
Originalism appeared in an important 2006 article by Richard Fallon, Judicially Manageable 
Standards and Constitutional Meaning.  Fallon does not embrace originalism, but he identified 
the key distinction between the meaning of the constitution (its semantic content) and 
implementing rules of constitutional law (legal content): 
Despite large apparent differences between originalism and nonoriginalist theories, 
originalist and nonoriginalist judges converge in their decisions surprisingly often.  Given 
the strident debates among constitutional theorists, one well might wonder how so much 
agreement could eventuate. The reason, I would suggest, is that what we call constitutional 
theories or theories of constitutional interpretation are often theories about constitutional 
meaning that implicitly accept the permissibility of a disparity between constitutional 
meaning and implementing doctrine. If constitutional theories fix the meaning of the 
Constitution, but stipulate that implementing doctrines sometimes permissibly diverge 
from it, then such theories are less complete and thus less practically significant than their 
proponents suggest.87 
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Fallon’s distinction between the semantic content of the Constitution and the legal content of 
constitutional law put the question of contribution on the table: how does the semantic content 
contribute to legal content? 
 
 
* * * 
 
Many participants in academic debates about originalism assume that the fundamental 
questions must be normative—in the sense of normative includes ethical questions and issues of 
political morality.  The roots of that assumption are buried deep but some excavation provides 
useful context for understanding the role of Semantic Originalism in contemporary theoretical 
debates.  Post-realist academic writing about constitutional theory did not occur in a vacuum.  
The realist critique of legal formalism left its mark on every serious intellectual movement in the 
legal academy and had a shaping influence on the legal process school.  Explicitly or implicitly, 
most theorizing about law in the American legal academy during the last half-century has 
assumed what might be called the instrumentalist thesis: more or less, the view that the deep 
answers to legal questions must be justified by arguments of policy or principle.  The 
instrumentalist thesis had a special salience for liberal constitutional theory which took as its 
Herculean task the construction of a normative foundation for the jurisprudence of the Warren 
Court—paradigmatically the decisions in Brown v. Board of Education and Griswold v. 
Connecticut.  Because liberal constitutionalist theorists also took it as a given that Lochner v. 
New York, in particular, and substantive due process, in general, could not be justified on 
formalist grounds, academic defenders of the Warren Court legacy believed that its normative 
foundations would have to come from outside the law.  What was sometimes called “big think 
constitutional theory” fished in the deep waters of moral, political, and social philosophy: the 
“one that got away” was the theory that would reconcile approval for Griswold (and later Roe 
v. Wade) with opprobrium for Lochner while simultaneously endorsing the thesis that the 
counter-majoritarian difficulty was a real problem for the institution of judicial review.  The 
assumption that theories of constitutional meaning were normative “all the way down” began to 
look like a truism. 
In this context, early originalists looked hopelessly naïve.  They seemed to be saying, “The 
meaning of the constitution just is the original meaning, and, therefore, we should follow the 
original meaning, because it is the law.”  The natural reactions of big think liberal 
constitutionalism were “there isn’t even an argument there,” or “that’s question begging” or 
“you need a normative theory to justify adopting your account of constitutional interpretation.”  
As the academic defenders of originalism became “more sophisticated” they took up the 
challenge, and did, in fact, produce big normative theories—“popular sovereignty,” 
“constitutional legitimacy,” “consequentialist supermajoritarianism.”  That is, they began to 
fight the anti-originalists on living constitutionalism’s home turf, whose metes and bounds are 
marked by the instrumentalist thesis and the countermajoritarian difficulty. 
Ironically, the naïve originalists were close to a theoretically powerful and normatively 
defensible position.  The core of originalism is based on common sense about the meaning of the 
constitutional text and the nature of law.  Once the claims of originalism are pruned of 
ideological excess and theoretical confusion, the common sense appeal of originalism is difficult 
to resist.  Anti-originalists needed fancy theories to defend the counterintuitive positions to which 





There is nothing fancy or counterintuitive in the core commitments of Semantic Originalism.  At 
bottom, Semantic Originalism simply explains how three intuitive ideas (the fixation thesis, the 
clause-meaning thesis, and the contribution thesis) are grounded in both common sense and 
widely accepted theoretical views about meaning and the nature of law. One more idea (the 
fidelity thesis) finds support in an intuitive and widely shared principle of political morality.88 
 
* * * 
G. New Critics of the New Originalism 
And this brings us almost up to the minute—that is, up to the summer of 2008, the period 
during which this essay continues to be drafted and revised.  The seventh and final (so far) 
chapter in the story of the constitutional originalism is the emergence of new critics of the new 
originalism.  This part of the story is being played out as this essay is being written, but a variety 
of new criticism has begun to emerge. 
The first of the new critics is Stephen Griffin, the author of Rebooting Originalism,89 a 
powerful critique of the new originalism.  Griffin’s critique has thoroughly absorbed the 
theoretical significance of the shift from “original intentions” to “original public meaning,” but it 
is not clear that he fully appreciates the importance of Whittington/Barnett distinction between 
construction and interpretation.90  Although Griffin has a variety of important and well-argued 
criticisms of the new originalists, for present purposes two features of his article are especially 
important.  First, Griffin’s core argument against the new originalism is normative; he argues 
that consistent and exclusive use of originalist methodology would represent a major change in 
interpretive practice and therefore that originalists must offer a normative justification for their 
theory.91  Second, Griffin’s critique does not consider the possibility that original-meaning 
originalism might include a semantic thesis—a nonnormative claim about the meaning of the 
constitution.92  Similar observations can be made about Trevor Morrison’s review of Barnett’s 
book,93 Restoring the Lost Constitution.   Morrison clearly understands the distinction between 
“original public meaning” and “original intentions,” but his review (which is focused on other 
aspects of Barnett’s book) does not even consider the possibility that originalist theory has a 
semantic component. 
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A second new critic is Mitch Berman whose critique of originalism is tendentiously titled, 
“Originalism is Bunk.” 94  Berman’s essay is deep and rich, raising some old objections to 
originalism, providing new foundations for others, and developing new positions.  One of the 
crucial moves in his piece is his argument that the term “originalism” should be reserved for the 
strong claim the original meaning, whatever that might be, should trump other considerations in 
constitutional practice.  His summarizes this claim as follows: 
[O]n one dimension of potential variability - the dimension of strength - originalists are 
mostly united: They believe that those who should follow some aspect of a provision's 
original character must give that original aspect priority over all other considerations. That 
is, when the original meaning (or intent, etc.) is satisfactorily discernible, the interpreter 
must follow it. This is the thesis that self-professed originalists maintain and that their 
critics (the non-originalists) deny. 95 
Berman’s identification of “Originalism” with what he calls “strong originalism” is surely 
mistaken.  So far as I can discern, originalists do agree on the fixation thesis—that the semantic 
content of a constitutional provision is fixed at the time of framing and ratification, but one thing 
on which they explicitly disagree is whether and under what circumstances original meaning 
trumps precedent, the long-settled practices of the political branches, and other nonoriginalist 
considerations.  For example, in 2006, the New Originalist theorist, Randy Barnett, wrote 
Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of Faint Hearted Originalism,96 which explicitly disagrees with 
Justice Antonin Scalia on the question of force, contending that Scalia allows departure from 
original meaning on the basis of three factors: (1) precedent, (2) justiciability, and (3) settled 
historical practice.  In addition to Scalia, originalists of various stripes have taken the position 
that original meaning can be trumped by precedent for a variety of reasons and subject to a 
variety of constraints as evidenced by the work by Kurt Lash, Lee Strang, and myself cited in the 
accompanying footnote.97  A full statement of the reasons for rejecting Berman’s claim that 
“Originalism” must give original meaning “priority over all other considerations” are provided 
below.98 
Finally, Thomas Colby and Peter Smith have developed a very different line of criticism in 
Originalism’s Living Constitutionalism.  Colby and Smith claim to “demonstrat[e] that, despite 
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the suggestion of originalist rhetoric, originalism is . . . a disparate collection of distinct 
constitutional theories that share little more than a misleading reliance on a common label.”99 
Although the New Critics of the New Originalism advance a variety of arguments, they share 
a common characteristic; their criticisms premised on the notion that the debates about the New 
Originalism are fundamentally normative (ethical or moral) and not semantic (linguistic or 
meaning-focused).  That is, the focus of the New Criticism is on normative originalism—the 
thesis that the original meaning of the constitution should be given substantial normative force in 
constitutional practice. 
One last point about recent debates about originalism.  Lurking in the background of recent 
discussions is the impact of Bush v. Gore on constitutional theory.  Although the indeterminacy 
thesis—that judicial decisions are unconstrained by legal rules—might have been rejected by a 
consensus of legal scholars in the 1980s, Bush v. Gore was read by many to suggest that the 
Supreme Court is unconstrained by law or high principle.100 
H. District of Columbia v. Heller 
Supreme Court decisions that squarely address the fundamental issues of constitutional theory 
are rare, but District of Columbia v. Heller101 is such a decision.  Heller held that a District of 
Columbia ordinance that prohibited the possession of handguns violated the Second 
Amendment’s “right to keep and bear arms”.102  Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court begins 
with a general statement of interpretive methodology: 
The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.” In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that “[t]he Constitution 
was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal 
and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.” United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 
716, 731, 51 S.Ct. 220, 75 L.Ed. 640 (1931); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 188, 
6 L.Ed. 23 (1824). Normal meaning may of course include an idiomatic meaning, but it 
excludes secret or technical meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens 
in the founding generation.103 
The implications of the majority’s conclusion that the Second Amendment protects an 
individual right to possess and carry weapons were disputed by dissents from Justice Stevens and 
Justice Breyer; in particular, Justice Stevens offered a lengthy dissent that focused in part on the 
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101 District of Columbia v. Heller, ___  S.Ct.___, 2008 WL 2520816 (June 26, 2008) (citations omitted). 
102 U.S. Const. amend. 2. 
103 Heller, ___ S.Ct. at ___. 





purposes that animated the Second Amendment and raised a number of arguments relevant to the 
original intentions of the framers.104 
The Opinion of the Court in Heller covers a good deal of territory, much of it contested by the 
dissents, but, for the purpose of this brief survey of the contemporary development of originalist 
theory, the important feature of Heller is methodological.  The court examined each of the 
operative words and phrases in the Second Amendment, examining the semantic content of “the 
people,” “keep,” “bear,” “arms,” and then concluding, “Putting all of these textual elements 
together, we find that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of 
confrontation.”105  In examining each of the operative words and phrases, the court examined 
evidence of usage from the period the Second Amendment was proposed and ratified.  For 
example: 
• “Before addressing the verbs “keep” and “bear,” we interpret their object: “Arms.” 
The 18th-century meaning is no different from the meaning today.  The 1773 edition 
of Samuel Johnson's dictionary defined “arms” as “weapons of offence, or armour of 
defence.” 1 Dictionary of the English Language 107 (4th ed.) (hereinafter Johnson). 
Timothy Cunningham's important 1771 legal dictionary defined “arms” as “any thing 
that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or 
strike another.” 1 A New and Complete Law Dictionary (1771); see also N. Webster, 
American Dictionary of the English Language (1828) (reprinted 1989) (hereinafter 
Webster) (similar).”106 
• “The phrase “keep arms” was not prevalent in the written documents of the founding 
period that we have found, but there are a few examples, all of which favor viewing 
the right to “keep Arms” as an individual right unconnected with militia service. 
William Blackstone, for example, wrote that Catholics convicted of not attending 
service in the Church of England suffered certain penalties, one of which was that they 
were not permitted to “keep arms in their houses.” 4 Commentaries on the Laws of 
England 55 (1769) (hereinafter Blackstone); see also 1 W. & M., c. 15, § 4, in 3 Eng. 
Stat. at Large 422 (1689) (“[N]o Papist ... shall or may have or keep in his House ... 
any Arms ...”); 1 Hawkins, Treatise on the Pleas of the Crown 26 (1771) (similar).”107 
• “At the time of the founding, as now, to “bear” meant to “carry.” See Johnson 161; 
Webster; T. Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary of the English Language (1796); 2 
Oxford English Dictionary 20 (2d ed.1989) (hereinafter Oxford).”108 
 
Bracketing the question whether Heller’s analysis of the linguistic evidence was correct, the 
methodology of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion was clear: the Court focused on the evidence of 
the original public meaning of the text.  Given the inevitable differences between judicial 
practice and constitutional theory, it is hard to imagine finding a clearer example of “original 
public meaning originalism” in an actual judicial decision. 
                                                
104 See, e.g., Heller, ___ S.Ct. at ___ n. 28 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
105 Heller, ___ S.Ct. at ___. 
106 Id. at ___. 
107 Id. at ___. 





I. Situating Semantic Originalism in the Historical Narrative 
How does Semantic Originalism fit in the historical narrative of originalist theory and 
practice?  Of course the full answer to that question depends on the content of the theory, and 
that content is about to unfold.  But as a preliminary matter we can make a few observations 
about the relationship: 
 
• Semantic Originalism is a development within what is called the “New Originalism” 
and bears a close affinity to approach articulated by Justice Scalia, extended by Gary 
Lawson and Steve Calabresi and then modfied by Jack Balkin, Randy Barnett, and 
Keith Whittington. 
• Semantic Originalism can be understood as providing theoretical foundations for 
moves made by New Originalists, and in particular as doing groundwork in the 
philosophy of language for original public meaning originalism. 
• Semantic Originalism thematizes and makes explicit the linguistic turn in originalist 
constitutional theory.  Even careful originalists sometimes elide the distinction 
between normative claims and claims about semantic content.  Semantic Originalism 
untangles these claims. 
• Semantic Originalism disentangles claims about the conventions of legal practice that 
determine legal content from claims about semantic meaning and claims of political 
morality that can be used to justify or criticize these conventions. 
• Semantic Originalism extends and develops the substantive content of original public 
meaning originalism by offering a theory of the relationship of conventional semantic 
meaning to the publicly available context of constitutional utterance, the role of the 
division of linguistic labor, the possibility of constitutional implicature, and the special 
case of constitutional stipulation. 
• Semantic Originalism is broadly consistent with the core approach of the Supreme 
Court in District of Columbia v. Heller—which emphasizes “original public meaning” 
and relies on linguistic evidence to establish the conventional semantic meaning of the 
Second Amendment. 
 
In sum and substance, Semantic Originalism is both a move within the development of 
originalist constitutional theory and a move outside that theory.  Within originalism, the point of 
Semantic Originalism is to provide supporting arguments and modifications.  Outside of 
originalism, the upshot of Semantic Originalism is to reinterpret the debate from the perspective 
of the philosophy of language and the philosophy of law. 
III. SEMANTIC ORIGINALISM: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 
What does the constitution mean?  To be more specific, what is the fact of the matter with 
respect to the linguistic meaning of the constitutional text?109  And to restate the question in 
                                                
109 Our current task is to develop a theory of constitutional meaning, but this task presupposes that we have a 
view about what the constitution is—that is, a theory as to what “constitutes” the “constitution.”  Simplifying vastly, 
there are at least two answers (or families of answers) to this question.  The first answer is that the constitution is the 
United States Constitution—the content of the document that appears in various official compilations of the federal 
law.  It begins with the words, “We the People” and ends with 27th Amendment, “No law, varying the compensation 





language that is even more precise: what theory provides the best account of the semantic 
content of the United States Constitution? 
A. Semantics and Normativity 
Let’s begin with the distinction between semantics and normativity.  Semantics is about 
meaning.110  “Normativity,” in the sense in which I use it here,111 is about the moral or ethical 
status of reasons for action, evaluations of states of affairs, and judgments about human 
character.  The distinction between semantic and normative originalism is a fundamental 
building block of the argument of this Article.  Before going any further, let’s try to get that 
distinction clear. 
The domain of semantics is the domain of meaning.  A semantic theory is the theory of the 
meaning of utterances, usually in a natural language such as English.  The semantic content of an 
utterance is its linguistic meaning (or meaning in the semantic sense112).  When we make 
assertions about what an utterance means, we are making factual assertions about the world (and 
                                                                                                                                                       
for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of representatives shall have 
intervened.”  Let us call this first view of the constitution, “the textualist theory of constitutional content,” and for 
short let us use the phrase “constitution as text.”  The second answer (or family of answers) might be expressed via 
the idea of a constitutional regime—a set of fundamental practices that constitutes (defines and establishes) the 
mode of governance for a particular political community.  The second answer can (and does) encompass the first, 
but typically would include practices that go beyond the constitutional text.  For example, the constitutional regime 
in the United States might include the party system—a complex array of institutions and practices that are 
presupposed (implicitly or explicitly) by the positive law, but which is not the subject of any provision of the text of 
the United States Constitution.  Let us call the second view of the constitution, “the regime theory of constitutional 
content,” and for short use the phrase “constitution as regime.” 
For the purposes of this article, I want to assume a stance of strict neutrality as between constitution as text and 
constitution as regime—except for the assumptions explicitly stated in the remainder of this paragraph.  The first 
assumption is that the constitution in the broad sense (as as “text” or “regime”) includes at least some substantial 
role for the constitutional text.  The second assumption is that the role for the constitutional text includes (even if it 
is not limited to) the status of law, where that status is understood as including some conception of legal authority.  
The third assumption is that the constitutional text has normative significance (whether weak or strong, peremptory 
or nonperemptory) for officials (including judges, executives, administrators, and legislators) and citizens.  These 
assumptions rule out some possibilities.  For example, they rule out the possibility that the content of our 
constitution is a regime in which the constitutional text serves only a symbolic or rhetorical function, but does not 
function as a real element of the actual constitutional regime. 
These assumptions form the backdrop for the scope of this investigation of constitutional meaning.  The object 
of investigation will be the constitutional text.  “Semantic Originalism,” as the name of the theory advanced in this 
Article, refers to a theory of the meaning of text and does not refer to a theory of the constitutional regime to the 
extent that the regime includes practices that are outside the text.  That is, the scope of investigation is limited, and 
therefore, Semantic Originalism is not a theory that has purchase on the content of the extratextual elements of the 
constitutional regime—to the extent that there are any such elements. 
Some theorists who emphasize the importance of regime theory might argue that limiting the investigation to the 
constitutional text renders the results of the investigation trivial, unimportant, or misleading.  The point of the 
assumptions is, in part, to suggest that a theory of the meaning of the constitutional text is not trivial if the 
assumptions are warranted.  To put this more plainly but less precisely, the meaning of the written constitution is 
important enough to make for a substantial mouthful even if it isn’t the whole enchilada. 
110 MICHAEL MORRIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 152 (Cambridge University Press 
2007). 
111 For clarification of the sense of “normative,” see infra note 118. 
112 See supra Part I.A.1, “The Fixation Thesis: The Semantic Content of Constitutional Provisions is Fixed at the 





about the natural world if humans and their meanings are part of that world).  In the context of 
law, we are frequently interested in determining the semantic content of a legal text.  That is, 
constitutions, statutes, judicial opinions, rules, and regulations, all have semantic content, and 
both citizens and officials have practical reasons for ascertaining what that semantic content is. 
In particular, the Constitution of the United States is a text.  That text has syntactic113 and 
typographical114 properties—it is composed of letters, punctuation marks, and spaces in particular 
syntactic structures (phrases, sentences, and clauses).  Although there are rare exceptions,115 for 
the most part the syntactic and typographical properties of the Constitution are uncontroversial.  
As to typography, there are very few cases of significant dispute about whether the arrangement 
of letters, marks, and spaces in the United States Code are an accurate transcription of the 
document under glass in the Nation Archives.  And likewise, there are few (if any) questions 
about whether the archived token of the Constitution contains what are called “scrivener’s 
errors,” simple mistakes in transcription of the prior penultimate drafts of the Constitution as 
they were approved by the Philadelphia Convention and ratified by the ratification conventions.  
Constitutional typography and syntax may be settled, but constitutional semantics are (at least 
seemingly and on the surface), the subject of dispute.  We almost always agree on the word 
order, letters, marks, and spaces, but we seem to disagree about what they mean—the semantic 
content of the Constitution.  Semantic constitutional theories are theories of constitutional 
meaning;116 such theories provide conceptual apparatus for framing and answering questions 
about constitutional meaning. 
Semantics is one thing, normative theory is another.117  By using the term “normativity” and 
its root word “norm,” I mean to refer to reasons for action in a somewhat restricted sense.118  
                                                
113 See “Syntax,” Merriam Webster Online, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/syntax  (visited 
February 9, 2008) (defining syntax as “the way in which linguistic elements (as words) are put together to form 
constituents (as phrases or clauses) b: the part of grammar dealing with this”). 
114 See, e.g., “Typographical Error,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Typo (visited February 9, 2008) . 
115 But see Paul E. McGreal, There Is No Such Thing as Textualism: A Case Study in Constitutional Method, 69 
Fordham L. Rev. 2393, 2407 (2001) (“State ratifications of the Constitution hold further evidence of historical semi-
colon usage. Many states appended a copy of the Constitution to their form of ratification. On several of these 
copies, punctuation differs in many places from the punctuation of the document promulgated by the drafting 
convention.”); Gary Lawson, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the 
Sweeping Clause, 42 Duke L.J. 267, 291 n. 102 (1993) (discussing likely transcription error in the Georgia 
Constitution) .  Cf. William W. Van Alstyne, A Constitutional Conundrum of Second Amendment Commas: A Short 
Epistolary Report, 10 GREEN BAG 489 (2007); Peter Jeremy Smith, Commas, Constitutional Grammar, and the 
Straight-Face Test: What if Conan the Grammerian Were a Strict Textualist?, 16 CONST. COMM. 7 (1999).  
116 The word “seem” is italicized in text to emphasize that not all “seeming disagreement” about meaning is 
“actual disagreement” about semantic content. 
117 This claim might be misconstrued as asserting something quite different: that there are no necessary or 
possible connections between semantic facts and normative facts.  There are many such connections.  For example, 
the communication of meaning is a practical activity.  Speakers want to be understood.  Readers want to understand.  
So there are normative reasons to speak clearly and read carefully.  But this fact does not entail the further 
conclusion that the semantic content of a text is sensitive to normative considerations that bear on what the meaning 
of the text should be. 
118 In the broadest sense, “normative” might refer to all reason-involving activity.  Thus the broadest sense of 
normative would include reasons of prudence and reasons based on linguistic conventions.  In that very broad sense, 
derivation of “semantic content” is normative, but in this article I am not using “normative” in that broad sense.  
Some readers may be puzzled that I did not use either “moral” or “ethical” as the preferred term.  The difficulty is 
that those words are sometimes taken as having a very restricted meaning in legal theory.  For example, the term 
“moral” is sometimes read as referring only to deontological normative reasons; in this very restricted sense, 
consequentialist reasons are not “moral” reasons.  I am not endorsing this very restricted sense of the term moral.  





Thus, normative theory includes moral philosophy, political theory, and normative legal theory; 
normative reasons (in this restricted sense) include reasons drawn from consequentialist, 
deontological, and aretaic moral and political theory.  In the context of law, normative theories 
address “legal practice”—where that term refers to law-involving actions and choices, such as 
the activities of adjudicating legal disputes or complying with (or disobeying) the law.  In the 
more particular context of the Constitution (or of constitutions generally), the activity of 
normative theorizing can be called “normative constitutional theory,” which we can understand 
as moral philosophy, political theory, and normative legal theory, as applied to constitution-
involving choices, characteristically the activities of judicial interpretation and construction of 
the Constitution, but also including interpretation and construction of the Constitution by 
officials and citizens.119  For the sake of clarity, let us stipulate that these constitution-involving 
choices and activities can be called “constitutional practice.”  Normative constitutional theories 
are theories of the political morality of constitutional practice. 
It should now be obvious that there is a difference between a semantic theory of the meaning 
of legal texts and a normative theory of legal practice.  Similarly, there is a distinction between 
constitutional semantics and normative constitutional theory.  And that brings us to two idealized 
(or “pure”) versions of originalism, which we can now formulate via the following tentative and 
revisable definitions: 
 
Pure Semantic Originalism: the semantic content of the text of a constitution is (roughly) 
the original meaning of the text as it was fixed at the time of framing and ratification. 
 
Pure Normative Originalism: Constitutional practice should be substantially guided by 
the original public meaning of the text. 
 
These definitions are tentative and revisable—as will become clear as the argument of this 
Article unfolds.  Nonetheless, they are sufficient to make the distinction between these two 
simplified or pure versions originalism clear.  A purely semantic originalism is a theory that 
limits itself to claims about the semantic content of the constitutional text—by itself this theory 
makes no claims about how constitutional practice should precede.  A purely normative 
originalism would be a theory that limited itself to claims about how officials (judges, legislators, 
and executive officers) and citizens120 ought to treat the semantic content of the constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                       
My point is simply that the different communities of scholars use these terms differently.  The only solution is to 
define terms clearly or to invent a special technical vocabulary.  Both options have their drawbacks, but I believe the 
best communicative strategy is to use the term “normative” and then clearly state that it is being used in a restrictive 
sense that focuses on the moral or ethical broadly construed to include consequentialist, deontological, and aretaic 
reasons as applied to both the personal and political dimensions of human conduct. 
119 On the constitution outside the courts, see, e.g., Sotirios A. Barber & James F. Fleming, The Canon and the 
Constitution outside the Courts, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 267 (2000); Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal 
Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in 
Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410, 419 (1993). 
120 Throughout this essay, I shall bracket the question whether normative originalism should claim that the duties 
of fidelity that attach to officials as opposed to citizens with respect to the constitutional text are identical, or 
whether citizens may advocate and advance in what I have called “amending constructions,” e.g. constructions that 
change the constitutional meaning.  On this, see Mariah Zeisberg, “Frederick Douglass, Citizen Interpreter” 
Zeisberg, Mariah. "Frederick Douglass, Citizen Interpreter" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American 





text when they act in constitution-involving ways.121  Most originalist theories are likely to be 
mixed—making some semantic claims and some normative claims.  The theory advanced in this 
article and that is labeled “Semantic Originalism” is a mixed theory: although it emphasizes 
semantic claims, it also makes a modest normative argument. 
The distinction between semantics and normativity may seem obvious or trivial, and the claim 
that the semantic content of a text cannot be determined by a normative theory about how the 
text should figure in some human practice should not be controversial.  What words mean is one 
thing; what we should do about their meaning is another.  Nonetheless, constitutional theorists 
have frequently assumed and sometimes argued that the distinction between semantic theories of 
constitutional meaning and normative theories of constitutional practice is illusory.  Those 
assumptions and arguments will be addressed in detail below.122 
B. Five Ideas about Semantics 
This Subpart lays out five ideas about semantics.  The first idea is that semantics is distinct 
from typography, syntax, and pragmatics—although the relationship between semantics and 
pragmatics is an intimate one.  The second idea is that speakers meaning can be distinguished 
from sentence meaning.  The third idea is that of implicature—the notion that an expression can 
mean something it does not say.  The fourth idea is that there is (or at least can be) a “fact of the 
matter” about the meaning of a given utterance.  The fifth idea is that the concept of semantic 
meaning can be detached from particular conceptions (or perhaps theories or views) of semantic 
meaning that apply to utterance types.  The five ideas are followed by an external remark: 
constitutional theory must answer to the general theories of semantic meaning. 
1. Typography, Syntax, Semantics, and Pragmatics 
Semantics is about meaning, and it can be distinguished from three other topics.  Typography 
is about the marks or symbols that are used to communicate words in written form.  
Constitutional typography is mostly uncontested—there are disputes about what symbols provide 
the authoritative text of the constitution, but such disputes are rare and of only moderate 
significance.  Live constitutional issues rarely, if ever, depend on the question whether a comma 
was misplaced or letter transposed.123 
                                                                                                                                                       
Aug 30, 2007, May 14, 2008, ,http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p211169_index.html; see also Mariah Zeisberg, 
"[no title]" (2008). Schmooze 'tickets'. Paper 84, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/schmooze_papers/84. 
121 The phrases “semantic originalism” and “normative originalism” should be understood to have stipulated 
meanings.  In particular, my use of “semantic originalism” is not equivalent to Ronald Dworkin’s.  Dworkin defined 
“semantic originalism” as the view that “that the rights-granting clauses be read to say what those who made them 
intended to say.” See Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 117, 119 (Amy Gutmann ed. 1997).  Dworkin’s term designates what I refer to as normative original intentions 
originalism. See generally Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Dworkin as an Originalist, 17 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 49 
(2000).  Dworkin’s views are discussed in more depth below.  See infra Part III.F.4.b), “Constructive Interpretation: 
Dworkin’s Attempt to Absorb Interpretation into Construction,” p. 84. 
122 See infra Part III.H.1, “The Normativity Objection: Attempts to Collapse the Distinction Between 
Normativity and Semantics,” p. 98. 
123 One example of a typographical dispute concerns the qualifications clause for the presidency.  The clause 
requires that the President be “a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of 
this Constitution.”  The second comma appears to be a drafting or transcription error.  One natural reading would be 
that the clause confers eligibility only on those persons who were “natural born citizens” “at the time of 





Likewise, constitutional syntax, the grammar of constitutional clauses is rarely the subject of 
explicit constitutional controversy.  This is not to say that syntax is unimportant: syntax enables 
complex expression.  Constitutional syntax is rarely controversial because constitutional syntax 
is usually transparent: the structure of constitutional clauses usually fit our understanding of the 
sense of their meaning.  There are, however, at least two clauses in the Constitution that have 
unusual syntactic structure—the intellectual property clause in Article I and the Second 
Amendment. 
The second amendment reads, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”124  The initial 
phrase, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State” could be read as 
merely declaring the purpose of the rights declaration that follows.  Or it might be read as 
modifying or restricting the meaning of “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms.”  In this 
case, the contribution that the syntax makes to constitutional meaning is not fully transparent (at 
least to some readers).  One can imagine alternative syntactic structures that might have avoided 
the surface-level ambiguity. 
The other example of a clause with unusual syntax is the so-called intellectual property 
clause.  That clause grants “Congress” “Power”  “To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”  The syntax of the clause suggests that the power granted 
is “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” and that the remainder of the clause is a 
limitation on the exercise of that power, but a conventional reading of the clause ignores this 
syntactic structure and reads the clause as if it had the following syntactic structure: “Congress 
shall have Power to secure for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries” “in order to promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.”125  On this reading, the surface syntax of the clause does not reflect its meaning. 
Putting aside the rare disputes about constitutional typography and syntax, the heart of 
disputes about constitutional meaning lies in constitutional semantics and pragmatics.  Although 
the term “semantic” is almost surely familiar to every reader of this Article and was explicated 
above,126 the term “pragmatics” as it used in the philosophy of language and linguistics may be 
new or fuzzy for some readers.  “Pragmatics” in the philosophy of language has only a remote 
connection with philosophical pragmatism (associated with Pierce, Dewey, and James) or legal 
pragmatism (associated with Posner).127 
                                                                                                                                                       
Adoption”—membership in this group might be an empty set or it might be limited to those who were born at the 
time of adoption.  In either case, the consequence would be that no one would be eligible for the presidency after all 
those who became citizens at the time of adoption were no longer living.   Without the second comma, the clause 
would read, “a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States at the time of the Adoption of this 
Constitution,” and the absurd reading would no longer be suggested by the typographical error. See Matthew 
Yglesias, That Pesky Exception, TheAtlantic.Com, February 19, 2007, 
http://matthewyglesias.theatlantic.com/archives/2007/02/that_pesky_exception.php.  This type of typographical 
error does not interfere with the actual operation of government because the intended meaning is clear from the 
publicly available context of constitutional utterance. See infra Part III.C.2.c)(1), “First Modification: The Publicly 
Available Constitutional Context,” p. 54. 
124 U.S. CONST. amend. 2. 
125 Lawrence Solum, Congress’s Power to Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 LOYOLA OF 
LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW 1 (2002). 
126 See supra Part II, “An Opinionated History of Constitutional Originalism”, p. 14. 
127 The best discussion of legal pragmatics of which I am aware is Andrei Marmor, The Pragmatics of Legal 





Here is one standard definition of pragmatics: 
Pragmatics deals with utterances, by which we will mean specific events, the 
intentional acts of speakers at times and places, typically involving language. Logic and 
semantics traditionally deal with properties of types of expressions, and not with properties 
that differ from token to token, or use to use, or, as we shall say, from utterance to 
utterance, and vary with the particular properties that differentiate them.128 
This definition depends on a further distinction—the type/token distinction—the ontological 
(or metaphysical) difference between a general sort of thing (type) and particular instances 
(tokens).129 
Stated in this way, the definition of pragmatics is precise, but not edifying or illuminating.  
What does the study of expression tokens (utterances on particular occasions and hence in 
particular contexts) add to what we learn from the study of expression types (terms, phrases, 
sentences, clauses, and so forth)?  A rough and ready answer is that looking at particular 
expressions focuses us on the contribution that context makes to meaning.  Expression types are 
acontextual.  Expression tokens are always embedded in particular contexts of utterance. 
Another answer to the question about the contribution of pragmatics begins with two aspects 
of communication that pragmatics investigates.  The first aspect of pragmatics concerns topics 
like the resolution of ambiguity and vagueness.  The second aspect concerns with ways in which 
utterances (or expressions) can convey more information than the literal meaning of the utterance 
type or perform an action that is not explicit in the utterance type.130  Both aspects are concerned 
(in part) with the idea that people can do things with words—that is, with the idea of a “speech 
act.”131 
Speech act theory will be familiar to many readers of this essay, but may be new to others.  
The core idea is that we can perform a variety of actions when we say things.  To use a variant of 
J.L. Austin’s felicitous phrase, “we can do things with words.”  For example, we can promise, 
command, or assert.  The action performed by an utterance can be called its “illocutionary 
force.”  When a speech act succeeds and the audience recognizes its illocutionary force, we can 
say that there is “illocutionary uptake.”  
Thus, the illocutionary force of “I promise to meet you at the cafeteria for lunch” may be a 
promise—if those words are uttered in the right circumstances (that is, in an appropriate 
context).132  In many cases, the illocutionary force of an utterance is transparent—it is announced 
by the conventional semantic meaning of the utterance itself.  Sometimes the word “hereby” is a 
signal of such illocutionary transparency, as in “I hereby promise,” “I hereby apologize,” and so 
forth.  But such transparency is not always present.  Thus, the illocutionary force of “I promise 
you will regret it if you harm her,” may be a threat rather than a promise.  Or the illocutionary 
                                                
128 Kepa Korta & John Perry, Pragmatics, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2006, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatics/.  
129 Linda Wetzel, Types and Tokens, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2006, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/types-tokens/. 
130 The two aspects of pragmatics are sometimes called “near side” (the first aspect) and “far side” (the second 
aspect. See Korta & Perry, supra note 128. 
131 The two key texts are JOHN AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (Oxford University Press 1962) and 
JOHN SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (Cambridge University Press, 1969). 
132 Notice that in the sentence accompanying this note, the words are not uttered in a context in which they 
constitute a promise.  Instead, the sentence, “I promise to meet you at the cafeteria for lunch,” was mentioned rather 
than used. 





force of “I promise that the atomic number of Oxygen is 8,” may be an assertion, with the word 
“promise” serving to express confidence in the truth of the assertion rather than any guarantee of 
performance by the speaker. 
Returning then to the interpretation and construction of legal texts, the point of this brief 
survey is to pinpoint the importance of semantics and pragmatics.  When we seek the meaning of 
a legal text, characteristically the issues are semantic and pragmatic.  That is, our aim is to 
discover the conventional semantic meaning of the expression type and to resolve vagueness and 
ambiguity by reference to context of the particular utterance token.  In rare cases, there may be a 
typographical dispute over which marks constitute the text or a syntactic dispute over the 
structure and grammar of a particular provision.  In other cases, also rare, there may be 
disagreement over illocutionary force—that is, over the question whether a particular text is 
intended to have the illocutionary force of law.   But in most cases, constitutional practice is 
interested in elucidating constitutional meaning, although there may be further questions about 
what is to be done about that meaning once it is determined. 
 
* * * 
 
The philosophy of language has its own technical vocabulary.  Some of that vocabulary is 
familiar to academic lawyers.  Words like “semantics,” “syntax,” and “typography” are 
transparent to anyone familiar with learned discourse in the humanities and social sciences.  
Other terms are more foreboding.  Paragraphs that are thickly laden with phrases like “speech 
act,” “speakers meaning,” and “sentence meaning” may seem almost impenetrable on first 
reading.  Nonetheless, let me make a plea and give a promise.  The plea is: “Please stick with 
it.”  The promise is: “I give my personal guarantee that there is a payoff for using a precise and 
technical vocabulary.” 
Before we rejoin the argument, let me say something about the word “utterance” and the 
related terms “utter,” “utterer,” and so forth.  These words are deeply embedded in the tradition 
of speech act theory in general and the work of Paul Grice in particular.  On first acquaintance, 
all the talk about “utterances” may sound peculiar.  Remember that there is nothing special 
about this term.  An “utterance” is a “saying” or “writing.”  An “utterer” is a “speaker” or 
“writer.”  An “utterance token” is just a string of words uttered on a particular occasion.  An 
“utterance type” is just the string of words considered as something that could be said on more 
than one particular occasion. 
All of the philosophical terms and phrases that we are about to encounter will be carefully 
defined.  None of the concepts are especially difficult or complex. 
 
* * * 
2. Speakers Meaning and Sentence Meaning 
The next step in this brief survey of the theory of meaning is to investigate the distinction 
between “speakers meaning” and “sentence meaning” (or “expression meaning”), which was 
introduced by Paul Grice.133  Grice’s idea of speaker’s meaning is actually quite familiar.  We get 
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at the idea of speaker’s meaning all the time in ordinary conversations: “What did she mean by 
that?”  In the context of legal texts, we ask questions like: “What did the legislature mean by the 
provision?”  “What did the judge mean by that sentence in the opinion?”  “What did the framer’s 
mean by that clause in the Constitution?” 
Grice contended that speaker’s meaning, in turn, can be analyzed in terms of a speaker’s (or 
author’s) intentions.  His point is illustrated by the following thought experiment: 
[I]magine that you have stopped at night at an intersection.  The driver of another car 
flashes her lights at you, and you make the inference the reason for her doing this is that 
she wants to cause you to believe that you lights are not on.  And based on this inference, 
you now do, in fact, realize that your lights are not on.134 
In this example, the meaning of the flashing lights is the product of the following complex 
intention—as explicated by Richard Grandy and Richard Warner: 
 
1) The driver flashes her lights intending  
2) that you believe that your lights are not on;  
3) that you recognize her intention (1);  
4) that this recognition be part of your reason for believing that your lights are not on.135 
 
In the case of imperatives, for example, the intention is that the audience (or reader) performs 
a certain act on the basis of the reader’s recognition of the author’s intention that the reader 
perform the act.  Speakers meaning requires that speakers and audiences have “common 
knowledge”136 in a technical sense: the speaker must know what the audience knows about the 
speaker’s intentions and vice-versa. 
We can tentatively formulate speakers meaning as follows: 
Speakers meaning:  The speakers meaning (or utterer’s meaning) of an utterance is the 
illocutionary uptake that the speaker intended to produce in the audience on the basis of the 
audience’s recognition of the speaker’s intention. 
Grice formulated his notion in terms of speakers and audiences, implicitly assuming the 
context of oral communication between a speaker and an audience contiguous in space and time.  
At this stage in the argument, we can assume that this notion could be generalized to include 
written communication—so long as the author of the text and the reader of the text could satisfy 
the conditions for common knowledge of the author’s beliefs regarding audience recognition of 
the author’s intentions.  Thus, the “authors meaning” of a text would be the illocutionary uptake 
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that the author intended to produce in the reader on the basis of the reader’s recognition of the 
author’s intention. 
What about sentence meaning?  (Sometimes the phrase “expression meaning” is used to refer 
to the same notion as “speakers meaning.”)  In its simplest (and perhaps simplified) form, the 
idea is that words and expressions have standard meanings—the meanings that are conventional 
given relevant linguistic practices.  As Hurd puts it: “[i]n other words, the sentence meaning of a 
particular utterance can be understood not by reference to the illocutionary intentions of the 
speaker, but rather by reference to the illocutionary intentions that speakers in general have 
when employing such an utterance.”137  Hurd goes on to criticize this solution, but I want to put 
this sort of controversy to the side at this point.  At this point, let us tentatively use the following 
formulation: 
Sentence meaning: the sentence meaning (or “expression meaning”) of an utterance is 
the conventional semantic meaning of the words and phrases that constitute the utterance. 
The phrase “sentence meaning” does not contain the same implicit reference to oral 
communication under conditions of proximity.  Thus, texts and speeches can have “sentence 
meaning,” irrespective of whether the utterance is read or heard in spatial and temporal 
proximity to the occasion of writing or saying. 
3. Implicature 
Grice is associated with a second idea that has direct relevance to constitutional meaning.  
This is his notion of “implicature”—the notion that the illocutionary force of a particular 
communicative act can be implied rather than directly said.  Here is one version of the standard 
example: 
Professor is asked for a recommendation of Student, who is being considered for a job 
as a member of the law faculty of a research university.  Professor writes only the 
following in the letter of recommendation:  “Student regularly attended class and turned in 
work on time.  Student was never late to class.” 
The semantic content of the letter is sparse—speaking only to the student’s attendance, 
punctuality, and compliance with deadlines.  But given the context, the illocutionary force of the 
letter goes beyond its semantic content.  The implication of the letter is that the student is not 
qualified for the position.  Such a letter would be an extreme case of what we call “damning with 
faint praise.”  In the language of speech act theory, we might say that the semantic content of the 
letter would consist of one set of assertions (about attendance, punctuality, etc.) and the 
illocutionary uptake of the letter consists of a different set of assertions (about suitability of the 
candidate for the position). 
4. Semantic Meaning as a “Fact of the Matter” 
One final point about theories of meaning in the abstract and the meaning of general utterance 
types and particular utterance tokens: meanings in the semantic sense are facts determined by the 
evidence.  They are not courses of action adopted on the basis of normative concerns.  This point 
is so obvious in a variety of contexts that it is taken for granted.  Textbooks about semantics 
                                                





written for students of linguistics do not discuss the normative reasons for and against various 
theories of semantic meaning.  Translators of chemistry texts or product manuals do not (and 
should not) ask whether they should use the translation that best expresses the semantic content 
of the original or some other translation that might be preferred on normative grounds.  Of 
course, translations can be altered on normative grounds.  For example, in cultures with 
puritanical sexual mores, the translation of a racy novel might be bowdlerized: a grope might 
become a touch, intercourse a kiss.  The crucial point is that a bowdlerized translation alters and 
does not preserve semantic content.  No normative argument can bestow the property of 
“accuracy” on a bowdlerized translation.  We may prefer that our children read the bowdlerized 
translation, but this preference does not change the semantic content of the original.  Fucking not 
is kissing and wishing cannot make it so. 
Legal meanings are no different in this regard.  The question whether a given reading of a 
legal text preserves its meaning (in the sense of semantic content) is a factual question.  Notice, 
however, that the assertion that meaning is a fact is itself only a factual assertion.  The claim that 
semantic content is determined by the facts does not entail the further claim that the application 
of legal texts to particular cases in legal practice is determined by the facts.  For example, the 
semantic content of a particular legal rule may be vague.  If it is, then application in a particular 
case may require construction of the rule, and the fact that meaning is determined by the facts 
does not entail the conclusion that construction is determined by the facts.  Theories of 
construction may be normative, and if they are, then legal practice may be guided by normative 
considerations in a wide variety of cases.  In addition, there may be normative reasons to 
disregard or alter the semantic meaning of a given legal text. 
By making the assertion that semantic meaning is a matter of fact, I am denying that the 
correct interpretation of the semantic content of a text is necessarily the interpretation of the text 
that makes the semantic content “the best that it can be.”  Readers will recognize that this puts 
my view in possible tension with the account of meaning in Ronald Dworkin’s theory, “law as 
integrity” and/or the earlier view expressed most accessibly expressed in Hard Cases.  These 
questions will be addressed below. 
One final point: the claim that there is a fact of the matter about “semantic content” is a 
modest one.  Here are some of the ways in which it is modest: 
 
1. The claim is not that we can always know what the facts about meaning are.  The 
original public meaning of a text could be lost, because the information about usage at 
the time of utterance may not be accessible.  The claim that there is a fact of the matter 
is a metaphysical, not epistemological. 
2. The claim is not that the facts about semantic content necessarily settle all, most, or 
even any cases.   If the semantic content is vague, then construction may be required. 
3. The claim is not that there is a metaphysically deep distinction between facts and 
values.  My own view of value makes value part of the natural world and that there are 
moral propositions can express natural facts, but that doesn’t entail the further 
conclusion that the facts about meaning are moral facts.  Facts about meaning are 
linguistic facts. 
4. The claim is not that the “principle of charity” in interpretation has no scope of 
operation in epistemic access to semantic content.  We never have complete 
information about conventional semantic meaning (because there are always a vast 
number of instances of actual usage and a tiny proportion of those are preserved); 





similarly, we lack complete information about the context of utterance.  The principle 
of charity in interpretation allows us to make inferences about semantic content.138 
 
Doubtless there are other possible misunderstandings of the claim that the semantic content of 
the Constitution is a fact.  If you are in doubt about the meaning of the claim, I would ask that 
you use the following rules of thumb: (a) construe the claim modestly, and (b) avoid extravagant 
metaphysical interpretations. 
5. The Concept of Semantic Meaning Distinguished from Particular Theories of the 
Meaning of Utterance Types 
The concept of semantic meaning (or content) is abstract, and it plays a role in very general 
claims, such as the claim that the semantic meaning of one-on-one communications is captured 
by the notion of speakers meaning and the claim that the semantic meaning of written texts not 
addressed to particular persons is captured by the idea of sentence meaning.  Suitably qualified, 
these general claims are true—there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that they 
accurately describe the actual linguistic behavior of humans. 
But from the fact that these claims are true, it does not follow that they are necessarily true, 
self-evident, or apodictic.139  It is possible to meaningfully disagree with such claims or to posit a 
possible world in which they would not hold.  For this reason, we need a distinction between the 
concept of semantic meaning and various conceptions, views, or theories of particular meaning 
types (such as theories of constitutional meaning).140  For the most part, this article will use the 
phrases “semantic meaning,” “semantic content,” and similar expressions to refer to the actual 
meaning of the constitutional text in accord with a particular conception (theory or view) of that 
meaning.  If this theory is mistaken, but some other theory is true, then much of the argument of 
this Article may still hold, with appropriate substitutions of what we would come to view as the 
correct theory of constitutional semantics.141 
 
* * * 
 
Making the semantic turn in the theory of constitutional meaning will require an excursus 
beyond the disciplinary boundaries of the academic study of law (as practiced in the law schools 
and departments of political science) and into territory within the domain of the philosophy of 
language and linguistics.  The fundamental premise of the move beyond law is that constitutional 
semantics can only be sensibly understood as applied philosophy of language (or applied 
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linguistic theory).  Constitutional texts cannot mean in ways that are fundamentally different 
than the ways in which other utterances mean.  This is not to say that there is nothing special or 
different about constitutional interpretation or construction.  It is to say that a theory of 
constitutional meaning must be reconciled with our understanding of how humans communicate 
with language in general and written texts in particular—in a variety of legal and nonlegal 
contexts.  If a position taken in the theory of constitutional meaning is inconsistent with widely 
accepted views about meaning generally, then there is work to be done.  Either the constitutional 
theorist must convince us that the general views are wrong or that the constitutional (or legal) 
context is truly different.  But there is no plausible reason for relieving constitutional theorists of 
the burden of reconciliation.  The notion that constitutional theory could be sound if it requires 
demonstrably false beliefs about the nature of meaning is absurd.  
 
* * * 
C. Framers Meaning and Clause Meaning 
So far, our brief investigation of semantics and pragmatics has been very general.  The 
purpose of that general investigation has been to lay the groundwork for a more particular 
inquiry into constitutional meaning.  That particular inquiry can begin with the obvious 
parallelism between Grice’s discussion of speakers meaning and sentence meaning and 
contemporary debates in constitutional theory.  In that debate, a distinction is drawn between two 
forms of originalism—“original meaning originalism” and “original intentions originalism.”  
Both forms of originalism are sometimes contrasted with textualism. 
In this subpart of the essay, I shall explore the parallelism between speakers meaning and 
framers meaning, on one hand, and expression meaning and clause meaning, on the other.   This 
investigation shall be limited to constitutional interpretation, but the account that I offer could be 
generalized to almost any type of legal text that has general and prospective application.  Rather 
that discussing framers meaning and clause meaning, we might instead investigate the role of 
legislators meaning and section meaning in statutory interpretation.  Indeed, the view that 
meaning of a statute is distinction from the intentions of legislators has been a commonplace of 
the theory of statutory interpretation at least since Holmes’s 1899 essay, The Theory of Legal 
Interpretation.142 
One more point of clarification before turning to framers meaning: the account that I offer 
here will frequently cite the Constitution of 1789 as an example.  This account can be 
generalized to constitutional amendments that are proposed by Congress (playing the role of the 
framers) and ratified by state legislatures (playing the role of the ratifying conventions and 
assembly),143 but I shall simply assume rather than demonstrate that the necessary transpositions 
of moves could be accomplished. 
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1. Framers Meaning 
Let’s begin with the idea that the constitution should be interpreted to have the meaning that 
was originally intended by the Framers.  In this section, I will investigate the possibility that the 
meaning of the constitution could be understood on the model of speakers meaning, which in the 
constitutional context can be called “framers meaning.” 
a) Framers Meaning as the Semantic Equivalent of Original Intentions Originalism 
Let’s begin with the observation that what is called “original intentions originalism” is 
actually ambiguous.  This might be a semantic theory, about the meaning of the constitution.  Or 
it might be a normative theory, about constitutional practice.  Of course, there is a natural 
relationship between the two kinds of theory.  An original-intentions originalist might believe 
that the semantic content of the constitution is given by the original intentions of the framers and 
that there are decisive normative reasons for this semantic content to be considered authoritative 
or binding by officials and citizens.  In this section, I want to focus on original intentions 
originalism as a semantic theory—that is, as a theory about what the constitution means. 
In the context of something said by an individual speaker to an audience, there are good 
reasons to believe that the meaning of the utterance is accurately understood as the meaning the 
speaker intended the audience to grasp on the basis of the audience’s recognition of the speaker’s 
intentions.  This is Grice’s notion of speakers meaning.  Speaker’s meaning may be identical to 
the conventional semantic meaning of the utterance—the meaning of the utterance type—but this 
is not necessarily the case.  For example, if Ben says to Alice, “When I say use the term ‘cup,’ I 
mean to refer to what most people call ‘fork,” then utters, “most cups have four prongs,” his 
utterance will be perfectly intelligible and will succeed in conveying the assertion that Alice will 
understand as “most forks have four prongs” in standard English.  Even without Ben’s explicit 
declaration of nonstandard usage, Alice might infer that Ben’s usage is idiosyncratic from his 
linguistic behavior. 
The notion of speakers meaning can be narrowed to what we can call framers meaning.  The 
framers meaning of the constitution would be the content that the framers intended the audience 
of the constitution to grasp based on the audience’s recognition of the framers’ intention.  In this 
case, the audience of the constitution would be a variety of groups, including the members of the 
various ratifying conventions, officials (including judges, Presidents, officers of executive 
departments, members of Congress, and various equivalent officers of state and local 
governments), and citizens.  The “intended audience” for the United States Constitution was 
extended over time.  Most immediately, the text was directed at state legislatures and participants 
in the ratification process.  In the next period, the text was directed at those who organized the 
first Congress, conducted the first election for members of the Electoral College, and so forth.  
But the primary audience for the Constitution was the collection of citizens and official who 
would be governed by its provisions for the indefinite period during which provisions of the 
Constitution of 1789 would remain in effect—an audience that continues today and seems likely 
to continue for many decades or centuries to come. 
b) Framers Meaning, Ratifiers Meaning, Popular Meaning 
Who uttered the Constitution?  We know quite a bit about the drafting process—with bits of 





that the Constitution was ratified by various state ratifying conventions.  And we know that the 
Constitution itself begins, “We the People of the United States . . . do ordain and establish this 
Constitution for the United States of America.”  Was the text uttered by the framers, the ratifiers, 
or the people of the United States?  The most probative facts are not in dispute, and in some 
sense this question has no clear answer.  But if we view the Constitution as a speech act, then 
one relevant question is what individual, collectivity, or set of corporate bodies had authority to 
utter a constitution with the illocutionary forces that the constitution apparently has—bringing a 
new regime into being and establishing the framework for a national government.  A formal 
answer to that question might be—“the ratifying conventions.”  An answer rooted in a normative 
conception of legitimacy might be, “the people themselves.”  But there is an alternative story 
about resolving ambiguity and vagueness that suggests that the Constitution could be viewed as 
the utterance of the Philadelphia convention, and that the relevant speech act was not 
“constitution” but “proposal.” 
At this stage in the argument, we shall leave these intriguing questions unanswered and 
instead proceed (arguendo as it were) on the assumption that the Constitution was uttered by the 
framers—and more particularly by all those who drafted its language in the Philadelphia 
Convention.  Let us use the phrase “framers meaning” as the name for that meaning of the 
Constitution that the framers intended the Constitution to convey to its audiences based on the 
audiences’ recognition of the framers’ intention.  That is, framers meaning is the constitutional 
counterpart of speakers meaning. 
c) The Success Conditions for Framer’s Meaning 
Is framers meaning possible?144  Or to be more precise, is constitutional communication 
possible if the content to be conveyed is framers meaning?145  The criteria for the possibility of 
successful communication of framers meaning are established by Grice’s theory of speakers 
meaning.  For the constitution to have framers meaning, it must have been possible for the 
framers to intend that citizens and officials, contemporaneously and over an indefinite future 
span, grasp the illocutionary force of the constitution on the basis of their recognition of the 
framers’ intentions.  But as many readers will have surmised, the satisfaction of these conditions 
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is problematic, given the conditions of constitutional utterance.  At a very high level of 
abstraction, this point was made by Michael Moore more than a quarter-century ago: 
As utterances, statutes lack many of the non-linguistic, contextual features which 
constitute the foundation for a pragmatics analysis. Statutes are institutionalized utterances. 
Consequently, the richness of time and circumstance which the pragmatic approach 
embraces to interpret the intent of an ambiguous expression is eliminated by this 
institutionalized nature of statutes.146 
Moore’s point about context is refracted in a variety of criticisms of original intentions 
originalism.  These arguments can be restated as reasons for the failure of framer’s meaning as a 
theory of constitutional semantics. 
d) Reasons for Failure of Framers Meaning 
There are a variety of familiar criticisms of original intentions originalism.  We have briefly 
surveyed some of these criticisms in connection with our review of the history of originalism.147  
In this section, we will take a second look at these criticisms in a new context.  Our account of 
the success conditions for Framers Meaning gives us the criteria that must be satisfied.  Here, we 
examine four reasons for failure: (1) the collective intentions problem, (2) the collective 
recognition problem, (3) the publicity problem, and (4) the intentional state problem.  The first of 
these problems will be examined in depth. 
(1) The Collective Intentions Problem 
The first of these reasons is the familiar problem of collective intentions.148  Our investigation 
can begin with a statement of the problem. 
(a) A Statement of the Collective Intentions Problem 
The Constitution of 1789, for example was not uttered by an individual; rather it was uttered 
by a collectivity, with individual clauses and passages that reflected many hands and a whole that 
was the product of the complex interactive processes at the Philadelphia Convention.  For the 
Constitution to satisfy the possibility conditions for framers meaning, all of the members of the 
Philadelphia Convention would have had to have identical intentions with respect to the each and 
every clause.  Absent such identity, any particular clause with respect to which divergent 
intentions existed would have a multiplicity of meanings.  Of course, the problem becomes 
worse if we view the ratifiers as the utterers, since there were multiple conventions and the 
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historical evidence suggests that there were differences among the conventions with respect to 
the relevant intentional states.  Constitutional amendments are proposed by the House and Senate 
and ratified by the legislatures of the fifty states: once again, there are multiple groups with 
multiple members. 
Defenders of Framers Meaning have a variety of replies to the collective intentions problem.  
In the discussion that follows, we work through some of these defenses in depth. 
(b) The Possibility of Collective Intentions 
In the 1980s, the best answers to the collective intentions problem were provided by Richard 
Kay.  Kay began with the idea the collective intentions are possible: 
[I]ntent can be attributed to a group without positing the idea of a group mind. When we 
speak of such an intention we usually mean that each member of the group holds an 
identical individual intention. If a husband and wife discuss and settle on a list of 
invitations to a dinner party it seems perfectly proper to say that they have ‘an intention’ 
about who their guests will be. This phenomenon would only be impossible if the couple 
could not articulate and communicate their intentions to each other in a way that let each 
one know those intentions coincided . . . .149 
Kay was correct on this point: collective intentions are not impossible.  We can imagine a group 
that forms the requisite intention for Gricean speaker’s meaning: Ben and Alice talk about their 
intentions until they reach agreement in the presence of Carla, they then jointly write a text, and 
present the text to Carla, who then reads the text in light of his knowledge of Alice and Ben’s 
shared intention. 
The problem is not that shared or collective intentions are never possible.  The problem is that 
the various provisions of the Constitution were uttered by a multitude assembled at different 
places and at different times under conditions such that their intentions were inaccessible to 
intended readers of the constitution. 
Kay continued: 
The possibility of multiple, varying intentions is not, however, fatal to the enterprise of 
original intentions adjudication. The difficulty is intractable only if there are multiple and 
totally contradictory intentions. This could happen if, for example, a constitutional 
provision was created with some constitution-makers intending it to mean X and only X, 
while other constitution-makers intended it to mean not-X and only not-X. Such 
contradiction is extremely unlikely, however, because though the intentions involved are 
held by different people, those intentions are associated with the adoption of identical 
language. The use of the same language suggests a common core of meaning shared by all.  
Any different intentions are, therefore, likely to be overlapping not contradictory. Thus, if 
an ordinance prohibits ‘vehicles in the park,’ it is safe to assume that all of the enactors 
intended it apply to ordinary automobiles. Similarly, in a constitutional context, probably 
all of the enactors of the fifth and fourteenth amendments understood that incarceration 
would be a deprivation of liberty requiring due process of law. The differences in intention 
will arise in cases beyond the obvious situations suggested by the language, as that 
language was ordinarily used and understood. Where there is disagreement it will be with 
                                                
149 See Richard S. Kay, Adherence To The Original Intentions In Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections 
And Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 246 (1988).  





respect to the outer reach or scope of the rule. To use the terminology of some modern 
philosophers of language, these differences will be attributable to the vagueness, not the 
ambiguity, of the words adopted.150 
This argument can be interpreted in at least two ways, which we can call the conventional 
semantic meaning interpretation and the original expected applications interpretation.   
The first way of interpreting Kay’s remark is that the substance of his argument depends on 
conventional semantic meaning.  Kay might be arguing that the problem of possible conflicts 
between and among the intentions of the individuals who make up the relevant group of authors 
can be resolved by appeal to “identical language” or “the same language” with a “common core 
of meaning shared by all.”  One explanation for ability of the “same language” to coordinate 
intentions is that the language has a shared conventional semantic meaning.  This explanation is 
suggested by Kay’s reliance on the idea that shared intentions are a function of the way that 
“language was ordinarily used and understood.”  If by this he means the conventional semantic 
meaning of language, then the necessary collective intentions about the constitution are produced 
by its public meaning.  On this interpretation, the only difference between original intentions 
originalism and original public meaning originalism would be metaphysical.  Kay would be 
insisting the underlying metaphysically real entity was the collective intentions, whereas public 
meaning theorists would be insisting that the metaphysically real entity was the public meaning.  
This metaphysical difference would not make any practical difference—because collective 
intentions arise if and only if the conventional semantic meaning plays a causal role in producing 
them—and as a consequence, Kay’s theory would be practically identical original public 
meaning originalism. 
The second way of interpreting Kay’s remarks depends on his appeal to shared beliefs about 
original expected applications.  This interpretation is suggested by this statement: “if an 
ordinance prohibits ‘vehicles in the park,’ it is safe to assume that all of the enactors intended it 
apply to ordinary automobiles.”  On this interpretation, Kay’s theory suffers from the defects of 
the view that meaning is expectations about applications: those defects are outlined in detail 
below.151 
Kay offers a slightly different account in a more recent paper.  Here is the relevant passage: 
The [collective intentions] objection disputes the very coherence of the idea of an intent 
held by a multi-member body.  Intention, on this view, is a psychological state that may 
only be associated with an individual mind. This reasoning, however, ignores the very 
common fact of shared intention, the product of mutual communication of individual 
intentions. This is a phenomenon we encounter and use everyday: “We plan to go in the 
morning; they intend to wait until afternoon.” It is hard to imagine any kind of social 
environment in which this manner of expression is not constantly employed.152 
In this passage, the idea is that “shared intentions” are “the product of mutual communication 
of individual intentions.”  What does Kay mean?  There is an enormous amount in this small 
package, and a step-by-step reconstruction is required. 
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(c) What Mental States? 
The discussion that follows is a detailed reconstruction of Kay’s proposal.  We will start with 
the question, “What are individual intentions?”  Then we will ask, “What kind of agreement is 
required?” 
The first step in reconstructing Kay’s position is identifying the relevant “individual 
intentions”.  From context it appears that by “individual intentions” Kay means “intended 
semantic meaning” as opposed to “intended purpose.”  If this is so, there are two possible 
construals of the individual mental states that would constitute “intended semantic meanings.”  
The first construal is that these are “occurrent mental states,” that is conscious thoughts about the 
meaning of the provisions.  On this construal, the theory would work, but only if the occurrent 
mental states actually occurred.  But that seems unlikely, since many framers or ratifiers will 
have not actually have had the requisite conscious thoughts about each and every clause.  In fact, 
in many cases, we would expect that some ratifiers would not have read some of the clauses; in 
other cases, the clause would be read without any occurrent mental state that assigns semantic 
content to the clause.  If the “shared intentions” must be “occurrent mental states,” then it seems 
unlikely that the necessary “shared occurrent mental states” would actually have come into being 
and done the necessary work of producing meaning. 
The second construal of the mental states would be that they are dispositional.  This construal 
is more plausible—since all that would be necessary is that the framers and ratifiers would have 
been able to provide an interpretation of the semantic content if asked.  On this construal, the 
requisite mental states exist so long as the framers and ratifiers could produce an interpretation of 
the language when asked. 
(d) Dispositional Mental States as Shared Intentions 
Our next question is: “Assuming that the relevant mental states are dispositional, what are the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for saying that the dispositional mental state is shared?  There 
are four possibilities: (1) the states must be identical, (2) some subset must be identical, (3) the 
content is a superset, or (4) the content is given by conventional semantic meaning.  We will 
examine each of these possibilities in turn. 
(i) Identical Mental States 
The first possibility is that the mental states are shared if and only if the content of all the 
dispositional mental states is identical.  If identity of content is required, it is very unlikely that 
the Constitution has any meaning at all.  Identity is a very strong condition, and any variation 
would result in a failure of meaning.  It seems unlikely that many clauses of the constitution 
would have produced identical dispositional mental states in each and every framer and ratifier.  
For example, suppose that some framers and ratifiers thought “commerce” meant “economic 
activity,” some thought it meant “exchange for value of goods,” and some thought it meant 
“purchase, sale, or transportation of commodities.”  It might be that one of these meanings was 
the “conventional semantic meaning,” and the other two were deviant meanings—held by only a 
tiny number of ratifiers.  If identity of mental states is required, then the term “commerce” would 
have no meaning at all. 
(ii) A Subset of Mental States 





The second possibility is that all that is required is that there be some subset of content that is 
identical, i.e., that even if the dispositional mental states diverge in some respects, the shared 
intentions exclude the zone of divergence and include only the zone of convergence.  Once 
again, there are two possibilities, depending on the construal of the group that must have the 
identical mental states: (1) the group might consist of all the framers or ratifiers, or (2) the group 
might consist of a sufficient number of framers or ratifiers to secure approval of the relevant 
provision. 
(a) The Subset Shared by All 
If the requirements is that the mental states must be shared by all framers and ratifiers, it 
seems unlikely that the necessary sharing will occur.  If even a single ratifier had a nonstandard 
interpretation that did not converge, then the provision would have no meaning.  Moreover, the 
zone of convergence might not have been endorsed by many or any of the ratifiers—it would 
depend, of course, on the particular provision and the range of interpretations.  This last point 
can be illustrated with an example.  Take the “right to bear arms” in the Second Amendment.  
Suppose that there was a range of opinion about the meaning of “shall not be infringed.”  Most 
of the ratifying state legislators, if asked, would say “infringed” means “prohibition or 
unreasonable regulation,” but a tiny minority would have said “infringed” means “prohibition.”  
If the meaning is provided by the zone of convergence, then the Second Amendment means only 
“prohibition.”  But it is quite possible that the Second Amendment would not have been ratified 
had that meaning been clearly communicated—perhaps because of a worry about the negative 
pregnant. 
(b) The Subset Shared by the Enactment Group 
The second version of the subset possibility focuses on the group necessary to for proposal 
and ratification.153  On this account, the semantic content of a constitutional provision is provided 
by the subset of the content of the dispositional mental states shared by the group of actors which 
is the minimum necessary for enactment of the provisions.  Let us call this view the enactment 
group theory. 
For example, in the case of a constitutional amendment, the minimum group necessary to 
secure ratification consists of two-thirds of the members of the House of Representatives, two-
thirds of the members of the Senate, and a majority of the members of three-quarters of the fifty 
state legislatures—the enactment group.  Let us simplify the problem by assuming that each of 
these bodies has four members, and that there are only four states.  In this simplified version, 
proposal and ratification requires the votes of 3 Representatives, 3 Senators, and 3 
Representatives in each of 3 States.  Let us assume that we have an Amendment.  We are 
assuming that the semantic content of the Amendment is not given by its conventional semantic 
meaning, but is, instead, a function of the individual semantic intentions of the members of the 
House, Senate, and State legislatures (but in some cases, these intentions may match the public 
meaning). 
We can illustrate this with an example.  I am going to describe this example twice.  One in 
nontechnical language and the second time using abstract notation.  Here is simple version.  
Suppose the amendment is the Equality Clause, which reads, “No state shall deny any person 
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that treatment required by equality.”  Some of the Senators, Representatives and Legislators have 
the following linguistic intention: “No state shall discriminate against any racial minority group.  
And no state shall unreasonably discriminate against women.  And no state shall discriminate 
against gays, lesbians, or transsexuals.”  But some have different intentions.  Some believe that it 
only applies to race; others that it only applies to race and gender, and so forth.  Others believe 
the clause means: “No state shall discriminate on the basis of race.  And no state shall 
discriminate on the basis of gender.  And no state shall discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation.”  Let us also suppose that there is a deviant understanding: “No state shall deny any 
person an equal share of wealth and income.” 
That was the nontechnical version.  We can represent this same picture by representing the 
content of the dispositional mental states that constitutes the linguistic intentions of each member 
as a series of propositions that are members of sets.  We can use the lower case letters p, q, r, s, t, 
u, and v to represent the propositions.  For example, a Senator might believe the content of 
Amendment is a set with the single member p or the set that includes p and q and so forth.  Let 
us imagine that the conventional semantic meaning of our Amendment is the following set (p, q, 
r)  but that the some individual members have deviant intents such as is (p, q) and a very small 
number have a completely different understanding (r, s, t).  One member has a deviant and 
unique understanding (v). The following table would describe successful agreement on semantic 
intent.  The critical zone is indicated by gray shading. 
 
Table 1: Enactment Group Theory 
 Proposal Ratification 
 House Senate State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4 
Member 1 p, q, r p, q p, r p, q p s, t, u 
Member 2 p, q p, q, r p, q, r p, q, r p, q, r s, t 
Member 3 p, q, r p, q, r p, q, r p, q, r p, q, r s 
Member 4 s, t, u q, r s, t, u s, t q, r v 
 
Recall that we are pursuing the possibility that group intention need not be unanimous.  
Instead it will be sufficient if there is a subset of intentions upon which the group that is legally 
sufficient to secure ratification agrees.  The linguistic intentions in the gray zone all include 
agreement on the subset p, so the meaning of the Amendment is p.  Translating back to the 
nontechnical version, the semantic content is “No state shall discriminate against any racial 
minority group.” 
The hypothetical set of linguistic intentions identified in the Table illustrates the difference 
between the two interpretations of the second possibility.  If the meaning of the Amendment was 
the subset that reflected agreement among all those involved in proposal and ratification, our 
hypothetical Amendment would have no meaning.  There is no single proposition from the list 
(p, q, r, s, t, u, v) upon which all the members agree.  But if we limit the group to the enactment 
group, the Amendment does have meaning: it means p, because p is the subset that is common to 
all the sets in gray zone.  Notice that p is not included in any of the sets outside the gray zone, 
but that does not matter because the gray zone is sufficient for the amendment to become legally 
effective. 
We are now in a position to assess this option.  Notice that it solves the problem posed by the 
possibility that a deviant understanding by a single member or small group would result in a 





constitutional provision that would have no meaning at all.  The enactment group theory allows 
us to disregard deviant mental states held by small groups—only the enactment group counts. 
Nonetheless, the idea that the collective intentions problem can be overcome by identifying 
the meaning of an amendment with a subset of linguistic intentions shared by the enactment 
group does not work.  The enactment group theory is not actually a theory of interpretation 
(recognition or discovery or the semantic content) of the Constitution; instead, this theory is a 
theory of the construction of legal content.  This point may not have been obvious without 
consideration of the distinction between semantic content and legal content developed in this 
Article.154  The enactment group theory applies a legal rule (the enactment rule) to the 
supposedly salient linguistic facts (the dispositional mental states) yielding the legal content of 
the constitutional provision.  If the enactment group theory were a theory of linguistic meaning, 
it would produce the following anomaly: a constitutional meaning would not acquire linguistic 
meaning until the moment of enactment.  If the enactment group theory were a theory of 
linguistic meaning, the implication would have been that the Amendment was meaningless up to 
the point when sufficient mental states to create meaning came into being.  But this conclusion is 
absurd: constitutional amendments plausibly acquire legal content when ratified but they must 
have linguistic meaning in order to be ratified.155 
(iii) A Superset of Mental States  
The third possibility is that the shared intention is the superset of all the individual 
interpretations.  The third possibility is a nonstarter for at least two reasons.  First, it is possible 
that the superset can and likely will include inconsistent beliefs about meaning.  For example, 
one framer might believe that “necessary and proper” means “convenient” and another might 
believe that it means “essential,” but it cannot mean both, because things that are convenient can 
be nonessential.  Second, on the superset interpretation, even a single framer or ratifier with a 
deviant understanding would add to the meaning of the Constitution.  If every framer but one, 
thought that “high crimes and misdemeanors” meant “offenses against the criminal law of some 
state” and one framer thought it meant “offenses against the criminal law of some state or the 
criminal law of England,” then the meaning would include “offenses against the criminal law of 
England” because that superset includes the mental states of each and every framer and ratifier.  
Returning to the prior example, the superset of meanings of the hypothetical equality clause 
would include both the a prohibition of discrimination against racial minority groups and a 
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of race, creating potentially contradictory rules as 
applied to affirmative action programs. 
(iv) Conventional Semantic Meaning 
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There is a fourth possibility.  The key to the fourth possibility is Kay’s reference to “mutual 
communication of individual intentions.”  What is meant by “mutual communication?”  If we 
were talking about a group engaged in explicit discussion, the answer is simple.  If we talk about 
the meaning, and reach an agreement, then we can have identical semantic intentions.  But the 
circumstances of constitutional utterance do not allow for this solution.  Ratification conventions 
were mass events, and there were multiple conventions.  Under these circumstances, explicit 
agreement on identical semantic content is impossible, and such explicit agreement did not, in 
fact, occur.  But this does not imply that shared intentions are impossible.  Shared intentions are 
possible if the parties rely on conventional semantic meaning, but this solution converts Kay’s 
theory to original public meaning originalism. 
In the end, the only viable interpretations of Kay’s defense of original intentions originalism 
transform his view into a version of original public meaning originalism is no accident.  
Collective speakers’ meaning requires that the collective speakers intend their collective 
audience to collectively understand the collective utterance on the basis of audience’s collective 
recognition of the collective speakers’ collective intentions.  All those “collectives” are in 
immediately prior sentence because the “common knowledge”156 of the speaker’s intentions must 
be shared for collective speakers meaning to satisfy the success conditions for communication.  
There is a way that this trick can be accomplished short of express or tacit agreement among the 
collective speakers and the collective audience: the trick can be accomplished through reliance 
on conventional semantic meaning.  Given that express or tacit agreement did not (and could not) 
occur in the case of the United States Constitution, it follows that its meaning is its clause 
meaning and not its framers meaning. 
(2) The Collective Recognition Problem 
The collective recognition problem is the direct correlate of the collective intentions problem.  
It flows directly from the requirements of speakers meaning.  Speakers meaning is conveyed 
when the audience grasps the meaning on the basis of its recognition of the speaker's intention.  
When an individual speaker utters a sentence in direct proximity to a single listener, successful 
illocutionary uptake requires that one listener grasp the intended meaning.  When the audience of 
an utterance consists of many individuals, the precondition for what we might call “total 
success” is that each and every member of the audience recognizes the utterer’s intention.  In the 
context of the Constitution, the requirement for total success would have to be that the collective 
utterers intended a hugely disparate group of citizens and officials over an extended period of 
time would all grasp identical intentions.  That is the speaker must have intended that meaning 
be conveyed on the basis of “common knowledge”157 of relevant intentions by all speakers and 
audience members. 
Total success would not be required for constitutional communication to achieve its goals.  
Substantial misunderstanding by some judges, officials, and citizens could be consistent with 
sufficient understanding for the Constitution to serve the settlement function.  Instead what 
would have been required is an approximation of total success.  To the extent that the framers 
could not have believed that the conditions of constitutional utterance could result in something 
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approximating collective recognition of identical intentions, then they could not have understood 
their utterance as communicating framers meaning. 
(3) The Publicity Problem 
For framers meaning to succeed, the framers intentions must have been public.  But as we 
know, the conditions for ratification and interpretation of the Constitution in the framing era did 
not satisfy the publicity condition.  The records of the Philadelphia Convention were not 
available to the ratifiers, the first Congress, members of the first Cabinet, or the judges first 
appointed pursuant to the Judiciary Act of 1789.158  Likewise, if we view the ratifiers of the 
constitution to be the relevant utters, the records of the ratifying conventions were unavailable as 
well.  This is the familiar problem of “secret intentions.”  If the constitution was uttered under 
conditions such that the audience at whom the constitutional utterance was directed could not 
have recognized the framers intentions, then framers meaning could not have been conveyed.  
Common knowledge requires publicity. 
(4) The Intentional State Problem 
The final problem is that framers meaning requires a very particular intentional state on the part 
of the framers.  It requires that the framers have intended that their audience grasp their 
intentions.  But if Jefferson Powell is right and the original understanding of original intent was 
that the framers intentions were not understood as the meaning of the constitution, then the 
conditions for the possibility of framers meaning are not satisfied.159 
This point is subtle, and its force may not be immediately apparent.  The success conditions 
for framers meaning require that the framers have intended that the constitutional audience 
understand the semantic content of the constitution on the basis of their recognition of the 
framers intention that they do so.  This requirement is very specific, and it implies that not just 
any intentions will do for framers meaning to account for the possibility and actuality of 
constitutional communication.  As lawyers would say, a specific intent would be required.  
Although there might be a dispute about Powell’s thesis, to my knowledge no one has produced 
evidence that the specific intent required for framers meaning can be found in the historical 
record.  For example, it might be the case that there is evidence that purposes that formed part of 
the publicly available context of constitutional utterance would have been considered given the 
practices of judicial interpretation (and other forms of interpretation) in the framing era.  Such 
evidence is consistent with the clause-meaning thesis, and does not provide the right kind of 
evidence for the intention required for framers meaning to get off the ground. 
The intentional state problem is an independent problem with framers meaning.  This 
objection provides a sufficient reason for rejecting original intentions originalism as a theory of 
the semantic meaning of the Constitution.  But in addition to its status as an independent 
problem, the intentional state problem interacts with each of the prior three problems.  The 
required complex intentional state must have been shared by all of the framers, recognized by the 
divergent addressees, and publicly available.  But none of these conditions appear to have been 
met. 
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e) The Success Conditions for Framers Meaning Were Not Satisfied 
More could be said, but enough has been said to make the conclusion intelligible.  The 
success conditions for framers meaning were not met when the United States Constitution was 
proposed, ratified, and implemented.  So the meaning of the Constitution cannot be understood 
on the model of speakers meaning.  This entails the further conclusion that the semantic content 
and illocutionary force of the Constitution is not its framers meaning. 
One more thing.  This conclusion is not the consequence of a normative argument.  The 
model of framers meaning fails because the conditions for success of framers meaning were not 
satisfied as a matter of historical fact.  The success conditions derived, not from a normative 
theory of constitutional practice, but from general considerations in the theory of meaning.  It is 
not that we chose not to attribute framers meaning to the Constitution.  Rather, it is that the 
Constitution does not have framers meaning. 
2. Clause Meaning 
The alternative to framers meaning is clause meaning.  In this subpart, we will develop an 
account of clause meaning in the following steps.  As a first approximation, we will take clause 
meaning as the semantic and pragmatic equivalent of original public meaning originalism.  This 
account will be supplemented by a second approximation, which views clause meaning as the 
constitutional equivalent of sentence meaning (or expression meaning).  Then the first and 
second approximations will be modified in three ways: (1) the notion of constitutional context 
will modify the Gricean notion of “timeless” meaning, (2) the notion of a division of linguistic 
labor will be deployed to reconcile “public meaning” with the notion of a constitutional “term of 
art,” (3) the notion of constitutional implicature will be introduced to make room for the 
possibility that the illocutionary force of the constitution goes beyond the semantic content of the 
constitutional text, and (4) the notion of constitutional stipulation creates room for the possibility 
that the constitution itself creates terms of art such as “House of Representatives.” 
a) First Approximation: Clause Meaning as the Semantic Equivalent of Original 
Meaning Originalism 
How can we understand clause meaning?  One approximation is provided by original public 
meaning originalism.  As Blackstone wrote, “[w]ords are generally to be understood in their 
usual and most known signification.”160  The original-meaning version of originalism emphasizes 
the meaning that the Constitution (or its amendments) would have had to the relevant audience at 
the time of its adoptions. Thus, the relevant question in the recognition or discovery161 of clause 
meaning is, “How would the Constitution of 1789 have been understood by a competent speaker 
of American English at the time it was adopted?”  This question points us to ordinary and 
conventional meanings of the words and phrases of the Constitution.  Rather than assigning these 
words and phrases special or idiosyncratic meanings based on the secret and divergent intentions 
of multiple authors, an ordinary member of the public would have been required to look to 
common usage and public meanings. 
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We (twenty-first century citizens and officials) are not ordinary members of the public of 
1789: contemporary American English is not identical to late-eighteenth century American 
English.  In many cases particular, however, the contemporary meanings of the types 
corresponding to constitutional utterances tokens will be identical to the meanings at the time of 
utterance.  In theory and practice, however, there can be and are cases of divergence.  For us to 
determinate whether there is divergence with respect to a particular clause, we would be required 
to consult evidence as to late eighteenth-century usage.  So, for example, we might consult 
newspapers, political pamphlets, and a variety of other general sources for evidence about the 
meaning of particular phrases. 
We might also consult evidence that is directly connected to the drafting and ratification of 
the Constitution.  For example, the debates at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia may 
shed light on the question how the Constitution produced by the Convention would have been 
understood by those who did not participate in the secret deliberations of the drafters. The 
ratification debates and Federalist Papers can be supplemented by evidence of ordinary usage 
and by the constructions placed on the Constitution by the political branches and the states in the 
early years after its adoption. 
One more point about the first approximation.  The notion of clause meaning is deployed as 
part of an account of the semantic content and illocutionary force of the constitution.  The 
theories called “the New Originalism,” “original meaning originalism,” or “public meaning 
originalism” may have semantic and illocutionary components, but those components are 
embedded in theories with explicit normative content.  The point of the first approximation is to 
extract the implicit semantic and pragmatic claims from the New Originalism.  The extracted 
claims are related to but not identical with the claims made by the New Originalists themselves. 
b) Second Approximation: Clause Meaning as the Constitutional Equivalent of Speakers 
Meaning 
The problems with framers meaning suggest that our understanding of constitutional meaning 
should be modeled on Grice’s conception of sentence meaning and not on speaker’s meaning.  
Just as the speakers meaning of a Constitution can be called “framers meaning,” likewise, the 
“sentence meaning” (or “expression meaning”) of a Constitution can be called “clause meaning.”  
Clause meaning is the semantic content and illocutionary force that the various provisions would 
be understood as conveying, on the assumption that the clause was written with disparate 
intentions and with knowledge that it would be ratified and interpreted by readers who would 
have very limited access to information about the framing. 
Grice cashed out sentence meaning or expression meaning in terms of conventional semantic 
meaning.  The second approximation of clause meaning adopts this analysis, and hence can be 
stated as the view that the clause meaning of the constitution is the conventional semantic 
meaning of its words and phrases.  But as soon as we put that formulation on the table, we also 
need to note that it will require modification.  The discussion that follows qualifies the first and 
second approximations. 
c) Modifications of the First and Second Approximations 
The first and second approximations would limit constitutional meaning to the conventional 





over framers meaning, but these are only approximations.  A fuller version of the conception of 
clause meaning requires the introduction of four modifications. 
(1) First Modification: The Publicly Available Constitutional Context of Constitutional 
Utterance 
The first modification is a function of the fact that the act of constitutional utterance occurred 
in a context.162  The framers and ratifiers of the Constitution would not have assumed that the 
Constitution would be interpreted by readers who had no information about the context of 
utterance.  Certain features of the context could be assumed to be accessible (under normal 
conditions) by anyone who would read the Constitution in the course of what we might call 
“American constitutional practice,” that is, as part of the activity of interpreting and construing 
the Constitution in the role of official or citizen.163  Not every feature of the context of 
constitutional utterance could have been assumed to be publicly available in this way.   The 
whole context of constitutional utterance consists of a vast array of facts, ranging from the trivial 
to the fundamental.  But some of these facts would have been assumed by the framers and 
ratifiers to be publicly available to everyone who engages in American constitutional practice.  
Call these facts “the publicly available context of constitutional utterance” or “the public 
context” for short.  The precise contours of the public context can only be defined by careful 
inquiry, but one element is indisputable: the publicly available context of each individual clause 
includes the whole constitutional text.164 
The public context is relevant to clause meaning in the following way.  Given that framers 
and ratifiers believed that readers engaged in American constitutional practice would know the 
public context and that they would also know that the framers and ratifiers would believe that 
they would have such knowledge, the public available context satisfies the conditions for 
common knowledge and can successfully determine clause meaning.  Here is an example of a 
fact that lies within the domain of the public context: the constitutional text is the text of the 
                                                
162 This point is clearly made by Jack Balkin.  See Balkin, supra note 78, at 16 n. 30: 
Ronald Dworkin’s distinction between “semantic originalism” and “expectations originalism,” Dworkin, 
Comment in A Matter of  Interpretation, at 116, may be a little misleading here. The term “semantic 
originalism” might suggest that Dworkin is making a distinction between semantics– the dictionary 
definitions of words-- and pragmatics– the meanings of words in use or context. The problem is that original 
meaning-- either in Dworkin’s sense or mine-- cannot be limited to semantics. It is clearly also about 
pragmatics, that is, meaning in use and context. For example, Dworkin agrees that if we discover that certain 
words like “bill of attainder” were employed as terms of art, we must use that specialized meaning and not the 
dictionary definition of the individual words employed. Dworkin, Reflections On Fidelity, 65 Fordham L. 
Rev. 1799, 1806-1808 (1997). That is a claim about pragmatics, not semantics. In like fashion, we need to 
know whether, in context of use, what seems to be abstract language in the constitutional text (say of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause) is attempting to embrace an abstract principle, or whether 
it was understood in context at the time to refer to a laundry list of relatively specific applications. That too, is 
a question of pragmatics rather than semantics. 
For reasons that are made clear in text, I do not agree with Balkin’s rough and ready definition of semantics, but the 
thrust of this passage is consistent with the general position articulated herein. 
163 Of course, one can imagine possible worlds in which the public context of constitutional utterance would 
become lost because of some science-fiction calamity that destroyed all the relevant records and memories.  These 
possibilities are non inconsistent with an assumption that in the actual world, some elements of the context of 
constitutional utterance could be expected to remain accessible as long as the Constitution remained in force. 
164 See infra Part III.H.2.a)(3), “Constitutional Holism,” p. 109. 





Constitution of the United States—the nation state that came into existence as a result of the 
Revolutionary War between the American Colonies and Britain.  Importantly, the publicly 
available context may include facts about the general point or purpose of the provision (as 
opposed to “the intention of the author”) and those facts may resolve ambiguities.165 
A full account of clause meaning would include a theory of the criteria for inclusion in the set 
of facts that constitute the publicly available context of constitutional utterance.  Application of 
the conception of clause meaning to particular issues of interpretation and construction would 
require the identification of those aspects of the public context that are relevant to the issue at 
hand.  On this occasion, I will provide neither the criteria nor an enumeration of the facts that 
meet the criteria.  Rather, the limited purpose of this discussion is to introduce the public context 
as a modification of the conception of clause meaning. 
Given the notion of the publicly available context, we can give a more precise formulation of 
the notion of the semantic content of a given constitutional clause: 
The semantic content of a constitutional clause (CC) in the natural language English (E) 
relative to the publicly available context of constitutional utterance (PAC) is found by 
taking the semantic values of the parts of CC and combining them in accordance with the 
semantic and syntactic composition rules of E.166 
The parts of a clause are the meaningful units of meaning, either words or phrases.  If this 
formulation seems inaccessible because of its mode of expression, here is a paraphrase.  To 
understand what a clause of the constitution means, (1) look at the ordinary meaning of the 
words and phrases, (2) see how they combine given the rules of English syntax, (3) consider the 
context, including the whole text of the Constitution and the circumstances of its adoptions that 
the contemporary and future readers could be expected to know.  The first modification focuses 
on the third element of this paraphrase. 
 
* * * 
 
Originalists are sometimes accused of ignoring context, but that way of framing the issue is 
far too simple.  Context isn’t all or nothing.  To get clear about the proper role of context in the 
recognition or discovery of semantic content, we need a theory of meaning and an account of the 
role of context that is sensitive to the circumstances of communication.  Perhaps it is just too 
cute to say: “we must contextualize the role of context,” but that way of saying it gets to the 
heart of the matter.  Semantic Originalism both offers a theory of semantic content and explains 
both why context matters and which features of context contribute to meaning in ways that are 
consistent with an account of the possibility conditions for the success of constitutional 
communication.167 
 
                                                
165 As a consequence, the theory of clause meaning does not suffer from a “missing step” problem. See Abner 
Greene, The Missing Step of Textualism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913 (2006).  Assessment of clause meaning does 
not require arbitrary exclusion of any information about the context of utterance—all such evidence can come in, but 
only in order to determine the conventional semantic meaning in light of the publicly available context. 
166 Following Herman Cappelen, Semantics and Pragmatics: Some Central Issues in CONTEXT SENSITIVITY AND 
SEMANTIC MINIMALISM 3, 4 (Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007). 
167 For an example of the criticism, see Saul Cornell, The Original Meaning of Original Understanding, 67 Md. 





* * * 
(2) Second Modification: The Division of Linguistic Labor and Terms of Art 
The first approximation treats clause meaning as original public meaning and the second 
approximation focuses on conventional semantic meaning.  Both approximations elide the 
possibility that some of the words and phrases that comprise the constitutional text are “terms of 
art,” the meaning of which is accessible only to a specialist audience.  Blackstone put it this way: 
terms of art “must be taken according to the acceptation of the learned in each art, trade, and 
science.”168 
For example, the phrase “letters of marque and reprisal”169 might not have been familiar to the 
ordinary citizen or common human at the time the Constitution was drafted, ratified, and put into 
effect.  If the meaning of the Constitution is limited to the ordinary public meaning of the words 
and phrases, then any terms of art included in the constitution would fail to have any meaning at 
all and constitutional communication would misfire.  It appears, however, that constitutional 
communication succeeded despite the inclusion of terms of art.  Is this a problem for Semantic 
Originalism? 
The solution to this problem of terms of art is to recognize a division of linguistic labor.170  A 
full specification (or theory) of the division of linguistic labor is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but the intuitive idea is simply.  When a member of the public at large encounters a constitutional 
term of art, her understanding of its meaning can be described as involving a process of deferral.  
Consider the following example.  An ordinary citizen reads the phrase “letters of marquee and 
reprisal,” and thinks, “Hmm.  I wonder what that means.  It sounds like technical legal language 
to me.  If I want to know what it means, I should probably ask a lawyer.”  That is, ordinary 
citizens would recognize a division of linguistic labor and defer to the understanding of the term 
of art that would be the publicly available meaning to those who were members of the relevant 
group and those who shared the understandings of the members of the relevant group. 
This solution requires either that each constitutional term of art refer us to a single group, or 
to a group of groups that share the same understanding of the term of art.  For example, if both 
sailors and lawyers shared the same understanding of “letters of marquee and reprisal” then 
constitutional communication could succeed.  If different groups had different understandings of 
the same phrase, constitutional communication could still succeed, assuming the publicly 
available context of constitutional utterance allowed resolution of the resulting ambiguity. 
The contribution of the division of linguistic labor to Semantic Originalism is vividly 
illustrated by consideration of the controversy over John McCain’s eligibility for the presidency 
as a “natural born citizen” given his birth to American citizens in Mexico.171  Article II of the 
Constitution provides: 
                                                
168 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, supra note 160, at 59. 
169 U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 8. 
170 The idea of a division of linguistic labor is usually attributed to Hilary Putnam. See Hilary Putnam, The 
Meaning of 'Meaning' in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, VOL. 2: MIND, LANGUAGE AND REALITY (Cambridge University 
Press, 1985); see also Robert Ware, The Division of Linguistic Labor and Speaker Competence, 34 PHILOSOPHICAL 
STUDIES 37 (1978); Mark Greenberg, "Incomplete Understanding, Deference, and the Content of Thought" . UCLA 
School of Law Research Paper No. 07-30 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030144. 
171 The discussion that follows is adapted from Lawrence B. Solum, And yet more on “natural born citizens,” 
Legal Theory Blog, March 4, 2008, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2008/03/and-yet-more-on.html and 
Lawrence B. Solum, McCain, Natural Born Citizens, and Originalism, Legal Theory Blog, February 29, 2008, 





No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of 
the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall 
any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five 
Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.172 
Is McCain a “natural born citizen”?  Without an account of semantic content that looks to the 
linguistic division of labor at the time of framing, the phrase is difficult to interpret.  The phrase 
“natural born citizen” does not have a distinctive sense in contemporary usage, and readings 
informed by contemporary usage of the individual words seem absurd.   Does “natural born” 
refer to “natural childbirth” where the contrast is with birth by Caesarian section or with the aid 
of painkillers and forceps?  If contemporary usage were the only limit on interpretation, this 
could be the meaning of the clause, but no one has seriously suggested that this is meaning of the 
provision. 
For example, we might speculate that linguistic practice at the time would have suggested the 
following scenario.  The relevant evidence might suggest that the key to unlocking the meaning 
of the phrase “natural born citizen” is recognition that it had become a "term of art" by 1789 with 
both a core content and a zone subject to legislative determination. The core content is that 
"natural born citizens" must include persons who status as citizens accrues at birth: no one whose 
citizenship resulted from a subsequent event, such as naturalization can be a "natural born 
citizen" and all persons who were born of citizens on American soil must be "natural born 
citizens."  The zone subject to legislative determination concerns the class of persons that can be 
added to the category.  Possibilities include but are not limited to: (1) persons born of foreign 
parents on American soil, (2) persons born of American citizens on Foreign soil, (3) persons 
born of mixed (American and foreign parents).  The 14th Amendment handles category (1) and 
part of (3): hence all persons born on American soil are now "natural born citizens," but 
Congress has the power, through immigration law, to confer citizenship at birth to other groups, 
e.g., to category (2).  If Congress does confer citizenship at birth, then "natural born citizenship" 
follows automatically--no further action is required. 
If this scenario were correct, then the difficulty with interpreting the phrase in the twenty-first 
century would be that it is would have become a lost term of art.  First, "natural born citizenship" 
would have been a "term of art."  "Natural born citizen" is not now, and probably was not in 
1789 commonly used by ordinary speakers outside of specialist discourse (e.g., writings and 
other utterances concerning legal and political status among those learned in the law and political 
theory).  The phrase is itself infelicitous--in the following technical sense: the reference of 
"natural born citizenship" is not derivable from the concatenated word meaning of the phrase.  
"Natural born citizens" are not citizens whose birth is natural.   Indeed, the term natural makes a 
nonobvious contribution to the meaning of the phrase--apparently being a product of the sense of 
natural obligation in 17th and 18th century political theory.  So "natural born citizen" would have 
been a term of art the meaning of which was fixed by specialist usage.  The meaning of the 
phrase seems to have changed over time--originally referring only to citizenship acquired at birth 
                                                                                                                                                       
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2008/02/mccain-natural.html.  Extended versions can be found at Lawrence 
B. Solum, Originalism and the Natural Born Citizen Clause, University of Illinois, Public Law & Legal Theory 
Research Paper, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1263885 (September 5, 2008) and at Lawrence 
B. Solum, Commentary, Originalism and the Natural Born Citizen Clause, 107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 
22 (2008), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol107/solum.pdf. 





by persons born of native parents on native soil and then extending to other forms of citizenship 
at birth that resulted from legislative acts.  Second, the specialist usage that would have been 
familiar in 1789 is now lost--because the phrase is no longer in common circulation among the 
relevant specialists--immigration lawyers and political theorists. 
If "natural born citizenship" is a lost term of art, that would explain why it is now 
"semantically inaccessible" to modern readers.  We just don't know what it means.  To determine 
the semantic content of the phrase, we need to recover the original meaning--the meaning the 
phrase had at the time of constitutional utterance.  We look for public meaning, and discover that 
the division of linguistic labor in the late 19th century takes us to a specialist discourse.  We 
examine specialist usage during the relevant period and recover the lost semantic content.  This 
case of semantic opacity illustrates what we might call the "inescapability of originalism."  
Without resorting to originalist investigation, "natural born citizenship" lacks meaning.  The core 
insight of originalism, that semantic content is fixed at the time of utterance, when combined 
with the division of linguistic labor, is the key to unlocking the puzzle of “natural born 
citizenship.” 
These linguistic speculations are offered for a very limited purpose—to illustrate the second 
modification of the clause-meaning thesis.  It is at least possible that some provisions of the 
Constitution have semantic content that can only be recovered by positing a division of linguistic 
labor and the existence of constitutional terms of art.  The natural-born-citizenship clause is a 
plausible candidate for a constitutional term of art, but confirmation of that hypothesis would 
require a careful examination of the historical evidence. 
(3) Third Modification: Constitutional Implicature 
The third modification of the two approximations is found in the idea of constitutional 
implicature.  Recall Grice’s notion of conversational implicature—we can mean things we do not 
say.  Or to put the same point a bit differently, we can mean things implicitly that we do not say 
explicitly.173 
The possibility of implicit meanings is open to constitutions.  It is possible that the publicly 
accessible meaning of the constitution would include illocutionary uptake that is not contained in 
the semantic content of the constitutional text.  For example, in McCulloch v. Maryland,174 
Justice Marshall argues that the power to transport and deliver the mail can be implied from the 
power to establish post offices and postal roads: 
Take, for example, the power "to establish post-offices and post-roads." This power is 
executed by the single act of making the establishment. But from this has been inferred the 
power and duty of carrying the mail along the post road from one post office to another. And 
from this implied power has again been inferred the right to punish those who steal letters 
from the post office, or rob the mail.175 
This is a clear example of constitutional implicature—inference from what is said in the text to 
what is meant but not stated. 
Another example of possible constitutional implicature is provided by the Ninth Amendment 
to the Constitution.  The Ninth Amendment reads as follows: 
                                                
173 The treatment here is shallow.  For a deeper discussion, see Marmor, supra note 127. 
174 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
175 Id. at 417. 





The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.176 
The semantic content of the Ninth Amendment is quite limited.  It states a prohibition, “shall 
not,” the scope of which is limited by the syntax of the clause to forbidden constructions, that is, 
those constructions which deny or disparage rights retained by the people on the basis of the 
enumeration of certain rights in the Constitution.  It does not directly state that the there are 
“rights retained by the people” it does not forbid the infringement by the federal government of 
rights retained by the people.  But the existence of rights retained by the people and a prohibition 
on their infringement could be a necessary implication of the Ninth Amendment. 
On this occasion, I do not wish to claim that particular instances of constitutional implicature 
exist, or indeed, that there is even one such instance.  The claim that I do wish to make is that if 
there are instances of necessary constitutional implicature, then those instances are part of the 
meaning of the Constitution and they should be understood as within the “theory of clause 
meaning” as that theory is advanced in this article.  I use the locution “within the ‘theory of 
clause meaning’” deliberately—as distinct from “within the clause meaning”—to emphasize that 
constitutional implicature is a distinct phenomenon which is conceptually independent of clause 
meaning itself. 
(4) Fourth Modification: Constitutional Stipulations 
Some words and phrases used in the Constitution could not have had conventional semantic 
meanings that predate the Constitution itself.  For example, the Constitution of 1789 uses 
“Congress of the United States,” “Senate,” and “House of Representatives.”  The Constitution 
brought these institutions into being and named them.  So the Constitution of 1789 gives these 
words and phrases newly stipulated meanings.  “Congress” refers to the legislative body 
composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives; the Senate and the House are the 
names for the bodies with prescribed compositions and functions. 
Because these entities did not exist prior to the actual implementation of the Constitution of 
1789, it cannot be the case that the semantic content of their names (“Congress of the United 
States,” “Senate,” and “House of Representatives”) was fixed by conventional semantic meaning 
as of the moments of drafting or ratification.  To see this clearly, consider the possible world in 
which the Constitution of 1789 was ratified but not implemented.  (Suppose that the English 
invaded and successfully reimposed colonial status on the thirteen original colonies.)  The term 
Congress would never have come to refer to the Congress of the United States of America that 
meets in Washington, because that entity would not have come into being. 
The Senate and the House of Representatives were brought into being by the implementation 
of the Constitution—the actual convening of the first Congress.  The relevant provisions of 
Article I stipulate the conditions for implementation.  These meaning of these stipulative 
provisions—which specify the composition of the House and Senate and their functions—are 
themselves composed of words and phrases with clause meanings (i.e., conventional semantic 
meanings or meanings given by the four modifications outlined here.) 
                                                





d) The First Restatement of Semantic Originalism: Clause Meaning is the Original 
Semantic Meaning of the Constitution to the Relevant Audience in Context, Plus Any 
Implications or Stipulated Meanings  
At this point, we can restate the tentative version of Semantic Originalism that is implicit in 
the discussion so far: 
Semantic Originalism:  Semantic Originalism is the view that the meaning (semantic 
content and illocutionary force of the Constitution) is the clause meaning of the 
Constitution at the time of adoption and ratification to the relevant audience, given the 
division of linguistic labor and the publicly available context, plus any additional content 
and force that results from necessary constitutional implicature or stipulated meanings. 
This statement is tentative and subject to further modification and restatement,177 but it is 
sufficiently developed and precise so as to point in the direction that a full development of 
Semantic Originalism would take. 
D. What’s In a Name, Take Two: The Sense in Which Clause Meaning is Original Meaning 
Is the theory of clause meaning that is offered here fairly described as an originalist view?  Is 
Semantic Originalism (at this stage in the argument, the union of the fixation thesis with the 
theory of clause meaning) really a form of originalism?  As before, the answers to these 
questions should acknowledge that labels are less important than substance.  So long as the 
discussion is clear and terms are defined, we can stipulate different senses of terms and phrases 
like “originalism” and “living constitutionalism.”  If living constitutionalists or other anti-
originalists insist on the claim that the theory name “originalism” does not encompass the thesis 
that the original public meaning of the Constitution provides its semantic content, they may so 
stipulate.  Such stipulations will make communication awkward and misleading to casual 
readers, but so long as the stipulations are explicit and precise, mutual understanding among 
scholars will remain possible. 
I have already noted that the fixation thesis provides the core content of originalism, and that 
affirmation of this thesis is essential to the normative arguments used to justify the moral 
salience of originalism.  Because Semantic Originalism incorporates the fixation thesis it is a 
member of the family of originalist theories.  But there are two additional reasons for insisting 
that any attempt to stipulate that Semantic Originalism is not a member of the family of 
originalist theories be expressed clearly and justified.  First, as a matter of intellectual history the 
relationship between Semantic Originalism and predecessor views, including the New 
Originalism or original-meaning originalism is clear and beyond dispute.178  Semantic 
Originalism traces its origins to the New Originalism. 
Second, as a matter of substantive content, it is clear that the notion of original public 
meaning that is central to the New Originalism is an internal component of view that is called 
“Semantic Originalism.”  If the New Originalism is a form of originalism, then given the 
                                                
177 See infra V.G, “The Second Restatement of Semantic Originalism,” p. 175. 
178 As the author of this Article, I am in a unique position to speak authoritatively about its origins and shaping 
influences, and there is no doubt that this view grew out of my encounters with both original-intentions originalism 
and the original-public meaning theories of Barnett and Whittington. 





relationship between the substance of Semantic Originalism and substance of the New 
Originalism, it follows that Semantic Originalism is a form of originalism. 
Given these two facts about Semantic Originalism, those who wish to stipulate that it is not an 
originalist theory owe us both an explanation for their stipulation and a clear acknowledgement 
that their use of the term originalist involves a stipulated definition that is contested by others 
who write in the field. 
E. The Case for the Fixation Thesis Revisited 
We have already examined the case for the fixation thesis.  The semantic content of an 
utterance is fixed at the time of utterance179 under normal conditions.  Because the meaning of 
words and phrases can change over time, the semantic content of an utterance token is 
necessarily fixed at the time of utterance.  This conclusion is consistent with another fact about 
meaning: the conventional meaning of an expression type can change over time.  Thus, the 
individual words and phrases that comprise the constitution could have different meanings if 
they were uttered in different contexts.  The phrase “We the People of the United States” would 
have a different meaning if it were uttered in the Preamble of the United States of Brazil in 1889, 
but it would simply be a mistake to infer the further conclusion that the phrase “We the People” 
in the Constitution of 1789 could mean “We the People of Brazil in 1889.”  This move involves 
a conceptual confusion between the meaning of utterance tokens and expression types. 
Although the meaning of expression types can vary over time, the meaning of an utterance 
token is fixed by the context of utterance.180  The Constitution of the United States is an utterance 
token: a text that was framed and ratified in a particular historical context.  The original 
Constitution itself declares that it was uttered in 1789.181  Various amendments were uttered 
when they were proposed and ratified.  The semantic content of each clause of the Constitution is 
fixed at the time of utterance by the conventional semantic meaning of the words and phrases 
(the expression types).   Although this point is expressed in technical language, it expresses a 
                                                
179 The “time of utterance” may be a period rather than a moment in the case of any written text.  In the case of 
the Constitution, there will be gaps between the framing period and the ratification period.  The most extreme case 
of such a gap is the 27th Amendment, which was proposed in 1789 and finally ratified in 1992, more than 202 years 
later.  The typical gap between framing and ratification is much shorter.  If linguistic practice were to change during 
the relevant period, then there might be more than one “conventional semantic meaning.”  Resolution of this 
question is not urgent, but as a matter of theory, I am inclined to the view that such changes create irreducible 
ambiguity to be resolved by a rule of construction.  The problem is not urgent because it is likely the case that public 
understanding at the time of ratification will defer to the earlier conventional semantic meaning: this can be seen as a 
special case of the division of linguistic labor.  In that case, the earlier meaning clear controls given the overall 
structure of the theory of clause meaning. 
180 See L.J. COHEN, THE DIVERSITY OF MEANING 3 (2d ed. 1966): 
A speech has a date and duration, not so its meaning.  When a speech is over nothing can change what 
is meant.  What has been said cannot be unsaid, though later remarks can contradict it.  Even the 
ambiguities in this evening's speech must remain such forever, though tomorrow's press conference may 
clarify the speaker's intentions.  Though the speech may be differently translated in different countries or at 
different periods, no one could judge the correctness of each new translation unless he assumed the 
meaning of the original speech to remain the same.  Though expositions of what has been said can change, 
they can also be criticized, and the question whether a given exposition is loose or close, fair or biased, 
accurate or inaccurate, would not arise unless the meaning itself were invariant under exposition. 
181 U.S. Const. art. VII (“Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the Seventeenth 
Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eight seven and of the Independence of 





very simple intuition.  The meaning of the Constitution is the meaning of the Constitution of the 
United States of America as it was framed and ratified in our history. 182  Words and phrases 
mean in context, and the context includes time and place. 
There are, however, circumstances in which the meaning of an expression token can seem to 
change over time.  Recall that when the fixation thesis was first introduced it was illustrated with 
the example of a twelfth-century letter using the term “deer,” which then referred to any four 
footed mammal.183  David Meyer suggests the following counter example: 
What if we likened the Constitution not to a letter, but to a tattered, 200-year-old traffic 
manual specifying the “rules of the road” (or even to a traffic sign at a complicated 
                                                
182 The discussion in Stephen R. Munzer & James W. Nickle, Does The Constitution Mean What It Always 
Meant?, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 1029, (1977), begins with the observation that the meaning of utterance tokens as 
opposed to utterance types is fixed at the time of utterance: 
[P]hilosophers often think of the meaning of an utterance as being fixed for the present and for the future by 
the author's language and intent. It is not, of course, problematic to say that change occurs in the meanings of 
words in a language; the meaning of “wonderful,” for example, is now somewhat different from what it was 
prior to the eighteenth century. But it is problematic to say that an utterance which a particular person made at a 
particular time can have one meaning at that time and another meaning later.  
Id. at 1043-44.  Munzer and Nickle argue that fixation does not extend to the Constitution for two reasons, but 
neither is actually inconsistent with the fixation thesis.  They express the first reason as follows: 
The first is that the original document cannot be counted an “utterance” in the usual sense. The standard 
or paradigm case of an utterance is when one person speaks or writes a sentence on a particular occasion; 
its meaning is typically a function of the utterer's intentions together with the context and the senses 
assigned to those words in grammatical combinations in a given language. In contrast, the sentences of the 
Constitution were products of more than one person (draftsmen, framers, ratifiers) and more than one time 
(successive drafting, debating, adoption, and ratification stages). No doubt in the process statements were 
made which are susceptible of being analyzed as standard utterances. But the eventual product is not thus 
susceptible: if the text of the Constitution is an utterance or set of utterances at all, it is not so in the 
standard sense. Its original meaning may, it is true, still be a function of the various intentions, contexts, 
and words that led to it. Yet if so, given the number of persons involved at different times and in different 
situations, that meaning will be an extraordinarily complex function of those elements. 
Id. at 1044.  In this passage, Munzer and Nickle provide reasons for rejecting what we have called “framers 
meaning,” but their analysis is consistent with what the “clause meaning.”  The complexity of the process by which 
clause meaning is produced does not provide a reason for rejecting the fixation thesis. 
Munzer and Nickle express their second objection to the fixation thesis as follows: 
The second reason is that the original text serves through authoritative interpreters to give ongoing 
guidance in changing circumstances. Perhaps the idea that the meaning of a text composed of standard 
utterances cannot change is satisfactory where no one is empowered to make official determinations of its 
meaning, or where the language is not intended to provide a reason for action, or where directives supplied 
by the text apply only in a finite number of static situations. But if we turn our attention to law, it *1045 
does not seem so strange that the current meaning of a constitutional provision should be the result of the 
activities of both the authors and the officials who applied it. Authoritative interpreters, in their institutional 
capacity of determining what a provision means in unanticipated situations, supplement or modify the 
meaning or content of the provision. 
Id. at 1044-45.  Although this argument may (on the surface) appear to argue against the fixation thesis, that 
appearance may result from Munzer and Nickle’s failure to appreciate the ambiguity in the meaning of “meaning” 
and the distinction between constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction.  They are absolutely correct 
to observe that constitutional construction by “authoritative interpreters” can change the legal consequences that 
result from the semantic content (or linguistic meaning) of the constitutional text, but from that fact it does not 
follow that the meaning (in the semantic sense of “meaning”) has changed. 
183 See Part I.A.1, “The Fixation Thesis: The Semantic Content of Constitutional Provisions is Fixed at the Time 
of Framing and Ratification,” p. 3. 





intersection)?  Suppose that, as with “deer,” the meaning of some key words used in the 
sign or manual had evolved over many generations, so that readers today would 
universally (and perhaps unwittingly) give the word a different meaning than its original 
speakers or sentence meaning.  Suppose also that traffic patterns have evolved to conform 
to the new understanding, so that the common (though non-original) understanding of the 
text succeeds in regulating traffic smoothly with a minimum of accidents, even though the 
traffic now flows in a different pattern from what the original meaning of the text would 
have directed.  Would it be a “factual error” for drivers to adhere to the modern 
understanding of the traffic sign or manual?  If the goal of reading the text is to 
successfully navigate traffic without collisions – or, from society’s point of view, to 
maximize overall traffic efficiency and minimize accidents – I would guess not.184 
This is a particularly marvelous hypothetical, because it illustrates the manner in which the 
linguistic meaning of an utterance can seem to change in a way that would be inconsistent with 
the fixation thesis.  To see why this seeming change is not real, we need to examine Meyer’s 
hypothetical in some detail. 
The key to the example is the assumption that the conventional semantic meaning of the 
hypothetical 200-year-old traffic manual changed gradually over many generations.  Such 
changes in conventional semantic meaning do occur. But the mechanism of change is important: 
meanings change because of accumulated errors.  Someone uses a word or phrase in a deviant 
sense.  The mistake goes uncorrected and propagates until it gradually becomes the standard 
usage.  If this happens gradually, it can be the case that very few speakers are aware that the 
change in meaning is underway.  During a transitional period, the two meanings may even exist 
side by side in slightly different groups of users without members of the standard-usage group 
even recognizing the emergence of the deviant-usage group.  Over time, the old meaning 
gradually disappears and the new meaning becomes standard.185 
In Meyer’s hypothetical, the new meaning assigned to the expression types (the words and 
phrases that make up the manual) are attributed to the utterance token (the manual itself), 
because of a linguistic mistake.  New readers of the manual are unaware of the change in 
meaning—indeed, their lack of awareness is what enables the change in meaning to occur.  
Believing that the new sense of the words and phrases is the linguistic meaning of the old text, 
their driving behavior conforms to their linguistic mistake rather than the actual linguistic 
meaning of the text.  They believe the new meaning is the correct meaning, but this belief results 
from their lack of epistemic access to the relevant linguistic facts.  That is, they lack access to the 
conventional semantic meaning of the manual at the time of utterance.  The crucial fact is that 
the beliefs of the new readers of the manual are not that the meaning of the manual has changed: 
rather, the new meaning is acquired because of mistaken beliefs that the meaning has stayed the 
same. 
The crucial role of the mistakes in creating the illusion of changed meaning can be brought 
out in another way, by revising Meyer’s hypothetical.  Here is the revised version: 
Once again imagine a 200-year-old traffic manual specifying the “rules of the road.”  
This time let us suppose that traffic patterns have changed so that they no longer conform 
to the conventional semantic meaning of the text.  The universal pattern is driving on the 
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right, although the traffic manual requires that that all vehicles drive on the left hand side 
of the road.  Officials recognize that adherence to the rule in the manual would be 
dangerous, but changing the manual is very difficult, so they post signs that with arrows 
that direction of traffic: “THIS IS NOW THE “NEW LEFT” SIDE OF THE ROAD.  
DRIVE ON THE “NEW LEFT.”  The linguistic practice is self-consciously aware of the 
distinction between the old and new ways of talking.  Children are taught “old right is new 
left.”  No one thinks that the linguistic meaning of “left” in the manual is “new left”: the 
whole point of saying “new left” is to create a newly stipulated legal meaning.  In other 
contexts, the words “right” and “left” retain their old meaning, but there is now a legal 
fiction that “left” means “right” in the traffic manual. 
The difference between the two versions of Meyer’s hypothetical is that in the original 
version, contemporary readers lack access to the linguistic facts (they don’t know what the traffic 
manual really means), but in the revised version, they have access to such facts.  In the original 
version, there is a linguistic mistake.  In the revised version, no one makes a linguistic mistake, 
but practice is informed by a legal fiction. 
What would happen if the lost meaning of the manual were rediscovered in the original 
version of Meyer’s hypothetical?  Meyer didn’t specify the particular pattern of linguistic 
mistakes, so let us suppose once again that the original meaning was drive on the left hand side 
of the road, but through some wildly improbably chain of events, the word “right” had switched 
meanings with the word “left.”  If the original meaning were rediscovered and brought to the 
attention of contemporary readers and drivers, they would see that their current beliefs about the 
linguistic meaning of the old traffic manual were mistaken.  But this would not be inconsistent 
with Meyer’s observation that if we want to maximize traffic efficiency and minimize accidents, 
we have good reasons to use the content of the modern reading and not the semantic content of 
the text as a guide for action.  Adhering to the modern reading would not retroactively change 
the linguistic facts that fixed the semantic content of the text, but it does give us reason to treat 
the text as if it had a different meaning.  We might even say, “The meaning has changed.”  But if 
we said that, it would be shorthand for the more complex reality: (1) the meaning of the 
expression types in the manual have changed, (2) lots of readers acquired false beliefs about the 
linguistic meaning of the manual as a result, and (3) there are good reasons to now treat the 
manual as if means what it would have meant if it had been uttered after the change in linguistic 
practice had occurred. 
Meyer’s offered his hypothetical as a counter to the example of the change in meaning of the 
word “deer”—introduced with the fixation thesis above.186  What distinguished Meyer’s traffic-
manual example from the twelfth-century letter is the fact that the linguistic mistake became 
embedded in a social practice, which in turn gave us good reason to treat the text as if the 
mistake about its meaning was not a mistake at all.  This same pattern could occur in the case of 
a constitution.  The expression types (the words and phrases) could change meaning over time.  
It is at least possible that judges and other officials would have good legal or moral justification 
for adopting an “amending construction” that reads a constitutional provision as if it had been 
uttered after the meaning had changed.  But if they do adopt such an amending construction, they 
will not have changed the linguistic facts.  The amending construction is something we do about 
those facts—it is a legal construction and not a semantic interpretation.  In a sense the most 
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important point made in “Semantic Originalism” is that the two questions (“What is the linguistic 
meaning of a text?” and “What rule of law should be constructed given that linguistic 
meaning?”) need to be kept distinct if conceptual confusion is to be avoided.187 
Lawrence Lessig has articulated a point about meaning that is related to the point expressed 
by Meyer’s traffic-manual hypothetical.  Lessig’s argument is phrased in terms of the importance 
of context to meaning.  Here is the relevant passage from Lessig’s essay, Fidelity in 
Translation:188 
The lawyer reads normative texts. What distinguishes normative texts from other texts 
is that normative texts are not just read in context, but are also applied in context. A tort 
system, for example, may have a statute that says, “Exercise reasonable care.” As applied 
in, say, the context of authorship, a court could conclude that D, who drove sixty-five 
miles per hour down a narrow, curving road and caused an accident, did not exercise 
reasonable care, and is therefore liable. The text's meaning (the meaning of the words 
“exercise reasonable care”) is derived against the original context; the application's 
meaning (D is liable) is derived against the original context as well. In that original context 
we can say that the application's meaning must be consistent with the text's meaning. 
If we speak of the application's meaning, then we must consider the application itself to 
be a text. And as with any text, its meaning is a function of its context. Here, then, begins 
the problem faced by the two-step. For while contextualism teaches that we read the 
original text in the original context, we have no choice but to make an application, not in 
the original context, but in the current context. If the original and current contexts differ, 
then the meaning of the same application in the two contexts may differ as well. So again 
(and obviously), if in the second context, D was driving sixty-five miles per hour down the 
same road that has been straightened and widened to standards of a major artery then our 
application of the text (D is liable) should be different (D should not be liable). And if we 
applied the text in the second context just as we applied it in the first context, the 
application in the second context would be inconsistent with the meaning of the text in the 
first.189 
The key to understanding Lessig’s argument is to recall the distinction between three senses 
of the word meaning:  
• Semantic or linguistic meaning refers to the semantic content of an utterance. 
• Applicative meaning refers to the application of a general utterance to a particular 
case. 
• Teleological meaning refers to the purpose for an utterance.190 
Lessig’s remarks about “meaning” and context use the word “meaning” in the both the semantic 
and applicative sense.  Lessig emphasizes that legal texts “are applied in context” and the 
difference in “meaning” he identifies is a difference in application of legal texts and not a 
difference in their semantic content.  Indeed, his reasonable care example recognizes that 
differences in application must be consistent with “the meaning of the text”: to make sense of 
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Lessig’s argument, we need to assume that he means that the applicative meaning of text in the 
context of application must be consistent with the semantic meaning of the text in the context of 
utterance. 
Some readers may attempt to resist the fixation thesis by appealing to the apparent ability of 
readers to assign a new meaning to old texts.191  For example, we could say that the phrase 
“domestic violence” has a contemporary sense in which it means “spouse abuse.”  If the 
Supreme Court stipulated that this was the meaning of “domestic violence” in the Constitution192 
and if other officials and citizens acquiesced in the newly stipulated meaning, the legal effect of 
that phrase in the Constitution would be determined by the new meaning.  This possibility raises 
a number of distinct questions, and it is very important that the questions be carefully 
distinguished, one from another, in order to avoid conceptual error. 
If the Supreme Court announced that it will act based on a newly stipulated meaning for a 
word or phrase in the Constitution, the Court would not thereby alter the semantic content of the 
utterance token—in the case of “domestic violence,” the Constitution of 1789.  The reason that 
the Supreme Court today cannot change the semantic content of an utterance made in the past is 
that such an act is impossible.  Five votes can accomplish much, but they cannot change the past. 
The impossibility of present acts changing prior meanings is easy to see from a closely 
analogous case.  Suppose some issue of law were to hinge on the question whether Florida was 
part of the United States in 1789.   The United States Supreme Court could say, “For the 
purposes our decision, Florida was part of the United States in 1789, and all the legal 
consequences that would have resulted if that had been the case, are now legally required as a 
consequence of this decision.”  This stipulation is contrary to fact or counterfactual, but such 
counterfactual stipulations are a familiar part of the law.  We call them “legal fictions.”193 
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The conventional understanding of a legal fiction is that it does not involve deception: the 
legal fiction is announced when it is introduced.  But no one sensible could think that because 
there is a legal fiction that stipulates that legal consequences shall flow from a counterfactual 
assumption that Florida was part of the United States, that it follows that Florida was in fact part 
of the United States in 1789.  Suppose that the Supreme Court were to make the same 
counterfactual assumption without stipulative language.  That might result from an unintentional 
error or it might result from deliberate deception—lying.  No one sensible could think that telling 
a lie with authority to enforce the legal consequences of the lie makes the lie true. 
The power of the Supreme Court to create legal fictions or tell lies about the meaning of the 
Constitution cannot change the semantic content of the constitutional text.  But in the case of 
constitutional meaning, lawyers and constitutional theorists sometimes confuse the semantic 
content of a text and the effective legal meaning of the text.  Given the institutions of judicial 
review and vertical stare decisis, the Supreme Court can change the effective legal meaning of 
the Constitution.194  The Supreme Court could, for example, adopt “spouse abuse” as the 
meaning of the phrase “domestic violence.”  But is simply an error to draw from this fact the 
further conclusion that the semantic content of the Constitution of 1789 is thereby changed.  The 
Supreme Court cannot do magic.  Legal fictions and lies do not change semantic facts.195 
Resitance to the fixation thesis might be motivated by one of two possible misunderstandings 
of the implications of the thesis.  The first misunderstanding could arise through a confusion of 
meaning in the semantic sense with meaning the applicative sense.  The fixation thesis claims 
that semantic content is fixed at the time of constitutional utterance.  This is a claim about 
meaning in the semantic sense (linguistic meaning), and it is not a claim about meaning in the 
applicative sense.  This point is fundamental to the New Originalism, which distinguishes 
between original public meaning and original expectations about applications.196  Fixed semantic 
content does not imply fixed applications for at least two reasons.  First, applicative meaning can 
change because of changes in belief about the facts that determine application: if at T1 we believe 
that punishment X is not cruel because we believe it is painless, but at T2 we learn that X inflicts 
horrendous pain, then the applicative meaning of cruel could change while the linguistic meaning 
remained the same.  Second, applicative meaning can change given fixed interpretations given 
changes in construction: given the fact of the undeterdeterminacy of constitutional meaning, 
many different constructions may be consistent with the semantic content of a vague 
constitutional provision. 
The second misunderstanding could arise by conflating semantic content and legal content.  
The fixation thesis claims that semantic content is fixed at the time of constitutional utterance, 
but it makes no claim about the fixation of legal content.  The theory offered by Semantic 
Originalism does make a claim about legal content, but that claim is contained in the contribution 
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thesis and not by the fixation thesis.  The contribution thesis depends on social facts about 
constitutional practice—these facts are historically contingent.  We can imagine a possible world 
in which the fixation thesis is true, but the contribution thesis is false.  For example, there could 
be a possible world in which the rule of recognition would sanction a legal power for the 
Supreme Court to stipulate that the legal content of a given constitutional provision is different 
than the linguistic meaning of the provision.  In such a possible world, the fixation thesis would 
hold, although the contribution thesis would have to be modified. 
The two potential misunderstandings of the fixation thesis both point to the relative modesty 
of the thesis.  The only claim made by the fixation thesis is that the linguistic meaning (semantic 
content) of a given constitutional provision is fixed at the time that provision is uttered.  This is 
not the claim that applications are fixed.  It is not the claim that constructions are fixed.  It is not 
the claim that legal content is fixed.  Resistance to the fixation thesis may be based on false 
beliefs about the necessary implications of fixation.  When the modesty of the fixation thesis 
becomes clear, the plausibility of the thesis may begin to come into focus.197 
Perhaps you are still not convinced by the claim made by the fixation thesis.  Consider the 
following questions.  If the linguistic meaning (semantic content) of an utterance token is not 
fixed at the time of utterance, how is communication across time possible?  What accounts for 
the ability of a writer at T1 reliably to convey meaning to a reader at T2?  Fixation explains how 
reliable communication across time is possible.  Absent fixation, communication becomes 
impossible in cases in which the conventional semantic meanings of utterance types happen to 
change.  One answer to these questions is to simply deny the premise, either by denying that 
reliable communication is ever possible or by denying that it is possible when conventional 
semantic meanings change in the interim.  If you are attracted by the latter possibility, consider 
the following thought experiment.  A typewriter repair manual is written in 1920.  It uses the 
term “platen” to refer to the round thing around which the paper moves.  Subsequent to 1920, the 
term “platen” comes to mean “banana skin.”  Do you really think the manual might be referring 
to banana skins?  And if you do, do you think that we could repair typewriters by replacing the 
round things with banana skins?  Do you doubt that the manual will only communicate its 
instructions effectively if we read the semantic content as having been fixed?  The fixation thesis 
explains how the repair manual can reliably enable repairs despite changes in meaning, but if you 
deny fixation, explaining this fact is impossible. 
The truth or falsity of the fixation thesis does not depend on its acceptance as a rule of 
constitutional law.  Because the fixation thesis is a claim about the linguistic meaning or 
semantic content of the constitution, its truth does not depend on the related (but conceptually 
distinction question) whether constitutional doctrine (the legal content of constitutional law) is 
similarly fixed.  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has affirmed something like the fixation thesis.  
For example, in South Carolina v. United States,198 the Court stated: “The Constitution is a 
written instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That which it meant when adopted, it 
means now.”199  Of course, this pronouncement by the Court may be amgiguous—because the 
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meaning of “meaning” is ambiguous.  The fixation thesis expresses one reading of the Court’s 
pronouncement: because semantic is fixed at the time a constitutional provision is adopted, the 
linguistic “meaning” of the Constitution “does not alter.” 
F. Interpretation and Construction 
 
Our next move is to revisit the distinction between interpretation and construction.  My use of 
this distinction is deeply indebted to the work of Keith Whittington200 and to related work by 
Randy Barnett,201 but I will deploy their distinction in a framework informed by work in the 
philosophy of language on semantics and pragmatics.  My version of their distinction is closely 
related to theirs, but it may differ in some respects and I do not claim either that Whittington’s 
version of the distinction is equivalent to Barnett’s or that my version is the equivalent to theirs.  
But whatever subtle differences there may be, the distinction between interpretation and 
construction expresses an important insight of the New Originalism: interpretation gleans 
meaning whereas construction resolves vagueness. 
1. Distinguishing Interpretation from Construction 
This section returns to the distinction between constitutional interpretation (the activity 
directed at discerning the semantic content of the constitutional text) and constitutional 
construction (the activity directed at resolving vagueness, ambiguity, gaps, and contradictions 
and at constitutional implicature).  Interpretation and construction are hermeneutic activities.  In 
the context of constitution involving choices, these activities can be performed by officials 
(including judges, legislators, executives, and administrators) or citizens.  Both interpretation and 
construction are components of constitutional practice—the application of constitutional content 
to cases. 
Although the distinction between interpretation and construction that we shall employ is 
technical and theoretical, it is related judicial usage, especially in the early history of the 
Supreme Court.  Consider the following passage from Gibbons v. Ogden, in which Chief Justice 
Marshall is considering the argument that the enumerated powers of Congress should be 
construed narrowly:202 
This instrument contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to 
their government. It has been said, that these powers ought to be construed strictly. But 
why ought they to be so construed? Is there one sentence in the constitution which gives 
countenance to this rule? In the last of the enumerated powers, that which grants, 
expressly, the means for carrying all others into execution, Congress is authorized 'to make 
all laws which shall be necessary and proper' for the purpose. But this limitation, on the 
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means which may be used, is not extended to the powers which are conferred; nor is there 
one sentence in the constitution, which has been pointed out by the gentlemen of the bar, 
or which we have been able to discern, that prescribes this rule. We do not, therefore, think 
ourselves justified in adopting it. What do gentlemen mean, by a strict construction?  If 
they contend only against that enlarged construction, which would extend words beyond 
their natural and obvious import, we might question the application of the term, but should 
not controvert the principle. If they contend for that narrow construction which, in support 
or some theory not to be found in the constitution, would deny to the government those 
powers which the words of the grant, as usually understood, import, and which are 
consistent with the general views and objects of the instrument; for that narrow 
construction, which would cripple the government, and render it unequal to the object for 
which it is declared to be instituted, and to which the powers given, as fairly understood, 
render it competent; then we cannot perceive the propriety of this strict construction, nor 
adopt it as the rule by which the constitution is to be expounded.203 
Marshall’s opinion agrees with the principle that the Constitution may not be interpreted so as to 
“extend words beyond their natural and obvious import.”  He recognizes the possibility that the 
natural meaning might be given a broad or narrow construction and refers to what we shall call 
constitutional construction. 
For the purposes of this Article, the phrases “constitutional interpretation” and “constitutional 
construction” have stipulated meanings.  This need not be the case for other purposes.  A 
historian of constitutional ideas might seek to understand the distinction as it has developed in 
constitutional practice or theory.  A philosopher of law might find a deep connection between 
interpretation and semantics, on the one hand, and construction and pragmatics, on the other.  A 
constitutional practitioner might find doctrinal significance in the distinction.  But for our 
purposes, all that is necessary is that the distinction be made with precision and that the 
stipulated definitions be employed consistently.  With that in mind, let us stipulate as follows: 
Constitutional Interpretation: The activity of constitutional interpretation has as its 
object the recognition of the semantic content of the constitutional text. 
Constitutional Construction: The activity of constitutional interpretation has as its 
object the supplementation of the semantic context of the constitutional text based on the 
context of constitutional utterance. 
The key feature of the stipulated definitions is that “constitutional interpretation” is limited to 
the recognition or discovery of semantic content or meaning.  When constitutional practice 
requires that rules of constitutional law go beyond semantic content, then the activity of 
supplying that content is “constitutional construction.”204  Thus, the distinction can be 
summarized in the following slogan: 
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Constitutional construction begins when the meaning discovered by constitutional 
interpretation runs out. 
That is, constitutional construction operates after interpretation yields semantic content that is 
vague, ambiguous, or contains gaps or contradictions.  For the interpretation-construction 
distinction to be meaningful, it must be the case that meaning does run out before providing 
sufficient content to determine the outcome of issues faced in constitutional practice.  Why does 
that happen?  This question is our next topic. 
2. Occasions for Constitution Construction: Resolution and Implicature 
Constitutional construction characteristically occurs in two very general situation types.  The 
first type of situation might be called “resolution.”  The second type of situation might be called 
“implicature.” 
a) Resolution 
Constitutions must be construed when their semantic content does not resolve a particular 
constitutional issue or case—where we recall that constitution involving choices occur for 
judges, other officials, and citizens.  When the constitution is vague, ambiguous, gappy, or 
contradictory, construction resolves the ambiguities, draws lines to remove vagueness, fills the 
gaps, and resolves the contradictions. 
(1) Vagueness 
Unfortunately, the terms “vague” and “ambiguous” are used both in loose talk and in their 
strict senses.  In loose talk, we might think that “vague” and “ambiguous” are synonyms or even 
that they express a difference in degree.205  This Article uses “vague” in the strict (or 
philosophical sense206): 
Vagueness: A term or phrase is vague if and only if it admits of borderline (or 
uncertain) applications.207 
The term “tall” is vague in the strict sense.  Some people are definitely short—Danny DeVito.  
Others definitely are tall--Shaquille O'Neal.  But the term "tall" is vague.  5'11 is almost 
definitely tall for a woman in the United Sates, but it is probably a borderline case for men.  
“Tall” is not the sort of quality for which there are definite criteria that sort the world into “tall” 
things and “not tall” things.  In other words, "tall" is vague. 
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The constitution contains a variety of vague terms and phrases.  For example, the constitution 
uses the phrases “executive power,” “legislative power,” and “judicial power.”  Is the power to 
hold an administrative hearing executive or judicial?  Arguably, the semantic meaning of these 
phrases is vague so that their semantic content does not determine their application to 
administrative hearings.  If so, then construction would be required. 
Notice, however, that vagueness does not entail that the provisions are indeterminate.  For 
example, it might be the case that conducting a trial on an action of trespass on the case is 
definitely within the meaning of the phrase judicial power and definitely outside the meaning of 
the phrases “legislative power” and executive power.”  If that were the case, then the vague 
constitutional text would nonetheless determine a case in which it was alleged that Congress’s 
decision to conduct a trial in an action of trespass on the case was unconstitutional as beyond the 
legislative power.  This suggests a picture of vagueness in the case of the relationship among the 
three powers that can be diagrammed as follows: 
 
 
In the diagram, each of the three powers has a hard core of determinate meaning—represented 
by the inner circle.  The outer circle (or “penumbra”) represents the zone of 
underdetermination—where the semantic content of the phrase does not determine its 
application.  The shaded overlaps suggest that there are cases in which penumbras of the rules 
overlap, and a particular action could be characterized as falling under two or more of the three 
categories.  The example of a trial in a trespass action is located in the core of determinate 
meaning of the phrase judicial power.  The example of an administrative hearing is located in the 
overlapping penumbras of judicial power and executive power.208 
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In this Article, my official stance towards the actual semantic content of particular clauses is 
agnostic—I am bracketing all questions about the meaning and application of particular clauses 
of the United States Constitution.  The reason for bracketing is that one must “do the work” in 
order to determine actual semantic content.  If the argument were interrupted by the necessary 
exegesis and evidence required to demonstrate the actual semantic content of particular clauses, 
an already long essay would become a multivolume treatise.  With that qualification, we can 
speculate about other constitutional terms and phrases that are vague, such as: (1) freedom of 
speech, (2) privileges or immunities, (3) rights retained by the people, (4) equal protection of the 
laws, (5) due process of law, (6) republican form of government, (7) the power to declare war, 
and so forth. 
(2) Ambiguity 
A term or phrase is ambiguous in the strict or philosophical sense when it has more than one 
sense or meaning.209  “Cool” is ambiguous, because it has one sense related to temperature, 
another sense related to excitement and emotion, and a third sense related to hipness and style.210  
The word “constitution” is ambiguous, because it can refer to a written or unwritten constitution 
of an association or to the physical makeup of a human or other living thing or to an act of 
establishing.211  But while the term “constitution” is ambiguous in some contexts, it is not equally 
ambiguous in all contexts.  For example, when used in the capitalized phrase “Constitution of the 
United States,” the term “constitution” does not refer to the physical makeup of a human being; 
contextual evidence rules out this sense and therefore at least partially disambiguates the term. 
The Constitution of the United States uses a variety of words and phrases that would be 
ambiguous if uttered in a different context.  The phrase “we the people” is ambiguous out of 
context, because it isn’t clear to whom the indexical pronoun “we” refers.  The phrase “we the 
people of the United States” is still ambiguous if there is more than one “United States,” 
including the “United States of Belgium,” which existed in 1790 and the “United States of 
Brazil,” which was part of the official name of Brazil from 1889 to 1968.212  The phrase “we the 
people of the United States” is even ambiguous if we know that it refers to the people of the 
United States of America, because the term “the people” might refer to the human beings who 
are in the United States or it might be a term of art that refers to the citizens of the United States 
of America or to the citizens as a collective political entity.  It may be the case that all of the 
ambiguity regarding the phrase “We the People of the United States” can be eliminated by 
resorting to the publicly available context of constitutional utterance.213   But it is also possible 
that it is the case that there is ineliminable ambiguity; in that case constitutional construction—
going beyond meaning—will be required. 
It seems fair to say that most New Originalists (original-public-meaning originalists) believe 
that most constitutional ambiguities can be resolved by resort to the publicly available 
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Insurance Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against The Drafter, 30 GA. L. REV. 171 (1995); Allan Farnsworth, 










constitutional context.214  There are, however, at least three possible situations in which the 
linguistic meaning of the Constitution may be irreducibly ambiguous.  Briefly, the three 
situations can be described as follows: 
• Epistemic Ambiguity:  It is possible that some provisions of the constitution were 
originally unambiguous, but that the information necessary to resolve the semantic 
content is no longer available.  This seems most likely in the case of ambiguity that is 
subtle, where two or more senses of a term or phrase are closely related to one 
another.  Although the contemporary reader (e.g., a reader of the Constitution of 1789 
during the period surrounding framing and ratification) might have recognized which 
sense was the public meaning, it is at least possible that a modern reader would not be 
able to resolve the ambiguity.  If so, then a construction will be required. 
• Compromise Ambiguity: It is possible that some provisions of the Constitution were 
written ambiguously in order to resolve a disagreement about the content.  That is, 
ambiguous language may have been chosen in order to defer resolution of some issue 
to the future, when officials or judges would be required to apply the language in a 
situation that exposed the ambiguity.  For example, it might be argued that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause was intentionally ambiguous as between a stricter and 
looser sense of “necessity.”  If the original public meaning was itself ambiguous in 
this way, then a construction will be required. 
• Deceptive Ambiguity: It is possible that some provisions of the Constitution were 
written ambiguous in order to convey secure ratification that would have been 
impossible had unambiguous language have been chosen.  For example, it might have 
been the case that the framers of the original constitution deliberately chose 
ambiguous language when drafting provisions related to slavery in order to secure 
ratification from those who opposed any constitutional endorsement of slavery.  If this 
did in fact occur, and if the language would have been understood as ambiguous (or 
differently by different groups), then a construction would be required to resolve the 
ambiguity. 
For the purposes of Semantic Originalism, we can simply leave it as an open question whether 
we need to go beyond the theory of Semantic Originalism articulated above215 to resolve 
particular ambiguities in the United States Constitution.  The three types of ambiguity sketched 
here may (or may not) apply to particular provisions of the Constitution.  The important point 
from the perspective of Semantic Originalism is that such residual ambiguities may exist, and if 
they do, construction will be required to resolve them. 
 
* * * 
 
One more point about vagueness and ambiguity.  A given constitutional word, phrase, or 
clause can be both vague and ambiguous.  Or a clause might be ambiguous, with one of the 
multiple senses of the clause being vague and the other providing a bright line.  And there are, of 
course, other permutations. 
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215 See supra Part III.C.2.d), The First Restatement of Semantic Originalism: Clause Meaning is the Original 
Semantic Meaning of the Constitution to the Relevant Audience in Context,, p. 60. 





* * * 
(3) Gaps 
The phrases “constitutional gap” or “gap in the Constitution” could mean many things, but we 
are interested in a particular kind of gap—constitutional incompleteness in the sense that the 
structure of the Constitution requires that there be a constitutional rule governing a particular 
issue, but the text fails to provide the required rule.  For example, Akhil Amar has argued that 
the constitutional rules governing presidential and vice-presidential success leave such a gap.216  
Let us set aside the question whether there are any gaps in the semantic content of the 
Constitution.217  If there are such gaps, then filling them would be the work of construction. 
(4) Contradictions 
It is far from clear that there are any contradictions in the semantic content of the 
constitution.218  One of the rare examples of a judicial opinion finding such a contradiction is 
Judge William Norris’s famous dissent from the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in United 
States v. Woodley:219 
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, which gives the President the general power to “appoint 
Ambassadors ..., Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, 
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for ...,” the language of Article II 
seems to empower the President to grant recess commissions to fill judicial vacancies. 
Article III, on the other hand, seems equally clear that only persons with the 
independence secured by life tenure and protection against diminished compensation 
*1017 may exercise the judicial power of the United States. The relevant portion of Article 
III states simply and unconditionally, 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in 
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The 
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good 
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which 
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office. 
                                                
216 Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death: Closing the Constitution's Succession Gap, 48 
ARK. L. REV. 215, 228 (1995). 
217 Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 
233 (2001) (“The received wisdom would have us believe that the foreign affairs Constitution contains enormous 
gaps that must be filled by reference to extratextual sources....”); 
218 For alleged examples, see William C. Plouffe, Jr., A Federal Court Holds The Second Amendment Is An 
Individual Right: Jeffersonian Utopia Or Apocalypse Now? 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 55 (1999) (positing “an inherent 
constitutional contradiction in the ‘collective right’ interpretation of the Second Amendment. If the Second 
Amendment does, in fact, reserve to the state the right to create an army, it would conflict with Article I of the 
Constitution, which restricts the military power of the states.”); Louis Michael Seidman, This Essay Is Brilliant/This 
Essay Is Stupid: Positive And Negative Self-Reference In Constitutional Practice And Theory, 46 UCLA L. REV. 
501, 526-27 (1998) (“If the constitutional commands are read literally, it leads to contradiction because the 
Constitution would then both prohibit and permit *527 the same conduct. For example, the Constitution would both 
assert and deny the proposition that the IRS may not support racially discriminatory institutions.”). 





U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. On its face, this language admits of no exception; its command 
is that only judges with Article III protections may wield Article III power. 
Hence, we face an extraordinary situation: a direct conflict between two provisions of 
the Constitution. No accommodation seems possible; one clause must yield to the other.220 
If Judge Norris’s analysis were correct,221 then his opinion, which resolves the contradiction in 
favor of Article III’s command of life tenure would be an example of constitutional 
construction—going beyond the semantic content of the Constitution because the contradiction 
requires this move.  
 
* * * 
 
The typology offered here distinguishes four types of resolution (vagueness, ambiguity, gaps, 
and contradictions).  It could be argued that gaps and contradictions are actually special cases 
of ambiguity (and perhaps in some cases vagueness).  When there is a contradiction, the 
meaning of the whole text becomes ambiguous, either one of two contradictory provisions 
prevails or both are modified to effectuate a reconciliation.  Choosing among these options 
resolves the ambiguity.  Likewise, it might be argued that gaps are a special kind of ambiguity.  
Although the question whether the four types of resolution can be reduced to two may be of 
theoretical interest, for present purposes a less than maximally elegant typology will suffice. 
 
* * * 
b) Constitutional Implicature Revisited 
Constitutional implicature can play a role in both interpretation and construction.  When the 
semantic content of the constitutional text necessarily has what we can call a “necessary 
implication,” then discovery or recognition of the necessary implication counts as constitutional 
interpretation.  Necessary implications follow from the semantic content of the text: necessarily 
implications follow from the semantic content.  There may be additional implications that are not 
necessary, but nonetheless are reasonable given a theory of constitutional construction. 
This distinction can be illustrated with reference to the relationship (discussed above222) 
between the three power conferring clauses of the Constitution—Article I (“legislative power”), 
Article II (“executive power”), and Article III (“judicial power”).  It can be argued that the 
conjunction of these three provisions has the necessary implication that each type of power must 
fall into one of the three categories—that they exhaust the “powers of the Government of the 
United States.”  If this were true, then it would be a constitutional interpretation.  This necessary 
implication can be contrasted with a second, nonnecessary but reasonable inference: it might be 
argued that the structure of the three articles suggests that when a power type is within the 
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overlapping penumbras of legislative and executive power, then the judicial branch should defer 
to accommodations reached by the political branches.223 
c) The Fact of Constitutional Underdeterminacy 
The distinction between interpretation and construction can be explicated by distinguishing 
constitutional determinacy from constitutional indeterminacy and underdeterminacy.  Let us 
stipulate the following definitions: 
The Constitution is determinate with respect to a given case if and only if the set of 
results that can be squared with the semantic content of the Constitution contains one and 
only one result. 
The Constitution is indeterminate with respect to a given case if and only if the set of 
results in the case that can be squared with the semantic content of the Constitution is 
identical with the set of all imaginable results. 
The Constitution is underdeterminate with respect to a given case if and only if the set 
of results in the case that can be squared with the semantic content of the Constitution is a 
nonidentical subset of the set of all imaginable results.224 
Construction occurs in the zone of constitutional indeterminacy.  For this reason, the 
distinction between construction and interpretation depends on what we can call the fact of 
constitutional underdeterminacy.  That fact depends on the whether the constitutional text 
includes at least one instance of vagueness, ambiguity, gap, contradiction, and/or reasonable 
constitutional implicature.  It seems reasonable to assume that the constitution contains many 
vague provisions, some ambiguities, and a variety of opportunities for reasonable constitutional 
implicature.  That is, the fact of constitutional underdeterminacy appears to hold for the United 
States Constitution. 
3. Theories of Construction 
There is a glaring omission from the account of constitutional construction that has been 
offered so far.  Nothing has been said about particular methods of constitutional construction.  
This omission can be remedied in two steps: first, a quick and dirty survey of the various theories 
or prescribed methods of constitutional construction, and second, a discussion of the criteria by 
which such theories could be assessed. 
a) A Quick and Dirty Survey of Theories of Constitutional Construction 
This survey is neither exhaustive nor deep.  My aim is simply to accomplish a rough and 
ready mapping of the territory.  I shall neither adopt nor reject any of these theories of the 
correct, proper, or best method of constitutional construction.  The point of the survey is to 
illuminate and elucidate the distinction between interpretation and construction and not to set the 
stage for the endorsement of any of the existing views or the construction of a new one. 
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(1) Construe as Just 
Recall that the occasion of constitutional construction is the underdeterminacy of 
constitutional meaning.  We construe in order to draw lines for vague provisions, resolve the 
residue of ambiguity that remains after interpretation, fill gaps, resolve contradictions, and to 
select among reasonable alternative formulations of a constitutional implicature.  One approach 
to constitutional construction is based on the simple premise that when we select from among the 
constructions that are consistent with semantic content of the Constitution, our criterion should 
be just.  We should adopt that construction that is most just. 
If we are to construe the constitution as just, then we need a theory of justice.  This leads to 
metaphysical and metaethical questions about the nature of justice and epistemological questions 
about knowledge of justice.  Should officials and citizens rely on their own beliefs about justice?  
Or should they construe the constitution as just according to some publicly available and 
shareable conception of justice?  For our purposes on this occasion, there is no need to answer 
these deep questions.  It is sufficient to note that a justice-enhancing theory of constitutional 
construction must have answers to such questions to be complete. 
(2) Construe in Deference to the Political Branches 
A second possibility is that judges could construe the constitution in deference to the political 
branches of government.  For example, if the executive branch and the legislative branch have 
resolved a question about the borderline of their respective powers, then the judicial branch 
could adopt a principle of deference to their resolution of constitutional vagueness. 
Notice that the political deference approach constitutional construction is not a complete 
theory.  It provides a principle of judicial construction, but it also explicitly assumes that the 
political branches (Congress and the President) will engage in constitutional construction.  But 
the President cannot defer to himself; nor can Congress defer to itself.  So the political deference 
approach must be combined with some other theory to yield a complete theory of constitutional 
constructions. 
(3) Construe by the Method of Text and Principle 
A third possibility is that the constitution could be construed by what Jack Balkin calls the 
method of text and principle.  An extended passage from Balkin describes the method and its 
point: 
If the original expected application is not binding, why are constitutional text and 
underlying principle? The answer comes from two simple assumptions: first, judges must 
treat the Constitution as binding law, and, second one treats the Constitution as law by 
viewing its text and the principles that underlie the text as legal rules and legal principles. 
We ask, in other words, what the people who drafted the text were trying to achieve in 
choosing the words they chose, and, where their words presume underlying principles, 
what principles they sought to endorse. 
If these assumptions are correct, then we look to the original meaning of the words 
because if the meaning of the words changed over time, then the words will embrace 
different concepts than those who had the authority to create the text sought to refer to. We 
look to underlying principles because when the text uses relatively abstract and general 





concepts, we must know which principles the text presumes or is attempting to embrace. If 
we read the text to presume or embrace other principles, then we may be engaged in a play 
on words and we will not be faithful to the Constitution’s purposes. Just as we look to the 
public meaning of words of the text at the time of enactment, we discover underlying 
constitutional principles by looking to the events leading up to the enactment of the 
constitutional text and roughly contemporaneous to it. Sometimes the text refers to terms 
of art or uses figurative or non-literal language; in that case we must try to figure out what 
principles underlie that term of art or figurative or non-literal language.225 
There is a good deal going on in this passage.  One possibility is that Balkin means to endorse 
the use of constitutional principles to override the semantic meaning of the text.  For the purpose 
of this survey, I shall set that possibility aside and assume instead that the method of text and 
principle operates within the constraints imposed by the theory of clause meaning.  One way of 
stating this interpretation or modification of Balkin’s view is that the method of text and 
principle requires fidelity to the semantic content of the text.  Principle might be enable 
identification of that semantic content, when, for example, the conditions of constitutional 
utterance include a publicly available principle that would have been understood as the purpose 
of the text—for the purposes of this essay, the existence of such principles is neither affirmed nor 
denied. 
Whatever the role of text and principle in constitutional interpretation, the method can also be 
applied to constitutional construction—and especially a method for drawing lines in cases where 
the constitutional text is vague.  We might reconstruct the method in three steps: Step One: 
Interpretation reveals that the semantic content of a constitutional provision (usually a clause) is 
vague; Step Two: The principle (or principles, if more than one) that justify the provision are 
identified and articulated; Step Three: The principle is then used to guide application of the 
vague constitutional provision to a particular constitutional problem (such as a case in court or a 
legislative drafting problem).  In Step Three, the principle returns to the text and is employed to 
resolve ambiguity—that is, to construe a vague provision.  Call this reconstruction of the method 
of text and principle the construction-only version. 
This three-step interpretation of the method of text and principle preserves the distinction 
between interpretation (Step One) and construction (Steps Two and Three), but one can imagine 
a different version of the method of text and principle.  Suppose that the third step proceeded as 
follows: Step Three: The principle is then used to resolve the case at hand.  In this version of 
Step Three, the principle becomes detached from the text and itself becomes the basis for the 
decision of all cases.  Call this reconstruction of the method of text and principle the anti-
interpretative version.  The anti-interpretative version of the method of text and principle erases 
the distinction between interpretation and construction; in a sense, it allows construction to 
“swallow up” interpretation. 
For the limited purposes of this discussion, it is the construction-only version of the method of 
text and interpretation that is on the table.  It is this version of the method that joins “construe as 
just” and “construe in deference to the political branches” as one of several methods of 
constitutional construction. 
(4) Construe by the Methods of Common Law 
                                                





A fourth possibility is that the constitution could be construed by what we might call 
“common law methods” or perhaps “common law methods of statutory construction.”226  That is, 
the courts could use the techniques developed by common law courts—deciding “one case at 
time,” treating prior cases as precedents, and so forth.  The figure most associated with a 
common-law approach to constitutional practice is David Strauss.  Strauss describes his theory as 
“common law constitutional interpretation,” and fails to distinguish construction from 
interpretation, but we can reconstruct Strauss’s position in such a way as to limit his method to 
construction. 
Common law constitutional interpretation has two components. 
* * * 
The first component is traditionalist. The central idea is that the Constitution should be 
followed because its provisions reflect judgments that have been accepted by many 
generations in a variety of circumstances. The second component is conventionalist. It 
emphasizes the role of constitutional provisions in reducing unproductive controversy by 
specifying ready- made solutions to problems that otherwise would be too costly to 
resolve. The traditionalism underlying the practice of constitutional interpretation is a 
rational traditionalism that acknowledges the claims of the past but also specifies the 
circumstances in which traditions must be rejected because they are unjust or obsolete. The 
conventionalist component helps explain why the text of the Constitution is important and 
how much flexibility judges should have in interpreting it.227 
Strauss seems to contemplate that at least in some cases, common-law decisionmaking would 
allow judges to nullify or replace the constitutional text, but we can imagine a modified view that 
limited the common law method to issues of construction. 
(5) Construe by the Original Methods 
A fifth possibility, suggested by John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport’s recent work might 
be called “construction by original methods.”228  As Rappaport and McGinnis explain, 
Our theory now suggests that an “original methods” originalism is needed to discover 
and justify the type of originalism that should be employed. Original methods originalism 
requires that the Constitution's text be interpreted according to the original interpretive 
rules of the constitutional enactors.229 
Notice that Rappaport and McGinnis use the phrase “interpretive rules” to describe “original 
methods.”  This usage is ambiguous and can be interpreted in at least two ways.  The first 
interpretation is that Rappaport and McGinnis are using “interpretive” in a sense that does not 
distinguish between interpretation and construction in the senses stipulated above.230  The 
                                                
226 See David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717 
(2003); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996). 
227 Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. at 890-91. 
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230 See infra Part III.F.1, “Distinguishing Interpretation from Construction,” p. 69. 





second interpretation is that Rappaport and McGinnis do intend to use interpretation in the 
stipulated sense.  On either interpretation, the original-methods theory is not explicitly a theory 
of constitutional construction, but it can easily be modified so that it will serve in that role.  That 
is, we can imagine a theory of constitutional construction that argues on normative grounds that 
constitutional vagueness should be resolved by those methods of construction that would have 
been employed at the time the relevant provision (or perhaps the Constitution of 1789) was 
drafted and ratified.231 
(6) Other Theories of Construction 
The list of five possible theories of constitutional construction is not intended to be 
exhaustive.  For example, we could construe the constitution in accord with deeply held and 
widely shared social norms.232  Another possibility, suggested by the work of Philip Bobbitt, is 
that the constitution could be construed by a plurality of methods—with precedent, purposes, and 
contemporary values all playing a role.233  And a final option, suggested by Posnerian 
pragmatism would be to construe the constitution pragmatically—matching normative theories 
of construction to the particular problem on an ad hoc all-things-considered basis.234 
b) Justifying Theories of Construction 
The fact that there are several plausible theories of constitutional construction does not entail 
the conclusion that the choice among such theories is arbitrary.  A theory of constitutional 
construction might be justified on the basis of arguments of political morality or on the ground 
that theory fits current legal practice.  Dworkin’s criteria of fit and justification combine the two 
kinds of justification in a complex relationship.  In this Article, I do not take a position on the 
question as to which theory of construction is best or even on the question as to what are the 
sound criteria for evaluating theories of constitutional construction.  The only claim that I make 
is that theories of construction cannot be justified on the basis of the semantic content of the 
constitution.  This claim follows from the stipulated definition of constitutional construction: 
construction takes the stage after interpretation makes its bow and exits the scene. 
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4. Attempts to Collapse Interpretation and Construction 
Although the interpretation-construction distinction is rooted in conventional legal 
understanding, the distinction can be resisted.  In this subsection, three lines of objection are 
considered.  The first line of resistance is purely terminological, arguing that the word 
“interpretation” can and should do the work of ‘interpretation’ and ‘construction.”  The second 
and third lines of resistance are substantive.  Ronald Dworkin’s idea of “constructive 
interpretation” suggests the possibility of a substantive collapse of interpretation into 
construction.  Some originalists implicitly attempt the opposite move, trying to collapse 
construction into interpretation. 
a) Resistance to the Terminology: “Interpretation” Should Be Used to Refer to Both 
‘Interpretation’ and ‘Construction’ 
The use of the interpretation-construction distinction is not an invention of the New 
Originalists.235  The use of these terms to mark the difference between recognition or discovery 
of meaning and determination of legal content is rooted in the common law and traditional legal 
scholarship, most prominently in contract law.236  William Leiber employed the distinction in 
1837.237  Corbin relied on the interpretation-construction distinction in his influential 1919 
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article, Conditions in the Law of Contract,238 and Williston adopted a similar distinction.239  
Historically, the interpretation-construction distinction has played a role in the law of trusts and 
wills,240 patent law,241 choice-of-law,242 and other fields of law. 
The position take by Semantic Originalism is that the interpretation-construction distinction is 
essential to clarity in constitutional theory.  The distinction is not arbitrary: it reflects the real 
difference between recognition or discovery of the linguistic meaning of the Constitutional text 
and the translation of that semantic content into the legal content of the rules of constitutional 
law.  But the use of the terms “interpretation” and “construction” to denote the real distinction is 
a matter of the conventional use of language—in this case, the specialized conventions of legal 
practitioners and academics.  Although the interpretation-construction distinction has deep roots 
in usage by courts and scholars in a variety of contexts243 and in contemporary debates about 
constitutional theory,244 the distinction could be expressed in other language. 
For example, we might talk about two stages of interpretation: stage one could be the 
recognition or discovery of linguistic meaning and stage two could be the translation of linguistic 
meaning into legal rules.  Or we might distinguish linguistic interpretation and legal 
interpretation.  We can imagine a variety of similar terminological moves.  So long as the 
distinction and terminology are articulated clearly, there is no substantive reason to insist on any 
particular terminology.  Given the long legal pedigree and current usage, however, clarity can 
only be achieved if those who wish to use alternative terminology acknowledge the 
interpretation-construction distinction when they discuss the work of New Originalists, and then 
explain their terminology in light of this distinction. 
Another possibility is to attempt to do without any distinction at all and use the unadorned 
word “interpretation” to refer to both the recognition or discovery of linguistic meaning and the 
development of legal rules that are based on that meaning, with marking the distinction in any 
systematic way.  This terminological alternative requires the utmost care in order to avoid 
confusion.  If the word “interpretation” is used this way in discussions of the New Originalism 
and the interpretation-construction distinction is not acknowledged and discussed, the result will 
be substantive misrepresentation of the content of New Originalist theories.  In addition, failure 
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to observe the substance of the distinction between semantic content and legal content is bound 
to produce conceptual confusion.  Even more distressing would be the possibility that the 
distinction would be deliberately obscured so as to obviate the need to argue that legal content 
(constitutional law) is distinct from semantic content (the linguistic meaning of the Constitution). 
For these reasons, responsible scholarship regarding the New Originalism should, at a 
minimum, address the interpretation-construction distinction in some meaningful way: the role of 
the distinction in New Originalist work should be acknowledged and the term “interpretation” 
should be defined or explicated in relationship to the distinction between semantic content and 
legal content. 
b) Constructive Interpretation: Dworkin’s Attempt to Absorb Interpretation into 
Construction 
Ronald Dworkin’s work challenges the interpretation-construction distinction at a more 
fundamental level.  This is explicitly clear in his use of the phrase “constructive interpretation” 
as the name of (or as a description of) his theory of constitutional interpretation and construction.  
Of course, Dworkin’s has a complete theory of the nature of law and a normative theory of legal 
practice, and full engagement of that theory is outside the scope of a sub-sub-section of a Part of 
“Semantic Originalism.”  Some aspects of Dworkin’s theory will be discussed in connection with 
the concept-conception distinction.245  Other aspects are will be discussed as objections to the 
contribution thesis.246  In this section, Dworkin’s idea of “constructive interpretation” will be 
examined with the sole aim of determining whether it creates a fundamental problem for the 
distinction between interpretation and construction. 
In Law’s Empire, the notion of “constructive interpretation” is introduced at the end of one of 
Dworkin’s central arguments—the famous “Semantic Sting” argument, which is directed against 
H.L.A. Hart (but applies to any theory of law that based on the notion that the criteria for legal 
validity are given by an uncontested concept of law).  Often obscured by the notoriety of the 
semantic sting is a prior move directed at H.L.A. Hart’s account of the core and penumbra.  
Dworkin distinguishes between two kinds of cases, which he calls “borderline cases” and 
“pivotal cases.”  Borderline cases are those in Hart’s penumbra, and involve vagueness in the 
sense that term is used here.247  By definition, such cases are not resolved by semantic content, 
and hence involve construction. 
Dworkin’s second category, opposed to “borderline cases” are “pivotal cases.”  Here is the 
passage in which Dworkin introduces the distinction: 
People sometimes do speak at cross-purposes in the way the borderline defense 
describes.  They agree about the correct tests for applying some word in what they 
consider normal cases but use the word somewhat differently in what they all recognize to 
be marginal cases, like the case of a palace [referring to the question whether Buckingham 
Palace is a “house”].  Sometimes, however, they argue about the appropriateness of some 
word or description because they disagree about the correct tests for using the word or 
phrase on any occasion.248 
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Are pivotal cases, cases of simple ambiguity?  No, because in such cases competent speakers 
recognize that there are different senses of a word or phrase, and they resolve their disagreement 
by getting clear on which sense they are deploying.  Rather, Dworkin is asserting that there is 
another kind of disagreement about meaning that is neither vagueness nor ambiguity—this kind 
of disagreement is about what we can call “contested concepts.”249 
Dworkin then introduces “courtesy” as an example of what a contested concept, and suggests 
that there can be a disagreement about the meaning of “courtesy.”  Here is his description of the 
emergence of what he calls the “interpretive attitude” towards courtesy: 
Everyone develops a complex “interpretive” attitude toward the rules of courtesy, an 
attitude that has two components.  The first is the assumption that the practice of courtesy 
does not simply exist but has value, that it serves some interest or purpose or enforces 
some principle—in short, that it has some point—that can be stated independently of just 
describing the rules that make up the practice.  The second is the further assumption that 
the requirements of courtesy—the behavior it calls for or judgments it warrants—are not 
necessarily or exclusively what they have always been taken to be but are instead sensitive 
to its point, so that the strict rules must be understood or applied or extended or modified 
or qualified by that point.  Once this interpretive attitude takes hold, the institution of 
courtesy ceases to be mechanical; it is no longer unstudied deference to a runic order.  
People now try to impose meaning on the institution—to see it in its best light—and then 
restructure it in the light of that meaning.250 
All of this will be familiar to anyone who has encountered law as integrity—Dworkin’s 
theory of law.  The important point at this stage is to notice that the italicized reference to 
meaning is not a reference to the semantic meaning of the word courtesy; it is instead a reference 
to its teleological meaning—its purpose or point. 
Dworkin then introduces the idea of “constructive interpretation” in the context of the 
interpretation of a creative work, such as a novel or poem: 
Roughly, constructive interpretation is a matter of imposing purpose on an object or 
practice in order to make of it the best possible example of the form or genre to which it is 
taken to belong.  It does not follow, even from the rough account, that an interpreter can 
make of the a practice or a work of art anything he would have wanted it to be, that a 
citizen of courtesy who is enthralled by equality, for example, can in good faith claim that 
courtesy actually requires the sharing of wealth.  For the history or shape of a practice or 
object constrains the available interpretations of it, though the character of that constraint 
needs careful accounting, as we shall see.251 
The crucial point is that constructive interpretation does not aim at semantic meaning: it aims 
at teleological meaning.  The question then becomes, how does the purpose or point of a legal 
text translate into legal content? 
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Dworkin’s clearest discussion about the relationship of semantic content and legal content 
comes in the portion of Law’s Empire that considers and rejects what he calls the “speaker’s 
meaning” view.252  Here is his description of that view: 
I shall call this the “speaker’s meaning” view because it assumes that legislation is an 
occasion or instance of communication and that judges look to legislative history when a 
statue it not clear on its face to discover what state of mind the legislators tried to 
communicate through their vote.  It supposes, in short, that proper interpretation of a statue 
must be what I called in Chapter 2 conversational rather than constructive interpretation.253 
At the risk of redundancy, once again we observe that “interpretation” has two distinct senses 
in this passage.  Conversational interpretation aims at the recovery of semantic content or 
linguistic meaning.  Constructive interpretation aims at the recovery of purpose or teleological 
meaning.  The remainder of Dworkin’s discussion of “speaker’s meaning” focuses on the 
problems faced by an imaginary judge, Hermes, in making the model of speaker’s meaning work 
in the case of statutes—these problems parallel those discussed in connection with framer’s 
meaning, above.  Dworkin himself applies his discussion of speaker’s meaning to constitutional 
interpretation when he discusses “Framer’s Intent as Speaker’s Meaning.”254 
The point that I am about to make is crucial.  Let me state the conclusion first, and then 
provide the reason.  The conclusion is this: Dworkin’s account of constructive interpretation is 
not a rival to the interpretation-construction distinction.  The reason for this conclusion is that 
Dworkin does not have a theory of semantic interpretation, but his theory presupposes that such a 
theory exists.  Dworkin’s theory of constructive interpretation does not aim at the recovery of 
semantic content or linguistic meaning.  It aims at the recovery of purpose or teleological 
meaning.  Dworkin assumes that legal texts, such as cases, statutes, and constitutions have 
semantic content.  That content provides input to Hercules (personifying law as integrity) and 
from that input, Hercules constructs the normative theory that best fits and justifies the semantic 
content.  The theory that Hercules constructs is the output: it is the content of that theory that 
provides all of the content of the legal rules.  In the case of the Constitution, the content of the 
rules of constitutional law are a subset of the content of the theory that fits and justifies all of the 
law of the United States, including the semantic content of all the legal texts. 
This point can be expressed in different terms.  “Constructive interpretation” is a theory of 
legal content.  It does clash with Semantic Originalism, but not with the fixation thesis or the 
clause-meaning thesis.  (Indeed, it provides strong supporting arguments for clause meaning as 
against framers meaning.)  It does clash with the moderate version of the contribution thesis, 
because it just is an expression of the weak version of the contribution thesis.  Dworkin is 
unclear about all of this.  He uses the words “meaning” and “interpretation” in one sense when 
he describes “speaker’s meaning” and a difference sense when he articulates “constructive 
interpretation.”  But once this confusion is cleared up, it become apparent that Dworkin simply 
has no view about linguistic interpretation or semantic content.  My suspicion is that he simply 
didn’t see that he needed a view: if so he was mistake.  A less charitable reading would be that 
he did see the distinction, but deliberately chose to conceal it: this seems to me unlikely. 
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Dworkin revisited these issues in his essay entitled Bork’s Jurisprudence in 1990.  His 
terminology changed, but this discussion provides greater clarity regarding his view of the 
relationship between what we are calling “interpretation” and “construction.”  Here is the 
relevant passage: 
I must begin by emphasizing a distinction rarely explicit in discussions of the original 
understanding thesis, but which is, I think, essential to understanding its vulnerability to 
the objection I shall describe. The thesis insists that judges should interpret the 
Constitution to mean only what the framers intended it to mean. But the framers had two 
very different kinds of intention that, in very different senses, constituted what they meant. 
They had linguistic intentions, that is, intentions that the Constitution contain particular 
statements. They also had legal intentions, that is, intentions about what the law would be 
in virtue of these statements. 
We make constant assumptions about the framers' linguistic intentions, and we never 
contradict these in our views about what the Constitution says. We assume, for example, 
that the framers of the Eighth Amendment meant by “cruel”' roughly what we mean by 
“cruel,”' and that they followed roughly the same linguistic practices we do in forming 
statements out of words. We therefore assume that they intended the Constitution to say 
that cruel and unusual punishments are forbidden rather than, for example, that expensive 
and unusual punishments are forbidden. (We would give up that assumption, however, if 
incredibly, we learned that “cruel”' was invariably used to mean expensive in the 
Eighteenth Century.) We also assume that they intended to say something as abstract as we 
would intend to say if we said, “Cruel and unusual punishments are forbidden.”' Suppose 
we discover that they expected that the bastinado would be forbidden by the Eighth 
Amendment, but not solitary confinement. We would not then think that they intended to 
say that the bastinado but not solitary confinement was forbidden. We would have no 
justification for attributing to them that degree of linguistic incompetence. We would 
instead classify their opinions about these punishments as part of their legal rather than 
linguistic intentions. We would say that they thought they were outlawing the bastinado 
but not solitary confinement, or that that is what they hoped they were doing. 
The original understanding asks judges, not merely to make the framers' linguistic 
intentions decisive over what they said, which is innocuous, but to make their legal 
intentions decisive over what they did, that is, over what effect their statements had on 
constitutional law.255 
This passage is suggestive, but before we explicate, we should be cautious.  Dworkin is 
attacking Bork here.  Although this passage might suggest that he endorses a particular view of 
semantic content, it is perhaps more plausible this passage as context bound.  Putting it another 
way, Dworkin may simply be assuming arguendo that linguistic intentions determine meaning. 
But if Dworkin did mean what he said in the paragraphs quoted above, then he has in fact 
endorsed a version of Semantic Originalism and the interpretation-construction distinction.  I say 
“a version of Semantic Originalism,” because Dworkin’s argument equates meaning with the 
Gricean intentions of the framers—that is, he endorses the account of semantic content that I 
have called “Framers Meaning.”  It would be a mistake to read too much into this.  There is no 
                                                





indication that Dworkin has a clear awareness of Grice’s distinction between speakers meaning 
and sentence meaning or its application to the meaning of legal texts.  Moreover, his example, 
“cruel” is explicated in a manner that suggests that Dworkin would affirm the clause-meaning 
thesis: “We would give up [the] assumption [that “cruel” had its contemporary meaning when 
the Constitution of 1789 was framed and ratified], however, if incredibly, we learned that 
“cruel”' was invariably used to mean expensive in the Eighteenth Century.”  Notice that Dworkin 
says “invariable used to mean” and not “was intended by the framers to mean.” 
When Dworkin introduces the distinction between “linguistic intentions” and “legal 
intentions” he actually affirms the conceptual distinction that is at the heart of the interpretation-
construction distinction.  Of course, Dworkin has a confused picture here.  The semantic content 
of the Constitution is determined by its linguistic meaning.  The question addressed by 
construction should not be framed in terms of “legal intentions” (of the framers, ratifiers, or 
anyone else).  The right way of framing the question is in terms of the relationship between 
semantic content and legal content.  When Dworkin misleadingly distinguished between 
“linguistic intentions” and “legal intentions,” he seems to be pointing at the real distinction 
between semantic and legal content.  Once that distinction is admitted, then the interpretation-
construction distinction falls out.  Of course, all of this is based on a speculative reconstruction 
of brief remarks about Bork.  Dworkin may not have a view on these matters, or his views may 
have changed since he wrote Law’s Empire and Bork’s Jurisprudence. 
Here is the bottom line: Dworkin’s idea of “constructive interpretation” in no way undermines 
the distinction between interpretation and construction that is incorporated in Semantic 
Originalism. 
c) Interpretive Construction: Originalist Attempts to Absorb Construction into 
Interpretation 
The interpretation-construction distinction can be attacked from another angle.  Some 
originalists may object to this distinction on the ground that it permits non-originalist 
considerations to enter into constitutional practice.  They might express this objection is a variety 
of ways.  One angle of attack would be to attempt to argue for the extreme version of the 
contribution thesis—that the semantic content of the constitution fully determines all of the 
content of constitutional law.  That possibility has already been rejected as implausible.256 
Another angle of attack would be to attempt to subsume construction within interpretation—
arguing that same interpretive techniques that determine the linguistic meaning of the 
constitution can also be used to determine the proper construction.  Interpreted charitably, this 
view cannot rest on the assumption that the original public meaning of the words and phrases 
themselves answer all constitutional questions.  Rather, the view would have to be that semantic 
content can be supplemented by methods of construction that somehow derive the content of 
constitutional law from the linguistic meaning of the constitution. 
One can imagine several possibilities.  One possibility is suggested by the intellectually 
powerful and elegant work of Michael Paulsen.  Paulson argues that the exercise of power of 
judicial review presupposes that the political branches have made a choice that is forbidden by 
the Constitution.  When either of the political branches acts in a way that is inconsistent with the 
                                                
256 See supra Part I.A.3, “The Contribution Thesis: The Semantic Content of the Constitution Contributes to 
Constitutional Law,” p. 7. 





semantic content of the Constitution, then the judicial branch has the power to invalidate the 
action of the other two branches.  But where interpretation (and semantic content) runs out, then 
the Constitution permits the legislature or executive to act and courts may not invalidate their 
decisions.257  But Paulsen’s argument does not erase the interpretation-construction distinction: it 
actually assumes it.  This becomes crystal clear when we ask how Congress or the President 
should engage in constitutional construction when a clause is vague.  They cannot defer to 
themselves, but they must act.  Of course, Paulsen might say that their decision is entirely 
discretionary, and that they are free to ignore the constitutional purposes or principles.  But if this 
is his position, he needs an argument for it.  It is not self-evident.  A different version of this 
problem occurs when the courts are asked to adjudicate a dispute between the executive and 
legislative branches—deference is impossible because the courts must, at the very least, arrive at 
a principle of construction that selects which of the two branches they should defer to.  Once 
again, meaning runs out, construction is required, and the interpretation-construction distinction 
is vindicated. 
There are other alternatives.  It might be argued that original intentions originalism provides a 
method of both interpretation and construction.  This possibility is fraught with difficulties.  To 
the extent the original intentions could fix meaning, the meanings that they fix can be vague and 
require construction.  All of the problems that attend original intentions as a guide to semantic 
content would also attend their use in construction.  Another possibility would be to adopt the 
original methods of constitutional interpretation—but until those methods are fully specified, this 
is a “buck passing” theory.  We need to know to what the buck is passed before we can know 
whether it preserves the interpretation-construction distinction. 
One last point: it is easy to understand why some originalists would be motivated to attempt 
to erase the interpretation-construction distinction.  One of the attractions of originalism was that 
it offered the promise that constitutional interpretation could be reduced to legal science.  Judges 
would determine the original meaning and then just apply it to the facts.  This would be 
formalism, and formalism has powerful attractions (to which I am hardly immune258).  The 
difficulty with good-old-fashioned mechanical formalism is the “mechanical” part.  When the 
semantic content of legal texts is ambiguous, their application cannot be mechanical.  A theory 
of construction simply has to take the stage once interpretation exits the scene. 
 
* * * 
 
Why would constitutional theorists be motivated to deny the interpretation-construction 
distinction?  Of course, there are many possible reasons, but one powerful motivation might 
arise from the apparent similarities between the interpretation of religious and legal texts.  
Contemporary interpreters of religious texts have powerful reasons to believe that the semantic 
content of those texts is morally attractive.  Such texts play constitutive roles for religious 
communities.  It isn’t easy to say that the New Testament, Torah, or Koran expresses a morally 
repulsive view of the world.  These texts claim inerrant authority.  But in the case of religious 
texts, there may be theological reasons to believe that the true meaning of the text is the morally 
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appealing meaning, even when the “original meaning” seems morally unappealing.  Let’s 
pursue that idea. 
We might get at reasons for rejecting an original meaning account of religious texts by giving 
a Gricean account of an imaginary religious text, which we can simply call The Book.  The Book 
consists of discrete Verses and it was authored by a group of real humans: let’s call them the 
Prophets.  One theory of the semantic content of The Book is Prophets Meaning—the meaning 
that each prophet intended readers of the book (Believers) to grasp based on their recognition of 
the Prophet’s intentions.  Another theory of the semantic content of Book is Verse Meaning—the 
conventional semantic meaning of each verse at the time of prophetic utterance. 
But there is another theory of the meaning of The Book, which we might call God’s Meaning.  
The theory assumes that The Book is communication by God to Believers.  God does not speak 
directly, but instead inspired the Prophets, who then uttered the Verses based on their imperfect 
grasp of the content of the inspiration.  The true meaning of The Book is God’s Meaning, the 
meaning that God intended Believers to grasp based on their best understanding of God’s 
intentions.  Given the circumstances of prophetic utterance, Believers would recognize that 
God’s Meaning is not identical to either Prophets Meaning or Verse Meaning.  One of the clues 
to grasping God’s Meaning is that God is benevolent and omniscient: the God’s Meaning of an 
utterance cannot be morally unattractive.  Just as the Prophets had an imperfect grasp of 
inspiration, so too, Believers have an imperfect and evolving understanding of God’s Meaning.  
One way of expressing this process is via the metaphor of Living Prophecy—each generation 
interprets God’s Meaning according to their understanding of the nature of the world and of 
what goodness requires.  Given the relationship between God, Prophet, and Believer, and the 
circumstances of prophetic utterance, the God’s Meaning of a verse is its true or correct 
semantic content. 
As I have told it, this story involves belief in God as the real author of The Book and as the 
source of prophetic inspiration.  But one can imagine that the notion of God’s Meaning might 
survive the loss of belief in God as an actually existing entity with personality and agency.  Even 
if one adopted the belief that God was a metaphorical expression of the ultimate ground of 
being, one might retain the theory of Living Prophecy as the best way to carry on the traditions 
of a community of faith that is constituted by its relationship to the prophetic text.  In these 
circumstances, for members of the community the true meaning of the text would continue to be 
the morally most attractive meaning.  Of course, there might be other interpreters of the same 
text.  For examples, there might be academics who attempted to determine the Prophets Meaning 
or Verse Meaning of The Book: the academics would view their enterprise as the recovery of the 
actual semantic content.  Some of these academics might also be believers.  They might see the 
two kinds of meaning as complimentary rather than contradictory.  “Of course, the meaning 
assigned to The Book by Living Prophecy may vary from the semantic content discovered by 
historical investigation,” they might say.  Living Prophecy adopts the construction of the text 
that puts it in its best light.  Historical scholarship interprets the semantic content.  If one is 
engaging in only one of these activities, the distinction between interpretation and construction 
may be of no practical consequence.  It is only when one engages in both that the need for 
distinction becomes a practical necessity. 
Views about theological hermeneutics have had an enormous influence on theories of legal 
interpretation and construction.  Such influences can be direct (conscious reference) or indirect 
(unconscious or historically mediated influence).  In the contemporary era, most constitutional 
theorists eschew direct reliance on theological views, but it is at least possible that the cultural 





heritage of theological hermeneutics has had a shaping influence on the culture of constitutional 
theory.  If so, it would not be surprising if some constitutional theorists came to believe that a 
Living Constitutionalism that seeks the true, morally attractive, meaning of the Constitution, and 
eschews Framers Meaning or Clause Meaning, must be the correct view.259 
 
* * * 
G. Essentially Contested Concepts and Natural Kinds 
Discussions about constitutional interpretation sometimes include reference to two 
philosophical ideas the notion of an “essentially contested concept” and the idea of a “natural 
kind.” 
1. The Concept Conception Distinction and Constitutional Construction 
We have already deployed the distinction between concepts and conceptions in the context of 
our discussion of semantic content.260  That same distinction may be incorporated in a theory of 
constitutional interpretation or an account of constitutional construction.  Ronald Dworkin, 
among others, has argued that some constitutional clauses include words or phrases that refer to 
concepts, requiring a construction that singles out some conception of that concept in light of 
some theory of construction.261  Because this is a contested and potential important move in 
constitutional construction, we need a relatively robust understanding of the concept-conception 
distinction and the role it might play in constitutional meaning and practice. 
a) What is the Distinction? 
So far as I know, the concept-conception distinction originates with Essentially Contested 
Concepts, a paper written by the philosopher William Gallie in 1956.262  The core of Gallie's 
argument was the idea that certain moral concepts are "essentially contested." "Good," "right," 
and "just," for example, are each moral concepts which seem to have a common or shared 
meaning. That is, when I say, that the alleviation of unnecessary suffering is good, you 
understand what I mean. But it may be that you and I differ on the criteria for the application of 
the term "good." You may think that a state of affairs is good to the extent that it produces 
pleasure or the absence of pain, while I may think that the criteria for "good" make reference to 
the conception of a flourishing human life—a life of social and rational activity lived in accord 
with the human excellences or virtues.  We share the concept of “good,” but we have different 
conceptions of what constitutes a good life. 
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Sometimes, when there is this sort of disagreement, we want to say, "Ah, you and I are 
referring to different concepts." If by "cause," you mean "legal cause," whereas I use "cause" as a 
synonym for "cause in fact," then we are using the same word to refer to two different concepts.  
If this were the case, then “cause” would be ambiguous and once the ambiguity had been 
identified, we would come to realize that we were talking past one another. 
But in the case of "good," we seem to be using the same concept. I think that the good really 
is human flourishing and not pleasure; you have the opposite opinion. So we are contesting the 
meaning of the concept "good," and each of us has a different conception of that concept.  We 
are not talking past one another; we are disagreeing.  Gallie thought that some concepts were 
essentially contested. That is, Gallie believed that some concepts were such that we would never 
reach agreement on the criteria for application of the concepts. If a concept is essentially 
contested, then it is in the nature of the concept that we disagree about the criteria for its 
application. 
Perhaps the most famous use of the concept-conception distinction is found in the political 
philosopher John Rawls's famous book, A Theory of Justice. Rawls appeals to the distinction 
between the concept of justice and particular conceptions of justice.263 His theory, justice as 
fairness, is defended as the best conception of justice. Notice that as used by Rawls, the concept-
conception distinction does not imply that the concept of justice is essentially contested. It might 
be the case that we would eventually come to agreement on the criteria for a just society. In other 
words, not all contested concepts are essentially contested concepts. 
b) How is the Concept Conception Distinction Relevant to the Interpretation 
Construction Distinction? 
Another well-known use of the concept-conception distinction is found in Ronald Dworkin's 
theory, law as integrity. You may know that Dworkin uses a hypothetical judge, Hercules, to 
illustrate his theory.  Many believe that Dworkin’s theory changed over time.  The version of the 
theory that I am employing in this subsection of the Article is that found in his essay Hard 
Cases. 
Suppose that Hercules is interpreting the United States Constitution. He finds that the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Constitution makes reference to the concept of equality. In order to 
decide some case, about affirmative action say, Hercules must decide what equality means. To 
do this, Hercules will determine what conception of equality best fits and justifies our legal 
practices--narrowly, the equal protection clause cases but more broadly, the whole of American 
constitutional law and indeed the entire institutional history of the Republic. For Dworkin, 
"equality" is not an "essentially contested concept," because Dworkin does not take the position 
that there cannot be stable criteria for the meaning of concepts like equality. Rather, "equality" is 
an interpretive concept--a concept that is subject to interpretation. Interpretive concepts like 
equality are, in fact, contested, and may, in fact, always be contested, but this is not an 
"essential" (necessary) characteristic of interpretive concepts. 
How does Dworkin’s use of the concept-conception distinction relate to constitutional 
semantics?  The most natural interpretation is that concepts are ambiguous in a special way.  
Conceptions of a concept correspond to senses of an ambiguous word or phrase.  But there is a 
difference.  The senses of ambiguous terms are identified by examining usage.  We learn that 
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“cool” can refer to temperature or style by observing the different senses in which “cool” is used 
in English.  Ambiguous words and phrases are not indeterminate, because the different senses are 
fixed by usage—subject of course to the fact that usage can change over time. 
In the case of Dworkin’s deployment of the concept-conception distinction, usage does not 
constrain in the same way.  The main idea of the distinction requires that the limits of a concept 
be fixed in some way.  If this were not so, then various conceptions would not be of the same 
concept.  But Dworkin’s idea seems to admit of the possibility that when Hercules constructs the 
theory that best fits and justifies the law as a whole, he might (in principle) discover that the 
conception implicated by that theory is newly constructed and not sanctioned by current usage. 
How does the concept-conception distinction interact with the construction-interpretation 
distinction?  At the stage of interpretation, the question is the original public meaning of the 
clause—the conventional semantic meaning in context plus necessary implicature.264  If the 
semantic theory that underwrites the concept-conception distinction is correct, then, in principle, 
there is no a priori reason to believe that the conventional semantic meaning of the constitutional 
text never includes concepts that require construction.  If we discover that this is the case, then 
we move from the stage of interpretation to the stage of construction. 
We can illustrate this possibility with respect to Dworkin’s own example—the equal 
protection clause.  At the stage of interpretation, the question would be whether the conventional 
semantic meaning of “equal protection of the laws” is something like “treatment required by the 
concept of equality.”  To answer this question, we would look to evidence of usage during the 
period when the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was drafted and 
ratified.  That evidence might support the concept of equality interpretation or it might support 
some other interpretation.  If the evidence did support the concept of equality interpretation, then 
construction of the clause would require construction of a conception of equality.  Dworkin’s 
theory—law as integrity—would constitute a method of construction.  Hercules constructs the 
theory that best fits and justifies the law as a whole and that theory will include a conception of 
equality.  Other theories of construction provide competing criteria for sound constructions—a 
topic that is considered below.265 
The account that I have offered so far reconciles Dworkin’s use of the concept-conception 
distinction with the interpretation-construction distinction, and if this were the correct 
interpretation of Dworkin’s theory, then Dworkin’s approach would be broadly consistent with 
Semantic Originalism.  It is far from clear, however, this Dworkin views his own theory in this 
way.  It is possible that Dworkin believes that law as integrity would require Hercules to decide 
cases in a manner that contravenes the semantic content of the constitution when the theory that 
best fits and justifies the law as a whole so requires.  Notice, however, that this revised 
understanding of Dworkin’s theory is consistent with what I have called the weak version of the 
contribution thesis.266 
One more point about concepts, conceptions, and Semantic Originalism.  Jed Rubenfeld has 
argued that reconciliation of the concept-conception distinction with originalism collapses 
originalism into Dworkin’s theory.  Here is his argument: 
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As soon as an originalist starts saying that the framers' and ratifiers' concrete historical 
understandings of a constitutional provision were “mistaken” and may therefore be ignored 
in favor of the semantic or objective linguistic meaning of the words at the time of 
enactment, he is no longer an originalist but a Dworkinian. Dworkin's distinction between 
“concept” and “conception” (with Dworkin claiming to honor the concept as opposed to 
the conception) tracks very closely, if it is not identical to, a distinction between the 
original semantic meaning of the words in the text and the concrete historical 
understandings of how that text would apply to particular cases.267 
There is a good deal of confusion in this passage.  First, the references to understandings that 
were “mistaken” the use of “semantic or objective linguistic meaning” is ambiguous at best and 
obscure at worst: Goldstein’s discussion elides the fundamental difference between Gallie’s idea 
of essentially contested concepts and the Kripke’s idea of natural kinds with an essential 
structure (to be discussed below268).  It is difficult to exaggerate the magnitude of the 
difference—essentially contested concepts are the polar opposites of concepts with fixed 
essences.  (Note to reader: if you attention was waning, please reread the last sentence.) 
Second, the concept-conception distinction does not track the distinction between 
conventional semantic meaning and original expected applications.  Again, this is a fundamental 
mistake; both concepts and conceptions are intended to function as providers of semantic 
content.  The concept-conception distinction explains how a term like “good” can be a single 
concept, even though we have different conceptions of that concept.  From the point of view of 
Semantic Originalism, this would be analogous to ambiguity: each conception of the concept is 
like a different sense of an ambiguous term, but if the concept-conception account is right, the 
conceptions are of the same concept.  Suppose interpretation leads us to a particular 
conception—for now it doesn’t matter how that might happen.  The conception is now supplying 
the semantic content of the constitutional word or phrase.  But conceptions are not expected 
applications.  Rawls’s theory—justice as fairness—is a conception of the concept of justice: it is 
not a set of expected applications.  Dworkin’s own theory makes conceptions, not concepts, the 
providers of legal content.  Mistaking expected applications for semantic content leads to an 
incoherent theory of meaning, as is explained in detail below.269 
The argument that originalism must choose between a commitment to the incoherent view 
that meaning is original expected applications or Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity is utterly 
implausible and the structure of the argument is invalid (in the formal sense).  There is an 
excluded middle so vast that it includes almost every account of meaning in general and 
constitutional meaning in particular.  One of the options in the excluded middle is Semantic 
Originalism. 
c) Concepts, Conceptions, Constructions 
The larger point of this section is to identify relationship of the concept-conception distinction 
and the construction-interpretation distinction.  One picture of that relationship is that the 
semantic meaning of some constitutional provisions points to concepts.  On this picture, 
interpretation leads to the concept, and then construction selects a particular construction.  It is 
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possible that this picture is the right one, but whether it is (or isn’t) depends on what the semantic 
meaning of the particular clause actually is.  The concept-conception distinction is an account of 
the way that certain word and phrases mean.  The concept-conception distinction is not a tool 
that can be used (for normative reasons) to change the semantic content of the constitution.  
Thinking of the concept-conception distinction in that way is simply to misunderstand the 
distinction. 
It is possible that interpretation based on the evidence of contemporaneous meaning will lead 
us to the conclusion that a particular clause incorporates a concept.  But this is not necessarily the 
case.  There is no a priori reason that necessitates that all of the general and abstract clauses of 
the constitution point to contested concepts.  Conventional semantic meaning is fixed by 
linguistic practice at the time of constitutional utterance.  The idea that meaning is fixed by 
linguistic practice is not inconsistent with the idea of contested concepts.  Contested concepts 
explain how meaning can be fixed by linguistic practice and at the same time be contested.  
Linguistic practice fixes the boundaries of the concept within which the contest occurs. 
 
* * * 
 
The age of interdisciplinarity is upon us, and the full implications of that fact have only 
recently begun to “sink in.”  The legal academy includes the smart and the quick, generalists 
who can take in a distinction, theory, or concept, and put it to brilliant use.  And most of the 
time, that is good enough.  If a subtlety is missed or an intricate distinction elided, the money 
point remains.  But the standard for “good enough” is independent of the sociology and 
psychology of the legal academy.  Even the sharp and the quick can miss something 
fundamental.  Sometimes if a subtlety is missed or an intricate distinction is elided, the money 
point simply disappears.  The currency of legal theory is truth.  Cleverness lacks cash value. 
 
* * * 
2. Natural Kinds, Moral Kinds, and Legal Kinds 
The account of constitutional meaning that we have pursued so far ties clause meaning to 
conventional semantic meaning, which is fixed by usage.  But is this account of meaning 
correct?  Or if correct for some words and phrases, are the others for which a different account of 
meaning is required.  A fundamental challenge to the notion that meaning is conventional is 
posed by the work of Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, and others on the notion of a natural kind.  
Following Morris, let us define a natural kind as follows: 
Natural Kind: A natural kind is a kind whose identity as a kind is fixed by reality, and 
not by human interests or concerns.270 
Take the word “gold,” one sense of which refers to the shiny metal.271  Gold is a natural kind the 
identity of which is fixed by its atomic structure.  What counts as gold in this sense depends on 
our best scientific theory of the elements.  Whether a given object really is composed of gold 
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does not depend on usage.  It would be quite possible for everyone to be mistaken about the 
question whether something that seems very much like gold really is gold.  So this seems like a 
case in which conventional semantic meaning does not fix reference.  Once we had dubbed gold 
(the element) with the English word “gold” as its name, then reference was fixed by nature and 
not conventions. 
Does the constitution employ natural kind terms?  In a subsequent draft, I will have a really 
good answer to that question.  I did browse through Article I as I was writing this paragraph, and 
the only candidate for a natural kind term was “person.”  There are some other possible examples 
that come to me off the top of my head.  “Speech” in the sense of “language use” seems like it 
might be a natural kind.  For the purposes of this draft, I am inclined to adopt the position that 
there are very few natural kind terms in the constitution.  For this reason, the existence of natural 
kinds doesn’t seem to threaten the core theory of constitutional meaning articulated above.272 
If the constitution does contain natural kind terms, then the core theory would need to be 
modified.  This modification would not challenge the essential thrust of either the account of 
clause meaning or the distinction between interpretation and construction.  The meaning 
(semantic content) of natural kind terms is determinate.  Metaphysically, there is always a “fact 
of the matter” regarding the correct application of a natural kind term.  Epistemologically, there 
may, of course, be uncertainty.  The essential thrust of the view argued for this Article requires 
only that the Constitution have semantic content that is not indeterminate.  If the semantic 
content of the Constitution were largely determined by natural kind terms, that requirement 
would be satisfied. 
This modification of the theory is not as radical as it might seem on first blush.  The idea that 
some words refer to natural kinds is not inconsistent with the notion that the relationship between 
the word and the natural kind is fixed by convention or usage.  Indeed, that conclusion seems 
inescapable.  Because words change their meaning it is possible for a given word to refer to one 
natural kind at one time and then change its meaning as a result of accumulating errors in usage. 
Consider “speech” as an example of the role of conventions and natural kinds.  If the word 
“speech” in the First Amendment refers to a natural kind—oral human communication defined in 
terms of naturally occurring human capacities to produce sounds and linguistic capacities that are 
inherent to the human species—the relationship is a function of complex set of conventions that 
constitute the natural language English.  We can see the role of convention, because we can 
imagine that the word “speech” could acquire a new meaning in English.  Suppose the lyrics of 
rap music were referred to as “speech” and over time the pattern of usage changed so that it 
became the beat rather than the lyrics which conventional usage identified as speech.  It is 
imaginable that over a long period, the word “speech” would lose its old meaning, coming to 
refer only to beat in the musical sense.  If this occurred, the semantic content of the First 
Amendment would not change.  It would still refer to the natural kind speech.  It would be 
possible, of course, for naïve readers of the First Amendment to say, “How cool, the founders 
guaranteed the right to choose whatever speech [meaning what we call “beat”] you want when 
you compose music.”  But this would be a misunderstanding.  The semantic content of the First 
Amendment would not have changed. 
The constitution includes few words or phrases that are plausibly understood as natural kinds 
identified by science.  But it does include several words and phrases that could be understood as 
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having moral content, for example, “freedom of speech,” “cruel and unusual punishment,” and 
“equal protection of the laws.”  Some philosophers have argued that the meaning of moral 
language is fixed by moral kinds.273  This is not the occasion to interrogate the correctness or 
plausibility of this position, but we do need to ask whether and how this view, if true, would 
affect the theory of constitutional content offered here. 
If the constitution employs moral kind terms, then moral reality and not semantic conventions 
fixes their meaning given conventions that attach a word or phrase to the kind.  Conventions do 
the attaching of the word to the moral kind, but moral reality and not the convention fixes the 
nature of the kind.  In this case, the constitution has semantic content but that semantic content 
includes (but is not exhausted by) content that is independent of the original public meaning of 
the constitution.  This possibility creates a set of options for Semantic Originalism as a theory of 
constitution meaning.  The first option is to absorb “moral kinds” into the theory of clause 
meaning.  In that case the four modifications of clause meaning identified above,274 would be 
joined by a fifth modification, and the theory would proceed as modified.  There are other 
options as well, and some of these are discussed in a footnote accompanying this sentence.275 
Finally, there is at least the logical possibility that there exist “legal kinds,” metaphysically 
real entities that fix the reference of constitutional terms like “Republican form of government,” 
“privileges and immunities,” or “full faith and credit.”  The view that comes closest to this is 
expressed by Michael Moore in the context of the term “malice” in the criminal law: 
[A] second level realist is committed to something named ‘malice’ that is neither a 
natural nor a moral kind.  Rather than calling this a ‘legal kind,’ however, I prefer the label 
‘functional kind.’  The legal realist view of ‘malice’ is no different than the general realist 
understanding of terms like ‘lawyer’, ‘knife’, ‘vehicle’, or ‘paper weight’: all these terms 
refer to kinds of things whose essence is not given by their structure but by their 
function.276 
Again, for the purposes of this essay, the existence of “legal kinds” or “functional kinds” 
would not require modification of the main thesis—that the constitution has semantic content, 
that its content has the force of law, and that fidelity to that content is warranted absent 
overriding reasons of morality.  The fixation thesis remains intact, and the clause-meaning thesis 
would be reconstructed to incorporate the role of linguistic convention in creating the necessary 
relationships between words and phrases, on the one hand, and functional or legal kinds, on the 
other. 
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Ideally, all of these issues would be resolved in the scope of a single essay.  Practically, this 
requires full consideration of the most fundamental questions in contemporary philosophy of 
language.  Because the existence of natural, moral, and functional kinds can be incorporated 
within the structure of Semantic Originalism without fundamental alteration in the structure of 
the theory, the deep questions are deferred. 
H. Objections to Pure Semantic Originalism 
Even if pure semantic originalism (essentially, the fixation thesis and the clause-meaning 
thesis) is justified by arguments that are sound, it does not follow that it cannot be contested or 
resisted.  In this Section, I shall examine a variety of objections to pure semantic originalism, 
beginning with what we can call the “normativity objection,” which contests the line that I have 
drawn in the sand between semantics and normativity. 
1. The Normativity Objection: Attempts to Collapse the Distinction Between Normativity 
and Semantics 
The assertion that originalism must be justified on normative grounds is widely shared and 
deeply held among contemporary constitutional theorists.  Richard Kay wrote, “The choice of 
following or rejecting the original intentions is necessarily not a legal choice, but a moral and 
political one.”277  A Harvard Law Review student note opined, “The choice among methods of 
constitutional interpretation is a moral and political choice that implicates the deepest and most 
basic questions about how government authority may legitimately be allocated and exercised.”278 
Richard Fallon wrote, “Choosing between a text-based and a practice-based approach to 
constitutional theory requires a judgment of normative preferability.”279  Christopher Eisgruber 
stated, “Originalism, like any other theory about the judiciary’s proper role, ‘must depend upon a 
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political philosophy that it takes to be true.’”280  These authors express a view that is commonly 
held among constitutional theorists—that theories of constitutional interpretation must be 
justified on normative grounds.281 
 
* * * 
 
I’ve presented “Semantic Originalism” several times at workshops and conferences.  Despite 
the extended and explicit discussions of the distinction between its normative and semantic 
claims, my experience is that many readers react to the paper by asking for the normative 
justification for adopting “clause meaning” as a theory of the semantic content of the 
Constitution.  “Why should we adopt your theory?”  “How will it improve constitutional 
practice?”  “What are the practical advantages of Semantic Originalism?”  “Will it produce 
better decisions?”  When asked these questions, I pause and then reiterate the arguments for the 
proposition that the recognition or discovery of semantic content is guided by facts and not 
values.  The most common reaction is an uncomfortable silence.  I do not take this silence to 
indicate agreement.  Instead my assumption is that the silence indicates a failure of 
communication.  I have simply failed to get my point across.  I imagine my interlocutor silently 
thinking, “What on earth could Solum mean by that?” 
I have a working hypothesis about this failure of communication.  I believe that it flows from 
a failure to appreciate the ambiguity in words like “meaning” and “interpretation.”  In this 
Article, I use meaning to refer to semantic content and interpretation to refer to the process of 
determining semantic content.  But “meaning” can be used to refer to the authoritative legal 
gloss on a text, and we have already distinguished between semantic meaning, application 
meaning, and teleological meaning.  “Interpretation” can refer to the union of what I call 
interpretation and construction, or it could refer even more generally to constitutional 
practice—which could be guided by considerations entirely outside of the semantic content of the 
constitutional text.  So when I say that I am using the term “meaning” to refer to semantic 
content, it is possible for even a careful listener to reverse the direction of my stipulation.  That 
is, I can be interpreted as having said that “semantic content” is whatever guides constitutional 
practice.  Once I am interpreted in this way, my assertion that “semantic content is a matter of 
fact” seems nonsensical or obviously wrong. 
 
* * * 
 
The claim that the debate over originalism is normative “all the way down” is frequently 
asserted, but rarely defended.  The best, deepest, and most thorough discussion is found in 
Mitchell Berman’s Originalism is Bunk,282 and I will explicate his argument in detail.  Berman’s 
argument is advanced in the context of his critique of “intentionalism,” which is roughly the 
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underlying view about semantic content that serves as the foundation for original-intentions 
originalism. 
Let’s begin with the following passage: 
[M]y modest goal is simply to establish the strong prima facie grounds for believing 
that the author’s intended meaning is not the only possible meaning, hence not the only 
possible target of interpretation, and therefore (to speak loosely) that the argumentative 
burden appropriately falls upon the intentionalists. 
So Berman has established the aim of his argument.  Glossing his point in the vocabulary we 
have been employing, Berman will argue that author’s intended meaning is not the only possible 
semantic content of a text. 
In the next (extended) passage, Berman begins his argument: 
First, words must have meaning prior to their deployment by a particular speaker in a 
particular context in order to give the speaker reason to select particular words (or signs or 
marks) as against other particular words (or signs or marks) as the vehicle for conveying 
his intended meaning. For example, if, wanting the whitish mineral that enhances a food’s 
flavor, I know to ask you to “please pass the salt” and not to “please pass the gas” (let 
alone, to “flymx groppohurplebinger”) that’s because “salt” means the thing I have in mind 
antecedent to my choice to use it in this context, and “gas” doesn’t. Likewise, you know 
that my utterance of the word “salt” in this context is evidence of my wanting salt because 
of the meaning that our conventions have assigned to the word prior to my usage. Indeed, 
because intentions are states with semantic content, their content cannot be reducible to 
intentions on pain of infinite regress. 
Second, we need some notion of word or sentence meanings that are nonidentical to the 
author’s intended meanings just to express the mundane idea that a speaker has misspoken 
or in some other way erred in his use of language. We know that “‘meaning’ and ‘authorial 
intention’ are not conceptually identical . . . by the mere fact that we can meaningfully ask 
whether a given text really conveys the author’s intention.” If I do ask you to “pass the 
gas” when I really want the salt, and then I complain about the consequences, we know 
that I have erred in my use of language. I erred precisely because “gas” does not mean 
salt–not because saltness is naturally excluded from the combination of sounds or 
markings that comprise “gas,” but because of common usage and understandings. The 
simple idea that I misspoke is close to inexpressible if the only meaning of meaning is 
speaker meaning. For in that event, “gas” does mean salt. So, again, there must be 
conventional word meanings that are prior to the intent of an author. 
Because, for the same reasons, there must be conventional rules of grammar too, it 
would seem to follow that an utterance has at least two types of semantic meaning – the 
author’s intended meaning and the meaning that a text bears by application of the relevant 
community’s ordinary semantic and syntactic conventions for assigning meaning, given 
the context of the text’s utterance. Eliding some nuances and shades of gray, these two 
sorts of meaning are variously termed speaker’s meaning or utterer’s meaning on the one 
hand, and sentence meaning, utterance meaning or public meaning, on the other.283 
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So far, so good.  There is one mistake in Berman’s explication, but it is easily corrected.  
Berman states: 
 . . . words must have meaning prior to their deployment by a particular speaker in a 
particular context in order to give the speaker reason to select particular words (or signs or 
marks) as against other particular words (or signs or marks) as the vehicle for conveying 
his intended meaning  . . .284 
But this is incorrect because we can make up new words and assign their meanings in various 
ways, some of which do not involve definitions that use other words.  So if I point at a rabbit and 
utter the word “gavagai” and then say “Let’s catch the gavagai and put it back in its cage,” I can 
begin to create new meaning. 
With this one mistake corrected, the rest of Berman’s exposition above is essentially correct.  
His basic point is that speakers meaning is not the only possible meaning type because of the 
existence of sentence meaning.  It is the next move that is problematic: 
And if interpretation is the attribution of meaning to a text, there would seem to be at 
least two possible targets of interpretation. Importantly, this is not merely an abstract 
possibility. In many mundane contexts, interpretation in accordance with utterance 
meaning seems by far the more appropriate course.285 
The key is the first clause: “if interpretation is the attribution of meaning to a text.”  This remark 
is somewhat inaccessible or cryptic.  What work is the word “attribution” doing here?  The word 
“attribution” is ambiguous.  One sense of “attribution” is “the action of bestowing.”286  If by 
attribution Berman means that interpretation is an action that creates meaning, then his account is 
inconsistent with his own account of conventional semantic meaning. 
There is another sense of “attribution”: “assigning or ascribing of a character or quality as 
belonging or proper to any thing”287  In this sense, attribution of meaning is simply an assertion 
about what the meaning of a thing is.  If this is what Berman means by “attribution,” then this 
passage is unobjectionable.  In that sense, there can be correct and incorrect attributions of 
meaning. 
Berman continues: 
Consider an announcement that “applications must be received by 12:00 a.m. 
Thursday.” Possibly, the author or promulgator of the announcement mistakenly believed 
that “12:00 a.m.” means noon, and therefore intended to provide that applications must be 
received by midday Thursday to be eligible for consideration. Nonetheless, a competent 
speaker of the language understands that “12:00 a.m.” means midnight. The utterance 
meaning of the announcement is that applications are timely if received, in effect, no later 
than Wednesday, even though according to the speaker meaning – what the author 
intended – some applications received thereafter would be timely.288 
Here Berman has simply made a mistake in his account of speaker’s meaning.  For speaker’s 
meaning to be communicated, there must be “common knowledge” of the speaker’s intention.  In 
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cases where a speaker makes a “slip of the tongue” or has an erroneous belief about conventional 
semantic meaning, speaker’s meaning can nonetheless be conveyed—so long as speaker’s belief 
about the audience’s recognition of the speaker’s intention is true.  The success conditions for 
conveying speaker’s meaning can be therefore be met, even where the speaker is mistaken about 
what was uttered (I thought I said “12:00 p.m.”) or what the conventional semantic meaning was 
(I thought “12:00 a.m.” meant twelve noon).  If a reader of Berman’s announcement successfully 
recognizes the speaker’s intent and does in fact get the meaning, then it would simply be a 
mistake for the reader to say, “I get to choose what the announcement means.”  Given the 
context of utterance, it may be perfectly clear that “12:00 a.m.” means twelve noon: for example, 
the reader of the audience may know that applications are only received during business hours, 
that there is a standard practice of accepting applications until noon, and both the author of the 
announcement and share common knowledge of this context.  In these circumstances, the 
meaning of the utterance token is twelve noon and it would simply be a mistake to arbitrarily 
assign twelve midnight. 
The source of Berman’s confusion is his failure to distinguish between the conventional 
semantic meaning of an utterance type (all sentences of the form “applications must be received 
by 12:00 a.m. Thursday”) with the semantic content of a particular utterance token: the posting 
of an announcement reading “applications must be received by 12:00 a.m. Thursday” on a 
particular occasion at a particular location by a particular author with a particular audience in 
mind. 
Let me be clear, I am not claiming that as described, there is any fact of the matter regarding 
the meaning of the hypothetical utterance in Berman’s example.  That is because Berman’s 
example is hypothetical or fictional.  It isn’t, in fact, an utterance—it is a fictive utterance.  As a 
consequence, there is no fact of the matter about the context of utterance.  It didn’t happen.  
There was no context.  And therefore, there is no fact of the matter about what the utterance 
meant in context. 
Let me be clear, I am not defending intentionalism against Berman.  Of course not!  I am 
defending Semantic Originalism, which includes the clause-meaning thesis—the assertion that 
the meaning of the utterance token, the Constitution of the United States, is given by its 
conventional semantic meaning as modified by the full account of clause meaning.  But the case 
for the clause-meaning thesis does not entail the further conclusion that no utterance token ever 
has speaker’s meaning.  That would be silly, wouldn’t it?  Life is full of examples of speakers 
meaning: speakers succeed in communicating based on common knowledge of the speaker’s 
intentions all time—billions of times per hour given the size of the earth’s population.  My point 
is that the meaning of an utterance token isn’t a matter of choice. 
Berman’s argument continues: 
By recognizing both speaker meaning and sentence meaning as valid meanings of an 
utterance, nonintentionalists insist merely that insofar as interpretation is the search for 
meaning, it need not be the search for the originally intended meaning. In this context, 
interpretation of the text is a search for utterance meaning.289 
Berman’s meaning here may be unobjectionable.  There is an ambiguity in the assertion that 
“interpretation . . . need not be the search for originally intended meaning.”  If Berman assertion 
is that there is no general rule that the meaning of all utterance tokens is the speaker’s meaning 
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of the tokens, then he is absolutely right.  If his assertion is that there is no fact of the fact of 
matter with respect to any utterance token, that the meaning of that token is the speaker’s 
meaning, then is not only wrong, he has failed to produce any argument for his conclusion.  To 
produce such an argument, Berman would need to take into account the success conditions for 
communication of speaker’s meaning and the distinction between the meaning utterance tokens 
and utterance types. 
The assertions made by Berman in the passages quoted above were intended by Berman to 
support the conclusions drawn in the following passage.  This passage contains the crucial moves 
in Berman’s argument, and it requires extended dissection: 
For all these reasons, pluralism about interpretation looks more than plausible. Interpret 
the grocery list in pursuit of the author’s intended meaning because the author had 
knowledge that you lack that is relevant to your reasons for interpreting the document. 
Interpret the announcement in pursuit of utterance meaning because doing so best advances 
the values that surround and inform the use of announcements – to promote shared 
understandings, notice, fairness. The pluralist claim is not (as one Originalist has suggested 
dismissively) that utterer’s meaning is good enough for insignificant texts, but that we 
should pursue a different meaning when it comes to texts that are, in some sense, 
important. It is that our object or target of interpretation should be sensitive to our reasons 
for engaging in the activity of interpretation. We return, then, to our question of the 
intentionalists: why not pluralism?290 
The first sentence here is “For all these reasons, pluralism about interpretation looks more than 
plausible.”  The only prior occurrence of “pluralism” in Berman’s essay is in the following 
sentence, which occurs shortly before the passages we have been parsing: “The question 
concerns what can be said for always interpreting all texts solely in accordance with presumed 
authorial intent–what can be said, in other words, against pluralism?”291  If Berman really means 
“in other words,” then this passage is unobjectionable.  It is not the case that “always interpreting 
all texts solely in accordance with presumed authorial intent” results in accurate recovery of 
semantic content. 
The next two sentences of the paragraph we are now examining make the move to 
normativity.  First, “Interpret the grocery list in pursuit of the author’s intended meaning because 
the author had knowledge that you lack that is relevant to your reasons for interpreting the 
document.” And second, “Interpret the announcement in pursuit of utterance meaning because 
doing so best advances the values that surround and inform the use of announcements – to 
promote shared understandings, notice, fairness.”  In both sentences, the meaning of the word 
“interpret” is crucial.  As we have already seen, “interpretation” is ambiguous.  If Berman 
means, determine the semantic content, then these two sentences involve a kind of category 
mistake. Berman is discussing hypothetical utterance tokens that lack actual contexts, so in his 
examples, there is no fact of the matter about what the semantic content of the hypothetical 
utterances is—these are not actual utterances. 
In the case of an actual utterance with a context, we may not be able to determine the 
semantic content of a particular utterance token: there is no guarantee that communication will 
succeed on particular occasions.  But if the success conditions are met, then there is a fact of the 
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matter about the semantic content of the utterance, and considerations of fairness (to which 
Berman eludes in the second sentence quoted in this paragraph) do not directly bear on what that 
content is. 
But as I said, the meaning of the word “interpret” is ambiguous.  Berman might mean 
interpret in another sense.  We might conclude, for example, that the announcement did mean 
“twelve midnight”.  That meaning might be clear based on the context of utterance.  For 
example, past announcements may have been worded “12:00 a.m.—THAT MEANS 
MIDNIGHT.”  With the passage of time, the “THAT MEANS MIDNIGHT” could come to be 
omitted, but when the announcement was posted, it could have been misunderstood by someone 
who was new and unfamiliar with this unusual deadline.  The very fact that we would describe 
this situation as involving “misunderstanding” shows that do not think that the reader of the sign 
just chooses meaning on normative grounds. 
Just because the semantic content of the utterance token was midnight, that fact does not 
entail the conclusion that we must enforce the rule in a case where the misunderstanding was 
reasonable.  We can excuse noncompliance for normative reasons.  In that sense, we can 
adoptive what we might call an “amending construction” of the announcement that treats the 
announcement as if it had said “twelve noon.”  But it is simply a mistake to move from the fact 
that the practice of rule application can depart from semantic content for normative reasons to 
the conclusion that semantic content can be changed for normative reasons.  That move would 
involve a category mistake. 
This is not the end of Berman’s argument.  After additional discussion of interpretivism, he 
returns to his affirmative case for pluralism: 
The analysis to this point successfully counters the argument that intentionalism is 
demanded because it alone can satisfy the critical conceptual premises regarding what 
interpretation is. Because we already saw the insufficiency of the other principal 
intentionalist arguments (those relying on our untutored intuitions about the frequent 
propriety of intentionalist interpretation and on the proposition that meaning depends upon 
some sort of authorial intentions), intentionalism seems defeated. But after intentionalism 
falls, what is left? We used utterance meaning to defeat intentionalism. But an open 
question is whether utterance meaning exemplifies the possible other approaches or 
exhausts them. In other words, the question remains whether we are left with pluralism, as 
I have intimated, or merely dualism.292 
Once again, the meaning of the terms “meaning” and “interpretation” are crucial. 
If Berman is using interpretation and meaning in what I call their semantic senses, then 
“dualism” or “pluralism” is true at one level—there are cases in which the semantic content of an 
utterance is speakers meaning and other cases in which semantic meaning of an utterance is its 
sentence meaning.  But it would be a logically mistake to move from this fact to the conclusion 
that a single utterance token has both sorts of meaning.  That simply doesn’t follow. 
Moreover, there are cases where our information about the context of utterance is insufficient 
for us to be able to determine what the semantic content of a particular utterance is: there is no 
guarantee that semantic content is epistemically accessible.  But from these points it does not 
follow that there is no fact of the matter about the semantic content of a particular utterance. 
The same points apply to the Berman’s next move: 
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Roughly, I suggest, we do well to think of interpretation as an effort to attribute to a text 
the meaning that would best serve the interpreter’s reasons for engaging in the activity of 
interpretation, or would best serve her (possibly inchoate or not wholly conscious) criteria 
for success. And if one’s reasons or criteria are varied, then the best interpretation will be a 
complex function involving disparate desiderata all satisfied to varying degrees.293 
Two additional observations are relevant here.  First, Berman hasn’t actually made out the case 
for pluralism as opposed to dualism.  To do that, he would need to actually articulate and defend 
multiple accounts of meaning (beyond speakers meaning and sentence meaning) that account for 
successful communication.  He does not assume that burden, so his argument only warrants 
dualism. 
The second observation is more fundamental, but repetitive.  If Berman is referring to 
interpretation as what we do with texts—how we use them—then this paragraph is 
unobjectionable.  But if he believes that semantic content is determined after the fact of 
communication on the basis of what we would like an utterance to have meant given our 
practical concerns, then this way of thinking about interpretation is fundamentally confused. 
One way of getting at the idea that there is a fact of the matter about semantic meaning is to 
examine contexts where meaning is unambiguous.  The United States Constitution, for example, 
Article One, Section Three of the United States Constitution provides, “The Senate of the United 
States shall be composed of two Senators from each State.”  The semantic content of this 
provision is neither ambiguous nor vague.294  For example, Senators come only in whole 
numbers: there a bright line between one and two, and between two and three.  Nor is there any 
ambiguity in the meaning of two in context—the reference is clearly to the number of senators.  
This lack of ambiguity is not affected by the fact that the English word “two” is ambiguous: it 
can refer to either the number or to the numeral.  But no one could plausibly maintain that “two 
Senators” could mean “numeral two Senators”—even though there have been members of the 
now defunct Washington Senators baseball team who wore the numeral two on their uniforms.  
Even if there were normative reasons to interpret “two Senators” as referring to those members 
of the Washington Senators who were designated as numeral two, it would simply be a mistake 
to assign or attribute than meaning to Article Two, Section Three of the United States 
Constitution.  The Constitution of 1789 could not possibly have referred to players for the 
Washington Senators baseball team.  Baseball did not exist in 1789.  The Washington Senators 
baseball team did not exist in 1789.  When the Washington Senators did come into being and put 
a uniform with the numeral two on a player, this did not create a new possible semantic for the 
phrase “two senators.”  No normative argument, no matter how powerful, can change that. 
It might be argued that examples like this are trivial, and that objection is answered 
elsewhere.295  But even if the example was trivial, that would be no answer to the point that the 
example makes.  If there is a fact of the matter about the semantic content of constitutional 
provisions that are neither ambiguous nor vague, this shows that interpretation in the semantic 
sense is not normative all the way down.  And because the resolution of vagueness and 
ambiguity is a matter of construction and not interpretation, the fact that construction is a 
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normative enterprise does nothing to show that interpretation in the semantic sense is also 
normative. 
2. Substantive Objections to Clause Meaning and the Fixation Thesis 
The normativity objection doesn’t directly confront either the fixation thesis or the clause-
meaning thesis, but there are a number of arguments that do clash in a substantive way to these 
two claims. 
a) Alternative Theories of Semantic Meaning 
Many of the arguments against clause meaning are based on the notion that some other theory 
of semantic content is either the correct theory or that it provides an alternative kind of meaning 
that can be chosen by someone trying to interpret the constitution. 
(1) Intentionalism 
The most obvious alternative to clause-meaning thesis is grounded on intentionalism, the 
general theory of meaning that grounds original intentions originalism.296  In a sense, 
intentionalism doesn’t threaten the core of Semantic Originalism: it denies that semantic content 
is determined by original semantic meaning, but it accepts (or can accept) the fixation thesis, the 
contribution thesis, and the fidelity thesis.  If it were the case that intentionalism was true, then 
Semantic Originalism would need to be amended, but it would otherwise remain intact. 
The case for clause meaning and against framers meaning has already been made.297  Those 
arguments will not be repeated here.  Instead, I want to consider a different sort of argument for 
intentionalism, articulated by Steven Smith in his recent book, Law’s Quandary.  Let me give a 
name to Smith’s core position, which I shall call the “semantic intentions necessity thesis.”  Here 
is how Smith expresses this idea: “[T]he meaning of a legal text is necessarily given by—indeed, 
is basically identical with—the semantic intentions of an author or authors of some sort.”298  
Smith seems to be making an argument for intentionalism that has a special kind of trumping 
force—it purports to establish the impossibility of sentence meanings in general and clause 
meanings in particular. 
Smith’s argument can be tested with an example drawn from Gary Lawson.  Lawson argued 
that the Constitution should be read like a recipe and that recipes should be read in light of their 
original public meaning, as opposed to the private intentions of the cook (or correspondingly, the 
Framers).299  Smith responds: 
Lawson’s proposition seems positively perverse.  After all, if we are reading the recipe 
in an effort to cook fried chicken and on the assumption that the recipe was written by 
someone who was a specialist in the art, then what we care about in reading the recipe is 
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what the cook intended.  Conversely, we care not at all about the recipe’s original public 
meaning—except perhaps as an aid to figuring out what the cook actually meant.300 
The recipe example is a good one because it provides a context in which to test the semantic 
intentions necessity thesis.  But in order to get at the test, we need to elaborate the example just a 
bit.  Consider the following hypothetical situation.  Let’s call it “Anonymous Recipe Bank,”: 
Anonymous Recipe Bank.  Imagine that someone sets up an anonymous recipe bank.  
Let’s suppose it is on the Internet.  Contributors submit their recipe via a Web page and the 
recipe is then indexed and classified. 
Now imagine that that Mom submits her recipe for apple pie.  The author of the text is Mom; she 
uploaded the recipe.  But because this is an anonymous recipe bank, we do not know who Mom 
is.  So we have no way of acquiring particular knowledge of her semantic intentions.  But we do 
know this: Mom knew that her recipe would be anonymous.  So we know that Mom knew that 
we would not know anything about her particular intentions.  Mom would know that we would 
have to fall back on the ordinary or standard meaning of the various elements that make up 
recipe.  Mom knows that we could not know that by “butter,” she means margarine.  So Mom 
knows that her recipe will be given its “public meaning” or “sentence meaning.”301  So we will 
interpret Mom’s recipe by assigning the ordinary meanings to each of the ingredients and 
measures.  To coin a phrase, we will interpret Mom’s recipe for apple pie by using the idea of 
“recipe meaning” and not the idea of “cook’s meaning.” 
At this juncture that Smith can make an intuitive and apparently persuasive move: Smith can 
say, “Yes, and this example proves my point.”  In this situation, we are interpreting Mom’s 
intentions.  Given the situation, our interpretation is that Mom intended the words to have their 
ordinary public meaning.  In other words, we say that the meaning of the recipe is its “recipe 
meaning” because “recipe meaning” is “cook’s meaning.”  Suppose that Smith’s claim is correct 
as a general matter.302  This would imply that sentence meaning is a special kind of speakers 
meaning.  In the case of the Constitution, clause meaning would be a special kind of framers 
meaning.  Because the framers knew that we could know their special individual intentions, they 
must have intended that Constitution be interpreted in accord with its original public meaning. 
If Smith’s argument for the semantic intentions necessity thesis were correct, it would provide 
an alternative understanding of the rationale for assigning clause meaning to the Constitution, but 
it does not deny that clause meaning is possible.  The possibility of clause meaning depends on 
conventional semantic meaning, which in turn depends on the complex set of conventions that 
define a natural language.  These conventions are created by intentional actions that confer 
meanings on otherwise arbitrary sounds and marks.  But once conventional semantic meaning 
gets going, it can supply semantic content to a text that is independent of the intentions of any 
particular author.  There is no general metaphysical necessity that makes sentence meaning 
impossible or requires that every utterance be understood on the model of speakers meaning.  As 
a consequence, the general arguments against framers meaning and for clause meaning can go 
through even if it is the case intentions play a role in the creation of conventional semantic 
meaning. 
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In sum, Semantic Originalism makes two replies to intentionalism, in the alternative.  The 
first reply is that the account of meaning offered by intentionalism is incorrect: the semantic 
content of the Constitution is given by its clause meaning.  The second reply is that if 
intentionalism were true, it could be absorbed into Semantic Originalism: intentionalism can be 
seen as an explanation for how clause meaning arises. 
(2) A Variation of Intentionalism: Communication of Secret Intentions 
A variation of intentionalism was suggested by Howard Graham in his 1938 articles on the 
“conspiracy theory” of the fourteenth amendment.303  Graham’s argument challenges the 
assumption that the framers’ intentions were multitudinous and inaccessible.  Suppose that those 
who drafted a given constitutional provision were able to agree on a “secret” or “coded” meaning 
and that the authoritative interpreters of the provision, i.e., the Justices of the Supreme Court 
were in on the conspiracy.  Under these conditions, the success conditions for framers meaning 
would seem to be satisfied.  Here is Graham’s statement of the argument: 
Social historians have contended that the equal protection and due process clauses were 
designed to take in “the whole range of national economy;” that John A. Bingham, the 
member of the Joint Committee chiefly responsible for the phraseology of Section One, 
“smuggled” these “cabalistic” clauses into a measure ostensibly drafted to protect the 
Negro race. Others have been skeptical of this view, and have pointed out that it is 
pyramided on three propositions: (1) that the framers had a substantive conception of due 
process, (2) that as early as 1866 there existed a number of constitutional cases in which 
due process had been invoked in a substantive sense by corporations, (3) that the framers 
knew of these early cases and realized the corporate potentialities of their draft, which 
were not suspected by the ratifiers. 
Of course, Graham, writing in 1938 did not state his three conditions in Grice’s terminology, 
but unsurprisingly his description of the three propositions satisfy the common knowledge 
conditions for the success of speakers meaning. 
This scenario is not impossible.  If, in fact, such a conspiracy had existed, then the 14th 
Amendment’s semantic meaning would have been its framers meaning and not its clause 
meaning.  But this would not be the end of the matter.  There are at least two further questions.  
The first of these concerns the legal effect of the cabalistic clauses—given the fraud perpetrated 
by the framers on the ratifiers, should the cabalistic clauses be considered valid, and if valid, 
should their semantic content be recognized as their legal meaning.  Even if the framers meaning 
of the cabalistic clauses were their legal meaning, there is a further question whether fidelity to 
law would extend to this case. 
Of course, the possibility of Graham’s scenario does not establish its plausibility or truth.  So 
far as I know, this scenario is not supported by historical evidence.  The real lesson here is that 
there is a fact of the matter about the semantic content of an utterance, and that fact is a function 
of the conditions of constitutional utterance.  Under normal conditions, the semantic content of 
an utterance is given by its original public meaning, but we can imagine possible conditions in 
which that would not have been the case.  This possibility shows that the theory of clause 
meaning is falsifiable, and that fact provides supporting evidence that the claim that the 
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constitution has clause meaning is a theory about facts and not the conclusion of a normative 
argument. 
(3) Constitutional Holism 
Let us use the name constitutional holism for the view that the meaning of the Constitution is 
the meaning of the whole document or the holistic meaning.304  Does holism provide an 
alternative to clause meaning?  The clause-meaning thesis asserts that the semantic content of the 
constitution is a function of the meanings of individual clauses given the publicly available 
context of constitutional utterance.  But what if individual words and phrases cannot be 
understood in isolation because the Constitution is an organic whole?  For example, the phrase 
“rights . . .  retained by the People” in the Ninth Amendment might not be comprehensible 
without reference to “We the People” in the Preamble: are “the People” individuals or are they a 
polity?  Likewise, the Ninth uses the phrase “the enumeration of certain rights in this 
Constitution”   Gleaning the meaning of this phrase seems to require reference to what is now 
called “the Bill of Rights,” and once that has been accomplished, the meaning of the phrase 
“rights . . . retained by the People” may be clarified.  For example, the “retained rights” which 
are not to be denied or disparaged may be of the same type or kind as the “enumerated rights” 
such the freedom of speech and press, the right to bear arms, the right to due process, and so 
forth. 
Does holistic meaning provide a better account of the semantic content of the constitution 
than does clause meaning?  To get at this question, we first need to identify and then deflate a 
misleading picture of the relationship between the meaning of individual clauses and the whole 
Constitution.  It might be thought that there are only two alternative positions on the relationship 
of the whole to the parts when it comes to constitutional meaning. The first alternative might be 
called clause bound interpretivism, the view that the meaning of each clause must be determined 
from within the four corners of the clause.  The second alternative might be called organic unity 
holism, the view that meaning only attaches to the whole constitution as an organic unity and that 
as a consequence individual clauses are not meaningful units of constitutional communication.  
This picture, which suggests we must choose between clause bound interpretivism and organic 
unity holism, might be called the all-or-nothing picture: either the constitution’s meaning is all 
(the whole constitution all at once) or it is nothing (no meaning attaches to the individual clauses 
by virtue of their relationship to the whole document). 
The all-or-nothing picture creates a false dilemma.  There is an alternative picture of the 
relationship between the meaning of individual clauses and the whole Constitution: that picture 
can be expressed via two theoretical ideas: (1) the familiar device of the hermeneutic circle, and 
(2) the related notion of intratextualism. 
The idea of hermeneutic circle figured prominently in protestant theological hermeneutics to 
understand the relationship of the meaning of individual biblical passages to the whole text: the 
meaning of each individual passage of scripture is gleaned in light of the meaning of the Bible as 
a whole.305  As Gadamer puts it, “For it is the whole of scripture that guides the understanding of 
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the individual passage: and again this whole can be reached only through the cumulative 
understanding of individual passages.”306  Justice Story's first recommendation for constitutional 
construction is based on the same notion: “In construing the constitution of the United States, we 
are, in the first instance, to consider, what are its nature and objects, its scope and design, as 
apparent from the structure of the instrument, viewed as a whole, and also viewed in its 
component parts.”307 
Intratextualism308 as articulated by Akhil Amar expresses a closely related idea with a 
different metaphor: 
Textual argument as typically practiced today is blinkered (“clause-bound” in Ely's 
terminology), focusing intently on the words of a given constitutional provision in splendid 
isolation. By contrast, intratextualism always focuses on at least two clauses and highlights 
the link between them. Clause-bound textualism paradigmatically stresses what is explicit 
in the Constitution's text: “See here, it says X!” By contrast, intratextualism 
paradigmatically stresses what is only implicit in the Constitution's text: “See here, these 
clauses fit together!” But there is no clause in the Constitution that says, explicitly and in 
so many words, that the three Vesting Clauses should be construed together, or that the 
Article III grant of federal question jurisdiction should be read alongside the Article VI 
Supremacy Clause. Intratextualism simply reads the Constitution as if these implicit 
linking clauses existed. Clause-bound textualism reads the words of the Constitution in 
order, tracking the sequence of clauses as they appear in the document itself. By contrast, 
intratextualism often reads the words of the Constitution in a dramatically different order, 
placing textually nonadjoining clauses side by side for careful analysis. In effect, 
intratextualists read a two-dimensional parchment in a three-dimensional way, carefully 
folding the parchment to bring scattered clauses alongside each other.309 
Both the idea of the hermeneutic circle and the idea of intratextualism undermine the all-or-
nothing picture.  Our choices are not limited to clause-bound interpretivism and organic unity 
holism.  The excluded middle is to read individual clauses in the context of the whole 
Constitution.  The clause-meaning thesis squarely occupies the excluded middle: it insists that 
clause meaning is bound by the publicly available context,310 and the whole of the constitutional 
text is indisputably part of that!  Once the all-or-nothing picture is out of the way, it becomes 
apparent that contextual clause meaning can be reconciled with a plausible version of holistic 
meaning. 
One final point: organic unity holism is utterly implausible as a theory of semantic content.  
The whole constitution is not the relevant unit for determining semantic content.  It is no 
accident that when we apply the Constitution our focus is on clauses and the interaction between 
clauses.  The Constitution as an organic unity says both too much and too little.  Too much, 
because the whole Constitution from top to bottom considered a single unit of meaning doesn’t 
translate into rules of constitutional law: organic unity holism makes the Constitution one long 
primal scream.  Too little, because organic unity prevents us from assigning meaning at the level 
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of particularity required to do the work of constitutional practice: organic unity holism 
transforms individual clauses into meaningless concatenations of phonemes. 
In sum, if holistic meaning is construed plausibly (as incorporating the ideas of the 
hermeneutic circle and intratextualism) then it is absorbed into the theory of clause meaning via 
the notion of the publicly available context of utterance.  But if construed in accord with organic 
unity holism, holistic meaning is no meaning at all. 
(4) Contemporary Meanings 
Why not contemporary meanings?  If the meaning of the words and phrases that make up the 
Constitution have changed over time, isn’t it possible for the Supreme Court to use the 
contemporary meaning of these words and phrases when it interprets the Constitution?  This 
question is ambiguous.  In one sense, of course it is possible for the Supreme Court to “interpret” 
(or quasi-interpret) the Constitution in ways that are inconsistent with its semantic content.  The 
relevant question is whether it is possible for the Supreme Court to correctly interpret the 
Constitution to have semantic content that is determined by contemporary usage that is different 
from and inconsistent with the conventional semantic meaning of the words and phrases at the 
time particular constitutional provisions were framed and ratified.  In that sense, it is indeed 
“impossible”—the Court has the power to alter constitutional law (the rules that define the legal 
effects of the Constitution), but it does not have the power to change its semantic content. 
It is important to remember that at this stage of the argument, we are only discussing 
contemporary meaning as an alternative to the fixation thesis.  In that context, contemporary 
meaning is a nonstarter.  There is another, related, but conceptually distinct inquiry as to whether 
contemporary meanings can be legally effective and a third conceptually distinct inquiry as to 
whether authorizing the substitution of contemporary meanings for the actual meaning of the text 
is justifiable as a matter of political morality. 
(5) Expected Applications 
Another line of attack on Semantic Originalism might accept the fixation thesis, but embrace 
expectations about application as the semantic content of the Constitution.  It is very important 
that we distinguish between two different ways in which the expectations of framers, ratifiers, 
and citizens might relate to the semantic content of the Constitution.  Expected applications 
might be used as evidence about conventional semantic meaning.  Such evidence must be used 
with care, because expectations about application are complex in cases where the semantic 
content is vague.  In such cases, the evidence about expected applications will be ambiguous as 
between expected interpretations and expected constructions.  Moreover, in complex cases, it is 
possible have an expectation that is inconsistent with the semantic content of a constitutional 
provision.  For example, the original constitution notoriously had a glitch: the set up of the 
Electoral College permitted ties between candidates for President and Vice-President.  Suppose 
that we had evidence that framers, ratifiers, and citizens expected that this could not occur: their 
expectation could be based on the fact that they simply hadn’t considered all of the permutations 
that were possible given the rules governing the Electoral College.  This would be a case were 
their expectations would not match the semantic content. 
Although expected applications can be evidence of meaning, they cannot be the meaning of a 





Suppose we limited the application of the Constitution of 1789 to those applications that were 
expected by the framers.  Expectations are occurrent or dispositional mental states—individuals 
either have an expectation or they don’t.  Let’s assume that framers were of one mind (they all 
shared the same expectations) and that their expectations were abundant: they thought about lots 
of possible applications.  But even assuming that the framers minds were racing at a mile per 
minute, their expectations would quickly run out.  That is, if the meaning of a constitutional 
provision were identical to the original expectations, there would simply be “no meaning” in 
most cases.  For example, it might well be the case that no framer would have thought of the 
possibility of a tie between the President and Vice President in the Electoral College.  If the 
meaning of the relevant provisions were identical with the expectations, then there is simply no 
constitutional provision at all to deal with this situation. 
In fact, once we try to generalize an expected applications account, it becomes apparent it 
could not work as a theory of semantic.  Most utterances are not rules or commands: that is, most 
utterances have no expected applications.  “Thank you” cannot be understood on the model of 
expected applications, but “thank you” is an utterance.  The meaning of an utterance is not its 
expected applications. 
(6) Readers Meanings 
What about readers meanings?  Why doesn’t the Constitution mean whatever readers believe 
it means?  It is hard to know what to make of this proposal.  Is the idea that there are criteria by 
which readers’ beliefs about meaning can be true or false?  If the answer to this question is yes, 
then those criteria would provide the theory of meaning.  The criteria cannot be “readers 
meaning” on pain of vicious circularity.  If the answer to this question is no, then anything goes.  
But “anything goes” is not a theory of meaning at all; it is semantic skepticism, which shall be 
considered below.311 
(7) Legal Meanings 
Another possibility is that the semantic content of the Constitution is the “legal meaning” of 
its provisions.  Formulated in this way the notion of “legal meaning” is ambiguous.  “Legal 
meaning” might refer to: (1) whatever meaning the specialist community of lawyers, judges, and 
persons learned in the law would assign to the constitution given the conventional semantics of 
the legal community at the time a given provision was framed and ratified; (2) whatever meaning 
the legal system (with the Supreme Court at its apex) does assign to the provisions; (3) whatever 
meaning would result from the correct application of the conventions of legal interpretation and 
construction.  There are surely other variations, but these are sufficient for purposes of 
discussion. 
The first interpretation is a variation of the clause-meaning thesis: the proposal is that given 
the division of linguistic labor, all of the work is done by the community of lawyers, judges, and 
persons learned in the law.  This is a possible theory of the semantic content of the constitution, 
and it is consistent with the fixation thesis as well.  Whether this theory is correct depends on the 
facts.  Are the circumstances of constitutional communication such that each and every provision 
of the constitution is a term (or phrase) of art?  Probably not, but confirming this hunch would 
require an inquiry in linguistic history. 
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The second interpretation of legal meaning is a variation of the reader’s meaning theory, and 
it suffers from the same defect: the law means whatever judges read it to mean.    One version of 
the second interpretation is associated with John Chipman Gray, wrote, “The Law of the State or 
of any organized boy of men is composed of the rules which the courts, that is, the judicial 
organs of that body, lay down for the determination of legal rights and duties.”312  The conceptual 
poverty of Gray’s account is well known: Are there criteria for correct assignment of meaning by 
the legal system?  If not, then the constitution lacks determinate semantic content.  If there are 
criteria, what are they?  Whatever the criteria are, those criteria fix the meaning, resulting in the 
self-effacement of the judges (or lawyers) meaning theory. 
The third interpretation of legal meaning also requires further specification.  What are the 
“conventions of legal interpretation and construction” and what constitutes their “correct 
application”?  The answers to these questions will give the third version of lawyer’s meaning its 
content.  Depending on the answers, this third version may reduce to the equivalent of the first 
interpretation: the understandings of the community may be constituted by the convention.  Or 
the conventions may themselves point to some other theory of meaning, e.g., to conventional 
semantic meaning and the interpretation-construction distinction: in that case, the third 
interpretation would be precisely equivalent to the clause-meaning thesis.  There are many other 
possibilities as well, but their content will be determined by specification of the conventions: 
without such specification, the third alternative is not yet a theory of semantic content. 
There is an important ambiguity in the third interpretation legal meaning.  If the notion of 
legal meaning is limited to principles of construction, then legal meaning is meaning in the 
applicative sense and not in the semantic sense.  In this case, there is simply no conflict between 
the clause meaning account of the Constitution’s semantic content and the legal meaning account 
of the construction of vague terms and phrases. 
But the third interpretation of legal meaning could be developed as an account of semantic 
content.  That is, the actual meaning of the constitution’s words and phrases could be understood 
as the meaning that would be attached by legal conventions.  If this were so, then additional 
questions would have to be answered before the content of the legal meaning account of 
semantic meaning would be fully specified.  One question concerns priority.  One account of 
priority would start with conventional semantic meaning and the division of linguistic labor: if 
the actual linguistic practices were such that the general public would always defer to results of 
the correct application of the legal conventions, then the clause meaning of the Constitution 
would turn out to be identical to its legal meaning.  But if priority is given to linguistic practice, 
then it seems unlikely that the rule was always defer.  Even if the rule was always defer, the legal 
conventions may point back to conventional semantic meaning. 
There is another possibility regarding priority.  It might be argued that the legal meaning has 
priority over the conventional semantic reason.  If this were the claim, then the question would 
be: why?  Why would the Constitution’s semantic content be determined by the legal 
conventions that governed the interpretation of other legal texts?  The answer to this question 
cannot be that the preexisting law required this result: the Constitution itself brought into being a 
new legal regime.  Nor can the answer be that the Constitution itself requires this result.  Texts 
cannot fix their own meaning all the way down.  Even if there were a legal meaning clause in the 
Constitution—and there is not—the meaning of that clause would have to be determined in some 
                                                






way before the clause could be used as a guide for the interpretation of the remainder of the 
document. 
One final point about legal meaning.  All of the discussion in this subsection is directed at a 
very specific target—the theory that the semantic content of the Constitution is determined by 
the legal meaning of the text.  Nothing in this section addresses the question whether the content 
of constitutional law (the set of legal rules) is determined by the legal conventions of 
interpretation and construction.  That question is addressed by the contribution thesis.313 
(8) Historians Meaning 
In academic debates about originalism it is sometimes suggested that originalism is flawed 
because it lacks the methodological sophistication to recover the true historical meaning of the 
constitutional text.  The next move is the suggestion that academic historians do have the 
necessary tools to recover historical meaning, but that this does not yield an original meaning 
that can be applied to contemporary cases.  Stephen Siegel has summarized this point with 
admirable clarity and brevity, “[O]riginalism is impossible because history is too nuanced and 
ambiguous to give determinate answers to today’s constitutional controversies.”314  This point is 
frequently made in connection with their criticisms of “law office history”315 or “history lite.”316  
Another version of this criticism focuses on “context”: the claim is that the historical meaning of 
the constitution is contextual, and that radical differences in context between the time of framing 
and the time of application have the consequence that the historical meaning of a given provision 
may simply not apply. 
But what is historical meaning (or historians meaning)?  It cannot be the case that the 
meaning of legal texts is whatever historians (or political scientists or legal academics who do 
history) think the texts mean.  It could be that the meaning is the meaning determined by correct 
application of historical method, but then a theory of historical method is required, and it will be 
the content of that method that will determine meaning.  It will not do to say that the historical 
method is immersion in the archives—that provides no criteria of correctness or account of what 
one does while immersed. 
Is there a distinctive theory of meaning that is implicit in the “historical method”?  It seems 
likely that historians use different methods for different problems and disagree among 
themselves.  Nonetheless, “I don’t know, but I’ve been told”317 that Quentin Skinner’s article, 
Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas318 is a canonical text.319  If this is the case, 
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then the conceptual foundations for historical method as a technique for gleaning semantic 
content are shaky.  Skinner’s article aims at producing a theory of the meaning of historical texts 
based on ideas from the philosophy of language.  So far as I can tell there are two inconsistent 
strands of thought in Skinner’s account of historical meaning, which we might call the 
Wittgensteinian strand320 and the Gricean strand.  The two strands yield inconsistent theories of 
meaning, and neither strand does the work that some followers of Grice may seem to assume. 
The Wittgensteinian strand in Skinner is transparent in the following passage: “The 
appropriate, and famous formula—famous to philosophers, at least—is rather that we should 
study not the meanings of words, but their use.”  The famous formula is then attributed in a 
footnote to Ludwig Wittgenstein.  It is true that Wittgenstein is associated with notion that 
meaning is use, or as he put it, “Words are deeds.”321  The idea is that the meaning of an 
expression is the use to which it is put.  Wittgenstein was on to something, but it wasn’t a theory 
of semantic content.  Words are used to accomplish deeds, but the deeds are not the meaning of 
the words in the semantic sense of meaning.  We can extend Wittgenstein’s observation about 
words, to texts.  Put crudely, texts can be used to accomplish deeds.  Locke’s Second Treatise 
could be part of Lord Shaftesbury’s political program.  Hobbes Leviathan could be restoration 
ideology.  Rawls’s A Theory of Justice could be an apology for the Great Society.  There is 
nothing wrong with calling the political purposes of these historical texts their “meaning” so long 
as we are clear that this is not their meaning in the semantic sense. 
When Skinner says “we should study not the meanings for words, but their use” he may have 
sound practical advice for historians of ideas whose practical interest is not the content of the 
Second Treatise, Leviathan, or A Theory of Justice, but the connection of these texts to other 
historical events.  But this would not be sound advice to anyone who is seeking the semantic 
content of the texts.  Were they to follow Skinner’s advice, they would be “put off the scent” of 
semantic content. 
What I call the Gricean strand is illustrated in the following two passages from Skinner: 
The understanding of texts, I have sought to insist, presupposes the grasp both of what 
they were intended to mean, and how this meaning was intended to be taken.  It follows 
from this that to understand a text must be to understand both the intention to be 
understood, and the intention that this intention should be understood, which the text itself 
as an intended act of communication must at least have embodied.322  
And the second passage: 
The essential question . . . in studying any given text, is what its author, in writing at the 
time he did write for the audience he intended to address, could in practice have been 
intending to communicate by the utterance of this given utterance.  It follows that the 
essential aim, in any attempt to understand the utterances themselves, must be to recover 
this complex intention on the part of the author.323 
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There are no footnotes to these passages.  In prior passages, Skinner relies heavily on Austin’s 
account of illocutionary acts, but the parallelism between Skinner’s theory of text meaning and 
Grice’s theory of speaker’s meaning is unmistakable.  And in a recent interview, Skinner says, “I 
should add that, rightly or wrongly I regarded Paul Grice’s theory of meaning as an appendix to 
Austin, treating Grice’s analysis of communicative intentions as a further analysis, in effect, of 
Austin’s pivotal notion of an illocutionary act.”324 
Skinner was deeply confused about the implications of Wittgenstein and Grice for the 
meaning of historical texts.  The Wittgensteinian strand of his account of textual meaning is 
inconsistent (if viewed as a theory of semantic meaning) with the Gricean strand: the notion that 
meaning is use is not equivalent to the idea that speech acts have illocutionary content.  This 
conclusion is apparent from Skinner own arguments.  Skinner’s very crude paraphrase of Grice 
on speakers meaning does not support the claim that the meaning of a text is its use: instead it 
leads to the very different and inconsistent claim that the meaning of a text is the meaning that 
the author intended the audience to grasp based on the audience’s recognition of the speaker’s 
intention.   If this theory were correct, then the meaning of texts would be their “authors 
meaning” and the meaning of the constitution would be its “framers meaning.”  In other words, 
Skinner’s Gricean strand is predicated on the best theoretical foundation that could be given for 
original intentions originalism.  Of course, Skinner would not endorse this implication of his 
theory, because Skinner failed to grasp the implications of Grice’s account of speaker’s meaning 
for the recognition or discovery of semantic content and seems to have been entirely unaware of 
Grice’s account of sentence meanings. 
Thus, to the extent that historians believe that Skinner’s theory of the meaning of texts is 
inconsistent with original intentions originalism, they are twice wrong.  Skinner’s 
Wittgensteinian strand does not clash with any theory of semantic meaning, because it has 
nothing to say about semantic content.  His Gricean strand not only does not undermine the 
quest for the original meaning, it suggests that historians ought to join the Old Originalist team—
reinforcing the aging lineup of Meese and Bork.  But original intentions originalist could draw 
only cold comfort from the company of their new teammates.  As we have already seen, Grice’s 
theory of speakers meaning will not do as a theory of the meaning of legal (and other historical) 
texts—precisely because such text must rely on sentence meaning (conventional semantic 
meaning) to meet the success conditions for constitutional communication. 
The true relationship between the Wittgensteinian strand and the Gricean strand is that 
meaning is being used in two different senses.  Skinner was under the mistaken impression that 
the senses were the same, perhaps because he wrongly believed that illocutionary force is 
identical to use.325  Once we clear up this misunderstanding, it becomes clear that Skinner has no 
coherent theory of semantic content. 
                                                
324 Quentin Skinner on Encountering the Past, page 48, 
http://www.jyu.fi/yhtfil/redescriptions/Yearbook%202002/Skinner_Interview_2002.pdf.  See generally K. R. 
Minogue, Method in Intellectual History: Quentin Skinner's Foundations, 56 PHILOSOPHY 533-552 (Oct., 1981). 
325 This conclusion becomes apparent once we examine what “illocutionary forces” utterances actually can have.  
Austin for example, notes that an utterance can make promise, issue a command, make an assertion, proffer an offer, 
and so forth.  Historical texts studied by historians of ideas make assertions—the illocutionary force of the text 
essentially includes the semantic content of that which is asserted.  Legal texts make laws (roughly equivalent to 
issuing commands): the illocutionary force of a constitutional provision essentially includes the semantic content of 
the provision itself.  The illocutionary force of a promise is not the purpose the promise was intended to serve or the 
“use” of the promise in that sense.  Likewise, the illocutionary force of a constitutional provision in not the 
contextualized purpose of the provision. 





A very important qualification is in order.  I have used the phrase “historians meaning” and 
the word “historian” without sensitivity to important differences in the various theories of 
historiography embraced by different historian and political scientists.  Some historians may 
reject Skinner, and others may have a more sophisticated understanding of Grice and 
Wittgenstein than is evidenced in Skinner’s writing.  Most historians are simply uninterested in 
originalism—at least from a professional point of view.  My quarrel is not with history as a 
discipline—it is with the use of a particular theory of historiography in the argument over 
originalism. 
 
* * * 
 
Historians and academic lawyers sometimes engage in a turf war over original meaning.  
Historians may accuse lawyers of “law office history” and academic lawyers may accuse 
historians of “history common-table law.”  These disputes could become mean spirited.  
Historians might accuse legal academics of “cherry picking the evidence,” and lawyers could 
accuse historians of failing to understand the legal content of legal texts.  Of course, both cheery 
picking and gross failures of understanding have occurred, but generalizing to whole academic 
disciplines from individual cases does not facilitate mutual understanding among the disciplines. 
A more nuanced assessment of the relationship between history and law can begin with the 
possibility that legal academics and historians frequently talk past one another.  For example, 
New Originalists are after conventional semantic meaning: they are searching for evidence of 
the semantic content of legal texts: when they say “meaning” they mean semantic meaning.  
When historians are after the meaning of legal texts, they are frequently after something quite 
different; they are searching for the purpose or reasons for which the text was written.  Such 
purposes are not semantic meanings. 
In the original intentions phase of originalism, historians legitimately asked the question 
whether the original purpose of a legal text in a thick historical context had any application to 
current circumstances.  My speculation is that during this period some historians “hardened 
their hearts” towards originalism and to some extent lost interest in continued evolution of 
originalist theory.  Moreover, in my experience, few historians (or others who do history in 
related disciplines) have basic competence in the philosophy of language, and many are 
unaware of the ambiguity in the meaning of meaning.  So to them, “original meaning 
originalism” might have sounded like a deceptive euphemism—a cheap lawyerly trick to evade 
the contextuality of historically embedded purposes.  But on that score, the historians would 
have been mistaken.  If so, this is no shame.  Philosophers make legal mistakes.  Lawyers make 
historical mistakes.  Historians make philosophical mistakes.  But interdisciplinary turf wares do 
not excuse interdisciplinary ignorance; they merely explain it.  “One way or another this 
darkness got to give.”326 
 
* * * 
(9) Popular Meanings 
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There is another possible rival to Semantic Originalism suggested by “popular 
constitutionalism,” the recent revival of a set of old ideas in constitutional theory.327  In the 
context of constitutional interpretation, the theory might be summarized as follows: 
[P]opular constitutionalism is the view that the people themselves are the agents who 
make, enforce, and interpret the Constitution.  When the Constitution is violated, the 
people themselves enforce the Constitution, either by voting the rascals out or by rising up 
against them.  When the Constitution is ambiguous, the people themselves are charged 
with resolving the ambiguity by deliberating about — and articulating—the people’s own 
view of constitutional meaning.  These popular interpretations bind the executive, judicial, 
and legislative branches of government.  And finally, if the people are unhappy with their 
written constitution, they can override, alter, suspend, or ignore it.328 
Left in this bare form, popular constitutionalism would be mysterious—leaving unanswered 
questions about the mechanisms by which popular interpretations and constructions might gain 
the force of law.  We can imagine a variety of possibilities, however.  For example, the people 
might mobilize behind political movements focused on dissatisfaction with current constitutional 
meanings—either the original public meaning or a judicial construction.  Bruce Ackerman’s 
notion of transformative appointments provides the mechanism by which such “popular 
meanings” could be institutionalized in judicial decisions.  All of this is possible, and at this 
stage, I want to maintain strict normative neutrality about the further questions whether it would 
be workable or desirable. 
The important point is that such popular meanings may or may not accord with the semantic 
content of the Constitution itself.  If the popular meaning results in an effective change in the 
effective legal content of the Constitution, then the popular meaning results in what we might 
call an amending construction.  An amending construction cannot change the semantic content of 
the Constitution, but it can nullify its legal force.  If the popular meaning is consistent with the 
semantic content of the Constitution itself, then we have a popular construction within the 
semantic meaning of the Constitution, such popular constructions can overrule judicial 
constructions or even judicial misinterpretations of the semantic content of the Constitution, but 
in neither case do they alter semantic content. 
What about amending constructions?  Can they change the semantic content of the 
Constitution?  We can, of course, talk as if an amending construction actually changed the 
semantic meaning of the Constitution, but when we did so we would either be engaging in a legal 
fiction (if we admitted the “as if” character of our way of speaking) or a lie (if we did not).  This 
becomes clear once we try describe “what happened” when the meaning changed—any honest 
description of the process will require a distinction between the semantic content of the 
Constitution and the amending constructions.  It is no accident that “transformative 
appointments” are transformative. 
Nothing that I have said so far suggests that popular meanings cannot become legally 
effective or that they are normatively undesirable.  It seems indisputable as a matter of fact that 
an amending construction can become settled law—although the inconsistency with semantic 
content would, by conventional accounts, leave open an ongoing latent possibility that the 
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amending construction could be criticized and even reversed on the ground that it is legally 
incorrect.  What is not so clear is whether popular political action in support of an amending 
construction is consistent with the idea of fidelity to law—a question that I simply leave open.329 
(10) Textualism and Hypertextualism 
The clause-meaning thesis is related to “textualism,” the notion that the meaning of the 
Constitution is the meaning of the text.  The affinity is clear: both textualism and clause meaning 
prioritize the semantic content of the constitutional text.  The term “textualism” may be 
ambiguous, and some versions of textualism could have substantial disagreements with the full 
implications of clause meaning.  The clause meaning of the constitution could differ from the 
meaning identified by textualism in several ways: 
 
1. Clause meaning includes constitutional implicature, but textualism could be 
understood as the view that the meaning of the constitution is limited to its semantic 
content or as the view that only the semantic content can be translated into rules of 
constitutional law. 
2. Clause meaning is determined by going outside the four corners of the text to the 
publicly available context of constitutional utterance.  If textualism, does not allow 
this use of context, it is inconsistent with clause meaning. 
3. Clause meaning is not limited to the public or ordinary meaning of the text, because it 
acknowledges the division of linguistic labor and incorporates the technical meaning 
given to terms of art. 
4. Semantic Originalism incorporates the moderate version of the contribution thesis, and 
hence allows for the possibility of extratextual sources of constitutional law.  
Textualism might affirm the extreme version of the contribution thesis which limits 
constitutional law to the semantic content of the constitutional text. 
 
Of course, there may be textualists who would assent to the position taken by Semantic 
Originalism on each of these four issues.  In that case, we might say that Semantic Originalism is 
a variety of textualism or vice versa. 
“Hypertextualism,” as I employ that term, refers to a variant of textualism that emphasizes a 
close reading of the constitutional text that prioritizes syntax and word choice.  Hypertextualists 
deny that the precise punctuation or word choice in the constitutional text is accidental.  They 
seek to squeeze every drop of meaning out of each clause.  At an abstract level, hypertextualism 
might be consistent with clause meaning.  It is at least possible that the conventional semantic 
meaning of the Constitution is its hypertextual meaning: this would be the case if the rules of 
syntax, intratextualist relationships, and fine differences in word choice that are identified by 
hypetextualists were part of the publicly available context of constitutional utterance.  But if 
these rules, relationships, and fine difference would have been inaccessible to the constitutional 
audience (citizens, officials, and judges extended over time), then the fact of their accessibility to 
constitutional scholars who are deeply learned and immersed in the text is not sufficient to win 
them a place in clause meaning. 
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(11) Interpretive Pluralism 
Yet another suggestion is that the alternative to originalism is interpretive pluralism—a 
multimodal method for the manipulation of meaning.  Interpretive pluralism is simply the idea 
that courts use a variety of strategies to resolve constitutional questions.  They appeal to text, 
history, precedent, historical practice of the political branches, and explicitly normative 
argumentation.  The fact that courts do, in fact, employ multiple modes in constitutional practice 
is not in dispute.  The question is whether these this fact implies an alternative to clause meaning 
as a theory of the semantic content of the constitution or falsifies the fixation thesis. 
To begin, we should note that multiple modalities of constitutional practice are entirely 
consistent with Semantic Originalism with the modalities are deployed in constitutional 
construction.  By definition, construction begins after interpretation leaves the stage, and the 
entrance and exit are defined by the role of semantic content.  Paradigmatically, once we 
determine that semantic content is vague, then something other than the recognition or discovery 
of original meaning must guide constitutional practice.  Semantic Originalism is entirely 
consistent with the idea that consideration of constitutional purposes, historical practice, 
precedent, and direct resort to normative considerations would be relevant to construction. 
Similarly, multiple modalities may be relevant to the process of interpretation.  For example, 
consideration of purposes and expectations may provide evidence of conventional semantic 
meaning; similarly, early historical practice may provide such evidence.  Precedents may be 
cited for their reasoning and evidence regarding semantic content.  In a common law system, 
precedents may serve as institutional settlements of disputed questions of semantic content.  The 
doctrine of vertical stare decisis is noncontroversial in this regard: even the most ardent 
originalists believe that lower courts may properly be bound by Supreme Court decisions that are 
wrong on the semantic merits.  It can even be argued that the Supreme Court should consider 
itself bound by its own prior decisions about the semantic content of the Constitution: a strong 
formalist may believe that settlement of disputed questions regarding semantic content should, 
for normative or legal reasons, trump the beliefs of the current justices regarding these disputed 
questions.330 
The residual question is whether the multiple modalities provide a distinctive account of the 
semantic content of the Constitution: the answer to that question is “No.”  The fact of multiple 
modalities is not a theory of semantic meaning: it is a theory of constitutional practice.  It simply 
does not compete with clause meaning. 
b) Stepping Back from the Alternative Theories 
The pattern of argumentation against purported or possible alternatives to clause meaning as a 
theory of the semantic content of the Constitution is now clear.  One of these theories, 
intentionalism, offers a rival account of semantic content, but fails to give an adequate account of 
the success conditions for constitutional communication.  One variant of intentionalism, the 
cabalistic (or secret) meanings theory could, in principle, account for success conditions, but is 
not well confirmed by evidence.  The remaining accounts—holistic meanings, expected 
applications, readers meanings, legal meanings, historians meanings, popular meanings, and 
interpretive pluralism all fail to compete with clause meaning or the fixation thesis as viable 
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theories of semantic content.  These theories either do not address semantic content at all, or they 
fail to offer an account of the possibility of constitutional communication. 
3. Semantic Skepticisms 
One more objection must be answered.  Semantic skeptics deny that the constitution has 
semantic content.  My answers to semantic skepticism will be brief, because I believe semantic 
skepticism has few adherents, lacks coherence, and has been adequately answered by multiple 
arguments on numerous occasions.  We can, nonetheless, quickly consider three versions of 
semantic skepticism: (1) skepticism about the possibility of meaning in general; (2) skepticism 
about the possibility of legal meaning; and (3) skepticism about the possibility of constitutional 
meaning given the plurality of language communities. 
a) General Impossibility of Meaning 
Can it be the case that communication is impossible and hence that no texts have meaning?  
Not if you are reading this article, it isn’t.  That is enough, but here is more.  The assertion that 
meaning is impossible is self-effacing.  If it were true, it couldn’t be asserted.  Although it might 
be the case that which cannot be asserted can still be true, it is surely the case that that which 
cannot be asserted makes no claims and hence directs its own exit from the stage of argument.331  
More could be said, but no more needs to be said. 
b) Indeterminacy of Legal Meaning 
The idea that legal texts are radically indeterminate is similarly confused.  Why should legal 
texts be uniquely incapable of communicating meanings?  Any account of communication and 
meaning that establishes the possibility of communication outside of legal contexts will provide 
conditions under which legal texts can communicate semantic content. 
The fact that legal communication is possible does not entail that the semantic content of legal 
contexts determines the outcomes of all possible or actual cases.  Legal texts can be vague, and if 
they are then some mechanism for the resolution of vagueness will be required when a citizen, 
official, or court must resolve a case that falls within the zone of underdetermination.  But 
underdeterminacy does not imply indeterminacy,332 and indeterminacy would be required for 
semantic skepticism about legal meaning to get off the ground. 
c) Multiplicity of Language Communities 
A much more modest form of skepticism would take aim at the idea that the Constitution had 
conventional semantic meaning to speakers of standard American English in 1789 (or later years 
for the various amendments).  The notion of conventional semantic meaning assumes that there 
was something approximating a national linguistic community which could provide the basis for 
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conventional semantic meanings.  Suppose, however, that Americans in 1789 lacked a common 
tongue, and that the regional dialects were sufficiently divergent such that the various clauses 
would have meant different things to different readers who spoke various dialects of American 
English. 
In this article, I make no claims about whether this objection is or is not supported by the 
evidence.  It seems unlikely to me, but I have no special knowledge, and it might be true.  Even 
if it were true, the theory of clause meaning could be amended so as to overcome the objections.  
All that is required is a division of linguistic labor such that clause could be understood by 
speakers of the constitutional dialect (Philadelphian English) and translated by them so as to 
become comprehensible by those who spoke other dialects (Bostonian English, Virginian 
English, Appalachian English, and so forth). 
 
* * * 
 
Semantic skepticism is surely the very last line of defense for die-hard opponents of Semantic 
Originalism.  No jurisprudential theory of the contemporary period has been more thoroughly 
discredited than the claim that law is radically indeterminate.  Modest claims about 
indeterminacy may engage Semantic Originalism in other ways, but they are not expressions of 
semantic skepticism. 
Almost no one who objects to originalism would really be willing to embrace the legal 
implications of semantic skepticism.  If legal texts are all radically indeterminate, then there the 
“living meaning” of the living constitution is radically indeterminate.  No lower court decision 
can meaningfully be said to be consistent or inconsistent with a Supreme Court decision.  No 
action by a federal marshal or party can be meaningfully said to be consistent or inconsistent 
with a judicial order.  The attractiveness of living constitutionalism is that it allows legal norms 
to adapt to changing circumstances and social norms.  But if there are no legal meanings, then 
there is no difference between living and dead constitutions—they are all ghosts.  Constitutional 
ghosts can be frightening or friendly, but they all lack substance.  You can walk right through 
them. 
 
* * * 
I. What’s in a Name, Take Three: Strong Originalism and Moral Originalism 
In this section, we will examine two attempts to define the term “originalism” in ways that 
would exclude the New Originalists generally and Semantic Originalism in particular.  The first 
attempt was made by Mitchell Berman, and the second attempt was by Christopher Eisgruber.  
Both offer stipulated definitions of “originalism” that cannot be squared with the actual use of 
that term in theoretical discourse by self-identified originalists. 
Mitchell Berman has suggested that originalist theories can be classified according to the 
degree to which they are “hard” and “soft.”  He writes: 
At the weakest end of the spectrum lies the view that the originalist focus (framers’ 
intent, ratifiers’ understanding, original public meaning, or what-have-you) ought not to be 
excluded from the interpretive endeavor. This view–what we might call “weak 
originalism”–maintains merely that the proper originalist object (whatever it may be) 





should count among the data that interpreters treat as relevant. At a polar extreme from 
weak originalism rest views that collectively I will label “strong originalism.” 
Strong originalism, as I will use the term, comprises two distinct subsets.  Probably the 
most immediately recognizable originalist thesis holds that, whatever may be put forth as 
the proper focus of interpretive inquiry (framers’ intent, ratifiers’ understanding, or public 
meaning), that object should be the sole interpretive target or touchstone. Call this subtype 
of strong originalism, “exclusive originalism.” It can be distinguished from a sibling view 
a shade less strong–viz., that interpreters must accord original meaning (or intent or 
understanding) lexical priority when interpreting the Constitution, but may search for other 
forms of meaning (contemporary meaning, best meaning, etc.) when the original meaning 
cannot be ascertained with sufficient confidence. Call this marginally more modest variant 
of strong originalism “lexical originalism.”333 
Berman then argues that the term “Originalism” should be reserved for what he calls “strong 
originalism”: 
As Dennis Goldford put it in his recent book-length examination of the originalism 
debate, what distinguishes originalism from non-originalism is the claim “that the original 
understanding of the constitutional text always trumps any contrary understanding of that 
text in succeeding generations.” Self-described originalists differ regarding countless 
details–whether the proper interpretive focus is framers’ intent, ratifiers’ understanding, or 
original public meaning; whether the best reasons for originalism concern what it means to 
interpret a text, or what must be presupposed in treating a Constitution as binding, or how 
best to constrain judges and provide stability and predictability; whether extra-judicial 
constitutional interpretation is subject to the same constraints as is judicial constitutional 
interpretation; and so on. The contention urged consistently – from originalist icons Raoul 
Berger and Robert Bork to standard bearers from the younger generation like Gary Lawson 
and Michael Paulsen – is that judges should interpret the Constitution solely in accordance 
with some feature of the original character of the constitutional provision at issue.334 
Berman’s conclusion is “Translated into my proposed terminology and shorthand: 
Originalism is strong originalism. The Great Divide, to complete Scalia’s observation, lies 
between those who attend exclusively to the original object and those who attend to changed 
meanings too.”335 
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Berman’s argument that we should reserve the name “Originalism” for strong originalism is 
invalid.   Almost all of the evidence that he cites suggests that the core commitment of 
originalism is to the fixation thesis: the semantic content of a given constitutional provision is 
fixed at the time of constitutional utterance.336  But the fixation thesis is about semantic content, 
whereas the distinction between hard and soft originalism is about normative force.  Some of 
Berman’s evidence goes to what may be another feature of the core of originalism—the view 
that the original meaning’s contribution to law is moderate and not weak,337  but all of Berman’s 
evidence is consistent with the fact that the fixation thesis is the focal point for the originalist 
family of constitutional theories. 
Another proposal for limiting the term “originalism” in a way that excludes the New 
Originalists from the family has been made by Christopher Eisgruber.  Here is his proposal: 
My proposal is this: a theory should count as “originalist” if and only if, in some cases 
involving ambiguous moral and political concepts in the Constitution, it dictates that we 
must comply with a certain moral view because it was held in the past (when the 
Constitution or a relevant amendment was ratified), even though we now think that view 
erroneous..  In short, any originalist theory worthy of the name will permit historical fact to 
trump moral judgment in one or more controversies about the meaning of the 
Constitution’s abstract moral and political concepts.338 
The two sentences are supplemented by a footnote, which reads as follows: 
Not all abstract constitutional concepts are moral or political in character.  For example, 
the Seventh Amendment provides, “In suits at common law, where the value in 
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”  The 
concept of a “suit at common law” is an abstraction, but it is probably best viewed as 
describing a technical legal convention, not a moral, political, or jurisprudential idea.   For 
that reason, someone might believe that “suits at common law” should be define pursuant 
to some historical test (e.g., a suit is “at common law” if it would have been treated as a 
common-law action at the time when the Seventh Amendment was written and ratified) 
without becoming, under my definition, an originalist.339 
There is a lot going on in those two sentences.  Our first task will be to reconstruct 
Eisgruber’s meaning, and then we can consider the question whether his criterion (or criteria) for 
originalism are defensible. 
Given the conjunction of the text and the footnote is clear that the work is being done by the 
phrase “ambiguous moral and political concepts in the Constitution.”  Despite his admirable 
clarity, Eisgruber does not offer a definition of these key notions.  Some clues are found 
elsewhere in the text.  Without using the phrase “moral concepts,” he writes, “Many, if not all, of 
the Constitutions abstract provisions share an important feature: they refer to, or directly 
implicate, moral issues.  That characteristic is especially apparent in the constitutional 
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amendments that protect individual rights.”340  He then goes on to discuss the “abstract structural 
provisions” and observes, “Some people might suppose that these provisions articulate 
descriptive concepts of political science,”341 but concludes moral considerations may bear on 
these concepts and that the structural provisions may be regarded as “expressing political 
principles.”342 
Tentatively, then we can identify the moral concepts as including “establishment of religion,” 
“free exercise of religion,” “freedom of speech,” “freedom of the press,” “the right to bear arms,” 
“unreasonable search and seizure,” “due process of law,” “equal protection of the laws,” “rights 
retained by the people,” “privileges or immunities,” and so forth.  The political concepts include 
“executive power,” “legislative power,” “judicial power,” and perhaps the idea of “necessary and 
proper.” 
Eisgruber’s definition suffers from two minor glitches, but these are easily corrected.  The 
core of the definition is contained in this formulation: 
[A] theory should count as “originalist” if and only if, in some cases involving 
ambiguous moral and political concepts in the Constitution, it dictates that we must 
comply with a certain moral view because it was held in the past   
If read literally, Eisgruber’s definition would be limited to cases involving both “moral and 
political concepts,” but his definitions seem to suggest that the abstract concepts fall into one of 
three categories “moral,” “political,” or “legal.”  If so, then by definition originalism would be an 
empty set.  We can fix this problem by substituting “moral or political” for “moral and political.”  
The second problem is that he stipulates that originalist theories must dictate that we “comply 
with a certain moral view because it was held in the past.”  Here Eisgruber must mean “certain 
moral or political view”: otherwise, he would be requiring originalists to hold the view that 
controversies regarding political concepts must be settled by moral views of the past. 
Finally, Eisgruber oddly permits a theory to count as originalist so long as it would resort to  
the original or moral views of the past in “one or more” cases.  This definition seems too 
permissive.  It would count a theory as originalist if it included an arbitrary stipulation that one 
case shall be resolved by the moral views of the past.  For example: 
Constitutional controversies involving the abstract moral or political provisions of the 
Constitution shall be resolved in accord with the best (or morally correct) conception of the 
concept, unless that controversy involves the “titles of nobility” clause, in which case the 
Republican values of the founding era shall govern. 
Once again, Eisgruber’s theory can easily be corrected.  Surely he means that a theory is 
originalist if it characteristically resorts to the moral or political conceptions of the time at which 
the constitutional provision in question was adopted.  By substituting the notion of 
“characteristically” for “in at least one,” we preserve the possibility that originalists will make 
exceptions but avoid the odd consequences of making a single instance the criterion for 
satisfaction of the definition. 
With all of these corrections in place, we now have the following reconstructed version of 
Eisgruber’s statement of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a theory to count as 
originalist: 
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A theory should count as “originalist” if and only if, in cases involving ambiguous 
moral or political concepts in the Constitution, the theory characteristically requires that 
we must comply with a certain moral or political view because that view was held at the 
time the provision in question was adopted. 
Assuming we now have Eisgruber’s view in hand, the next question is whether this definition 
of originalism “saves the appearances.”  Does Eisgruber’s stipulated definition account for the 
way the term originalism has been used by theorists who self-identify as originalist? 
The answer to this question is surely “no.”  First, the “great divide,” to use Scalia’s phrase,343 
is between those who affirm or deny the fixation thesis.  The fixation thesis is best understood as 
a claim about the fixity of semantic content, and Eisgruber’s definition would therefore exclude 
many theorists who are clearly originalists, including both original-intentions originalists and 
original-public-meaning originalists.  Second, Eisgruber’s definition excludes almost all of the 
New Originalist theories.  Such theories characteristically affirm the interpretation-construction 
distinction, and observance of that distinction results leads to the conclusion that the abstract 
moral and political provisions that Eisgruber identifies require construction.  Third, so far as I 
know, no originalist has every used the term “originalism” to mean what Eisgruber suggests it 
means.  This is not to say that no originalist has ever satisfied Eisgruber’s criterion; some have.  
Rather, it is to say that no originalist defines originalism in the way that Eisgruber defines it.  
This is particularly important because Eisgruber uses “if and only if” to express his definition: 
this means that Eisgruber believes his formula captures the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for a theory counting as originalist.  If no self-identified originalist has used the terms 
“originalism” or “originalist” in this way, then it is very difficult to see how Eisgruber could 
claim that his definition reflects the actual pattern of usage in debates over originalism. 
Eisgruber might answer this argument by claiming that his stipulated definition is nonetheless 
appropriate because it captures the true essence of originalism.  I have tried to construct 
arguments on Eisgruber’s behalf for this claim, but I have failed to devise an argument that 
would be more than a straw man.  (Note to readers:  If you have such an argument, I would be 
grateful if you would share it with me.)  Of course, Eisgruber’s argument does serve a useful 
purpose in the context of his argument in Constitutional Self-Government: it creates a clear 
distinction between his position and originalism.  Serving that purpose would be a sufficient 
warrant for the definition if Eisgruber had coined the term “originalism” for the purpose of 
clarity of exposition.  But given the fact that originalism was a term in wide circulation when 
Eisgruber introduced his definition, the use of a stipulated definition that is contrary to usage is 
likely to introduce confusion rather than clarity. 
One more comment about Eisgruber’s definition.  Eisgruber can be seen as defining 
“originalism” as a particular theory of constitutional construction and simply excluding 
“originalism” from the realm of constitutional interpretation altogether.  That allows Eisgruber to 
claim the high ground of fidelity to law for his theory, and to relegate originalism to largely 
indefensible territory.  The propriety of this move will be examined in the concluding Part of this 
Article.344 
                                                
343 Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, supra 31, at 38. 
344 See infra Part V.B, “What’s in a Name, Take Five: The Topography of Constitutional Theory,” p. 170. 





J. Triviality, Take One: The Hard Wired Constitution 
If Semantic Originalism is correct, then much of the structural provisions of the Constitution 
are “hard wired” in the sense that their semantic content does indeed determine their application.  
No one doubts that there is a Senate and a House, that there are two and only two Senators per 
state, that the Constitution cannot be formally amended by ordinary legislation, and so forth.  At 
this point, a critic of living constitutionalism might argue that Semantic Originalism as it has 
been presented thus far is true but trivial.  All of the really interesting and contested cases, it 
could be argued, involve construction.  No one is arguing that California should have ten 
senators or that twenty-two year olds should be eligible for the presidency.  The easy cases are 
trivial, and if the only claims that Semantic Originalism makes are trivial claims, then theory is 
simply uninteresting.345 
Is the hard-wired Constitution trivial?  The full answer to the triviality objection will be built 
in three stages, with two of the stages built in subsequent sections of this Article.346  At this first 
stage, we will assume, arguendo, that an implicit premise of the objection is correct: that 
assumption is that the only provisions of the Constitution that draw bright lines are the power 
conferring provisions that create basic institution and define their compositions and the rights 
conferring provisions that confer rights that draw bright lines.  Such provisions include those that 
establish the House and the Senate and define their composition, bicameralism and presentment, 
the establishment of a Supreme Court, the Article V procedure for amendment, the electoral 
college, the power to create of a permanent national military, the assignment of foreign policy 
power including the treaty power to the national government, the retention of the states as 
separate and independent units of government, the amendments abolishing slavery, enfranchising 
women, and providing for the direct election of women, and so forth.  All of these provisions 
have relatively sharp-edged semantic content. 
Is the semantic content of these provisions trivial?  In one sense, the bright line provisions of 
the constitution are “trivial,” because their semantic content is not in dispute.  The meaning of 
these provisions is not the subject of the same kind of intense controversy that attends the 
meaning of the general, abstract, and vague provisions such as “freedom of speech,” “equal 
protection,” or “executive power.”  This fact is consistent with the Semantic Originalism which 
predicts exactly this result: interpretation of the bright-line constitutional provisions should not 
be controversial, because the meaning of these provisions was fixed at the time of framing and 
ratification and because the conventional semantic meaning was neither vague nor ambiguous. 
But this does not entail the further conclusion that the semantic content of the “trivial” 
provisions is practically unimportant or even that these provisions normatively unproblematic.  
The bright-line provisions that establish the basic plan of government are obviously of great 
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practical import: they define the basic plan of government.  So far as pragmatic significance is 
concerned, the hardwired constitution is the exact opposite of trivial: the hardwired constitution 
simply dwarfs the contestable constitution if consequences are the measure of importance.  
Moreover, these provisions are not trivial in the sense that they are the subject of universal 
normative agreement.  Sandy Levinson has persuasively argued that some of these provisions 
should be the most controversial: the Electoral College, the malapportionment of the Senate, and 
the practical impossibility of the Article V amendment process, Levinson argues, are profoundly 
undemocratic.347 
If the correct standard for judging the triviality of theory is “Does the theory have important 
consequences that are normatively contestable?” then by that standard, Semantic Originalism 
cannot fairly be categorized as a trivial theory. 
K. Monsters and Apparitions, Take One: Herein of Ink Blots 
There is one last objection to Semantic Originalism.  If the semantic content of the 
Constitution is given by its conventional semantic meaning, this raises the disturbing possibility 
that some provisions of the Constitution might “fail to mean.”  What if the phrase “privileges or 
immunities” had no conventional semantic meaning when the Fourteenth Amendment was 
framed and ratified?  What if the Ninth Amendment is semantically inaccessible (metaphorically, 
an “ink blot”)?  What if the power conferring phrases of Articles I, II, and III (“legislative 
power” “executive power” and “judicial power”) were so vague that the Constitution’s semantic 
content failed to confer any power at all. 
This objection could be pressed for a variety of reasons.  It might be articulated by living 
constitutionalists as a reduction ad absurdum: public meaning originalism, the argument would 
go, cannot be correct because it leads to the absurd consequence that constitutional provisions 
can be meaningless.  The same objection might be advanced by the advocates of original 
intentions: the meaning of the constitution has to be given by the intentions of the framers, they 
might say, in order to avoid the failure of meaning. 
The specter of ink blots and meaningless clauses is not, by itself, a good reason to reject 
Semantic Originalism as a theory of semantic content.  In fact, the fact that Semantic Originalism 
creates the possibility of failed meaning (and that other theories do not allow for such a 
possibility) is strong confirming evidence for the theory.  That is because in the general case, it is 
very clear that failures of meaning are not only possible, they actually occur.  It is possible to 
construct a meaningless utterance.  Readers of this essay, when you get to this sentence, stand up 
and propinquity placid mellifluousness!  Do it now!  (If that example didn’t work for you, then 
sit down and gdklw skoekd flwuw!  Right away!)  Any theory of semantic content that does not 
allow for failure of meaning has a problem. 
Of course, if it were actually the case that one or more of the significant clauses in the 
Constitution was meaningless, that would create a practical problem.  That problem might be 
addressed by simply ignoring the provision in question—or a mending construction might be 
required, with officials or courts filling the “gap” with semantic content created after the fact.  
And we can certainly agree that constitutional drafting that fails to create semantic content is 
poor drafting, but if there are any constitutional provisions that lack semantic content, our 
                                                
347 SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND 
HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).  I am not endorsing Levinson’s claim, nor am I disputing it. 





normative judgments about that fact would not actually change the meaning of the text itself.  
We may wish for the magical power of semantic transubstantiation, but wishing will not make it 
so. 
IV. THE NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF SEMANTIC ORIGINALISM 
So far, Semantic Originalism has been advanced as a claim about meaning: we have called 
this limited version of the theory “pure semantic originalism.”  At this point the article pivots, 
and makes claims about the legal and moral significance of the clause meaning of the 
Constitution.  But before advancing those claims, one point needs to be made absolutely clear: 
the claims about meaning stand on their own.  The fixation thesis and the clause-meaning thesis 
have content that is independent of their normative implications.  If these theses are true, then 
legal and normative theories of the Constitution must take them into account. 
This Part of “Semantic Originalism” will make arguments that are sketchy and 
programmatic—especially when compared to the deeper, more fully articulated, and elaborate 
arguments of Part III.  The point of this essay is not to offer a comprehensive normative theory 
of constitutional practice.  Indeed, the main point of the essay is mark clearly the distinction 
between theories of semantic content and normative theories of constitutional practice.  The 
normative claims offered here are based on the weakest (in the sense of “least controversial”) 
premises necessary to establish the minimum legal and moral significance of Semantic 
Originalism.  That is, my aim is to establish a floor and not a ceiling for the normative 
implications of normative originalism. 
A. The Possible Relationships between Semantic and Normative Originalism 
The first step is a brief survey of the conceptual space.  What are the possible relationships 
between law, morality, and pure semantic originalism?348  One possibility is that is that pure 
semantic originalism has no legal or normative significance.  This would be true, for example, if 
our theories of law denied the contribution thesis entirely: if the semantic content of the 
Constitution is a legal dead letter and makes no contribution to the law of any kind, then it would 
be unlikely that its semantic content would have significance for political morality.  The 
semantic content would be a mere historical curiosity. 
Even if the semantic content of the Constitution does have legal significance, it is at least 
conceivable that it has no moral significance.  Some philosophical anarchists may believe that 
law in general lacks normative force.  Some comprehensive moral doctrines might reach the 
conclusion that our moral obligations always trump our legal obligations and that law has no 
effect on our moral obligations.  Some theories of political morality may reach the conclusion 
that when a constitutional order fails to satisfy criteria of minimal justice, then the conditions for 
an obligation of fidelity to law fail: and it is possible that a case could be made that these criteria 
are not satisfied in the case of the United States in the early twenty-first century. 
But it is also possible that the semantic content of the constitution has both legal and 
normative significance.  Consider legal significance first.  The contribution thesis expresses the 
idea that the semantic content is a source of law, but that idea can be interpreted in several ways.  
The extreme version is that the semantic content fully determines constitutional law, but that 
claim is radically implausible.  The moderate version of thesis is that the semantic content does 
                                                





provide rules of law, but that these rules can be supplemented and modified under limited 
circumstances.  The weak version holds that the semantic content makes only indirect 
contributions, with the content of the constitutional law primarily determined by something 
else—such as the decisions of judges or the requirements of political morality. 
What about normative significance?  Even if the moderate version of the contribution thesis is 
correct, there remains the question whether the legal contribution of the Constitution’s semantic 
content is morally significant.  Here the conceptual space is wide open—ranging from 
philosophical anarchism, which denies that the law creates any duties, to the most rigorous 
deontological duty of absolute obedience to the commands of any effective legal authority.  The 
fidelity thesis that is incorporated in Semantic Originalism asserts that there is at least a 
defeasible obligation for citizens and officials to respect the law in general and the Constitution 
in particular. 
 
* * * 
 
At this point, the most important work of “Semantic Originalism” has been accomplished.  
That work could aptly be described as reconfiguration of argumentative space.  Once pure 
semantic originalism is on the table and the distinction between interpretation and construction 
put by its side, then a transformation of the debate over originalism become possible.  
Originalists can begin to see that their normative arguments must be about contribution or 
fidelity (or some other normative issue).  Likewise, antioriginalists can begin to see that the true 
substance of their objections to originalism are not about originalism as a theory of linguistic 
meaning or semantic content; their true objections are about the relationship of semantic content 
to legal content or about the political morality of constitutional practice. 
As I was writing “Semantic Originalism,” it occurred to me that the argument might be 
clearer if I were to stop at this point, and take no stand on the legal or moral implications of 
pure semantic originalism.  The Article continues for two reasons.  First, I believe that the 
contribution thesis and the fidelity thesis are supported by good and sufficient reasons.  Second, 
I believe that discussing the normative implications of Semantic Originalism will illuminate 
rather than obscure the originalism debate.  But I could be wrong about that! 
 
* * * 
B. The Standard Normative Arguments for Originalism 
Although the account offered within Semantic Originalism focuses on the conjunction of the 
contribution thesis and the fidelity thesis, Semantic Originalism opens a new perspective on 
familiar arguments for originalism. 
1. Popular Sovereignty 
The most common justification for originalism is rooted in the ideas of popular sovereignty 
and democratic legitimacy.  In the legal academy, this theory focuses on the idea that “We the 
People” are the authors of the Constitution, because its central provisions, the Constitution of 
1789 and the Reconstruction Amendments were the result of constitutional politics—periods of 
extraordinary mobilization where popular attention was focused and the formal ratification 





reflected the popular will.  If these facts are combined with dualism—the view that ordinary 
politics (including the elections for Congress and the Presidency) does not reflect the will of “We 
the People,” a case is made that the constitutional text has democratic legitimacy that is not 
shared by ordinary legislation or routine executive action.  The arguments for and against 
popular sovereignty theory are legion and the central claims well know: the will not be rehearsed 
on this occasion. 
How does popular sovereignty interact with Semantic Originalism?  In particular, can a case 
be made that popular sovereignty theory provides normative grounds for treating the semantic 
content as law or for the recognition of fidelity to constitutional law as an obligation of political 
morality?  Notice that from the perspective of Semantic Originalism the question is not “Does 
popular sovereignty theory give us normative reasons to attribute the original public meaning to 
the constitutional text?”  That question involves a category mistake: semantic content is not 
conferred on texts by normative arguments.  So from the point of view of Semantic Originalism, 
the questions are whether there are normative reasons to treat the original public meaning as law 
or to treat the legal content contributed by the semantic content as the object of fidelity. 
Consider the first question: does popular sovereignty theory give us a normative reason to 
treat the semantic content of the Constitution as law?  It is not clear that this question is fully 
coherent.  Eliding the differences between various forms of legal positivism, most contemporary 
positivist theories of the nature of law do not admit the possibility of moral “rules of 
recognition.”  If legal content must be determined by sources, social facts, or social rules, then 
normative popular sovereignty theory is the wrong place to look for warrants that confer legal 
status on norms. 
Of course, popular sovereignty theory has as in its name the word “sovereignty” and 
sovereign-command theory is a form of legal positivism.  Could it be the case that command by 
the popular sovereign is criterial for legal validity?  Deep waters await anyone who would 
attempt to cross that ocean of argument, but on its choppy surface, waves of objection present 
themselves.  The move to popular sovereignty deprives sovereign-command theories of their 
already meager resources: how do we identify the commands of the popular sovereign absented 
conventions that determine what constitutes a popular command? 
If popular sovereignty theory is not a promising source of warrants for the contribution thesis, 
might it be more promising as the basis for obligations of fidelity to law?  We have now arrived 
at the well worn debate over the relationship between democratic legitimacy and the obligation 
to obey the law.  Huge clusters of complex argument contend.  The bones of contention are 
familiar.  “Democratic law binds for reasons of fairness” is met by observations about lack of 
consent, lack of ability to withhold consent given the lack of exit options, dead hand problems, 
and a host of others. 
Assuming that a normative case for fidelity to law can be grounded in democratic legitimacy 
or popular sovereignty, is Semantic Originalism consistent with that grounding?  Because 
constitutional law is fundamental and because Semantic Originalism identifies the content of 
constitutional law with public meanings, it seems reasonable to argue that Semantic Originalism 
is consistent with democratic justification for fidelity to law. 
2. The Rule of Law 
A second familiar justification for originalism is based on the great value of the rule of law 





of Semantic Originalism is that it offers a conceptually satisfying grounding and formulation of 
the argument that adherence to original meaning facilitates the rule of law values. 
We can begin by trying to imagine how the rule of law argument if we were to try to justify 
what might be called nonsemantic originalism on rule of law grounds.  Nonsemantic originalism 
is a very unusual theory.349  It does not make the claim that the semantic content of the 
constitution is, as a matter of fact, the original meaning.  (For the very limited purposes of this 
argument, it does not matter whether we are discussion original public meaning nonsemantic 
originalism or original intentions nonsemantic originalism.)  Nonsemantic originalism claims 
that for normative reasons we should deem that the legally effective meaning of the 
constitutional text is the original meaning—although in fact that is false.  For nonsemantic 
originalism, the assignment of meaning is a matter of choice.  The Constitution’s meaning is 
constructed out of the marks (the constitutional typography) by rules of quasi-interpretation 
(where quasi-interpretation is the name for the assignment of meanings to a text as a matter of 
normatively guided choice and not as an attempt to discover the true meaning). 
How might we argue for nonsemantic originalism on the basis of the rule of law?  The 
argument would have to be that nonsemantic originalism would yield greater predictability, 
certainty, and stability than alternatives methods of quasi-interpretation.  To make this argument 
nonsemantic originalist rules of quasi-interpretation would have to be compared with alternatives 
methods of quasi-interpretation.  We can imagine, for example, that there could be (i) the 
common-law method of quasi-interpretation, (ii) contemporary meanings quasi-interpretation, 
(iii) Supreme-Court discretion quasi-interpretation, and so forth.  When we do the comparison, it 
may be the case that nonsemantic originalism would produce greater predictability, certainty, and 
stability than its rivals, but I do not see any a priori guarantees of this conclusion.  What if 
original meaning is relatively more difficult to determine than are contemporary meanings, with 
the consequence that contemporary meanings are more predictable?  What if the common-law 
method actually makes the system of law more stable, because it requires gradual doctrinal 
evolution and general doctrinal coherence and thus avoids the disruptive potential that a newly 
discovered or long forgotten original meaning can create for originalists. 
Here is another way of getting at the same point.  Nonsemantic originalism is vulnerable to 
Mitch Berman’s criticism of the rule of law argument: 
Even granting arguendo that some of the values that flesh out the rule of law ideal – 
predictability, stability, publicity, prospectivity, procedural regularity, principled 
adjudication, and the like – are better promoted by judicial adherence to the original 
meaning, that does not entail that an interpretive posture of, say, moderate originalism is 
inconsistent with the rule of law. Consider by analogy that, although many theorists have 
contended over the years that statutory law promotes this congeries of values better than 
common law does, very few would conclude that a commitment to the rule of law thereby 
forecloses common law adjudication.350 
Berman’s argument is premised on the notion that we can choose among methods of 
interpretation on the basis of all-things-considered normative reasoning.  This makes the rule of 
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law values just a list of factors to be weighed against all the other relevant factors in the overall 
balance of reasons.  Once we have adopted this picture of the evaluation process, the case for 
nonsemantic originalism on the basis of the rule of law is necessarily incomplete without 
consideration of the countervailing advantages of competing methods and the possibility that 
there are alternatives that are “good enough” on the rule of law measure, but much better when 
evaluated on other criteria. 
In sum, it is possible that nonsemantic originalism could be justified on the basis for the rule 
of law values: I see no a priori reasons for believing that the case could not be made.  But 
making the case would require consideration of all the alternatives and all of the other factors 
that would go into making an all-things-considered judgment. 
How does this compare with the case for Semantic Originalism?  At this stage in the 
argument, it should be clear that the component ideas that constitute Semantic Originalism 
cannot given the same kind of normative foundations that nonsemantic originalism seeks.  The 
fixation thesis and the clause-meaning thesis are factual claims about semantic content.  
Normative arguments cannot justify such claims.  So the rule of law values cannot justify 
Semantic Originalism as a theory of constitutional interpretation—where interpretation (as 
opposed to quasi-interpretation) is understood as the activity that seeks the truth about semantic 
content. 
If the rule of law values come into the case for Semantic Originalism as a theory of meaning, 
law, and political morality, the point of entry must be as a warrant or support for some version of 
the contribution thesis or the fidelity thesis.  Each of these possibilities can be examined in turn. 
The contribution thesis asserts that the semantic content of the constitution contributes to the 
content of the law.  The moderate version of the thesis suggests that the semantic content of the 
constitution provides rules of constitutional law, absent some special countervailing 
consideration.  Could the rule of law argument provide support for the contribution thesis?  The 
standard positivist story suggests a negative answer to this question.  If we assume that rules of 
recognition are social facts, not the conclusion of normative arguments, then arguing for the 
contribution thesis on the basis of a normative argument would involve a category mistake. 
There is another possibility.  One could argue that while the current shape of the rule of 
recognition is a matter of fact, it would be possible to argue for a change in the rule of 
recognition on normative grounds.  That is, one might argue that we should stop recognizing the 
semantic content of the constitution as providing content in the way that the moderate version of 
the contribution thesis specifies, and coordinate on a new rule of recognition.  Some such process 
must be possible; since rules of recognition do change: arguably such a change occurred when 
the Articles of Confederation gave way (through a process that was extralegal under the Articles) 
to the Constitution of 1789. 
One argument against changes in the rule of recognition could be based on the rule of law.  
Let’s stick with the existing rule of recognition.  If we try to change it, we will go through a 
period of legal instability, uncertainty, and unpredictability.  That is an argument from rule of 
law values, and it looks plausible. 
The remaining option is that we could see the rule of law values as arguments for fidelity to 
the law.  Of course, this argument seems almost too easy.  Of course, fidelity to law serves the 
rule of law: how could it not?  The alternative to fidelity to law is infidelity.  With general 
fidelity to law, the law can do its work of producing predictable, certain, and stable rules that 





What role does the semantic content of the Constitution as specified by the fixation thesis and 
the clause-meaning thesis play in this story?  The fixation thesis specifies that the semantic 
content of constitutional provisions is fixed at the time of framing and adoption.  This entails that 
the semantic content never changes, but not that legal force never changes.  The legal force of a 
given provision can be changed through amendments that repeal or supersede the provision.  
Moreover, the rule of recognition and the power conferring provisions of the Constitution may 
under some circumstances render the semantic content inoperable in other ways.  For example, 
Supreme Court decisions that are legally incorrect (because they misinterpret or ignore semantic 
content) may nonetheless be binding on lower courts.  The fact that semantic content is, as a 
matter of fact, fixed, when combined with the fact that the semantic content contributes to legal 
meaning explains why fidelity to law serves the rule of law values of predictability, certainty, 
and stability. 
To see why this is the case, let us consider a possible world in which the Constitution of 1789 
was replaced by a Magic Eight Ball.  Imagine a particularly large Magic Eight Ball.  On each 
facet of the icosahedron contained in the giant Magic Eight Ball is a complete constitutional 
code.  On one facet is a constitution that institutes parliamentary democracy.  On another facet is 
the Constitution of 1789.  On a third facet is found a constitution that resembles the current 
constitution of Canada, but with United States substituted for Canada, the states substituted for 
the provinces, and Texas substituted for Quebec.  The remaining facets have other constitutions.  
Printed on the outer shell of the Magic Eight Ball is the instruction: 
Supreme Court, shake me and apply the constitution that appears in 
order to resolve cases with constitutional questions that come to you! 
Let us suppose that the content of each of the constitutions were drafted and that 
the Magic Eight Ball itself was ratified under conditions such that the semantic 
content of each facet of the Magic Eight Ball is the original public meaning of 
the text.  Original public meaning originalism would not produce the rule of law values of 
certainty, predictability, and stability.  The whole constitutional regime would change each time 
the Supreme Court decided a case, producing uncertainty, unpredictability, and instability. 
Now imagine that someone proposes a modification to the Magic Eight Ball.  The current 
facet of the Magic Eight Ball is attached to the window by superglue.  Now, when the Supreme 
Court shakes the dodecahedron does not move, and the semantic content of the Constitution 
remains fixed.  As a result of the superglue, Supreme Court decisions no longer produce 
uncertainty, unpredictability, and instability.  The superglue fixes the semantic content and the 
fact of fixation plus acceptance of the moderate version of the contribution thesis and affirmation 
by a critical mass of officials and citizens of the fidelity thesis produce the rule of law. 
We are lucky.  In the actual world, we have one Constitution of the United States of 
American.  That fact plus the facts about the world identified by the fixation thesis and the 
clause-meaning thesis entail the further conclusion that the moderate version of the contribution 
thesis when combined with fidelity to law will produce the rule of law values of certainty, 
predictability, and stability.  General acceptance of Semantic Originalism works like superglue. 
But what about the alternatives?  In particular, what about a variation of “interpretive 
pluralism”  that recommends that different methods of constitutional interpretation (or quasi-
interpretation) should be used to resolve different cases?  This version of interpretive pluralism 
allows us to take a constitution with fixed semantic content, and make that content indeterminate.  
Imagine a second possible world.  Like the first possible world, there is a Magic Eight Ball.  This 





time the Constitution of the United States is printed on the outside of the Magic Eight Ball, plus 
one more sentence: 
Supreme Court, shake me each time you decide a case and interpret this Constitution 
using the methodology that appears in the window! 
Each of the twenty facets of the icosahedron contains one of the various interpretive (or quasi-
interpretive) methods that constitute interpretive pluralism.  One facet reads: Use the text.  
Another facet reads: consult framers intent.  A third facet reads: consult contemporary meanings.  
A fourth face reads: use contemporary values.  A fifth facet reads: consult moral reality.  A sixth 
facet reads: vote your political preference.  A seventh facet reads: maximize social welfare.  An 
eighth facet reads: follow precedent.  A ninth facet reads: defer to the political branches.  Some 
of the facets direct interpretation using a complex combination of the individual methods. 
By itself, the text of the Constitution would have fixed semantic content.  But with the 
addition of the Magic Eight Ball, this is no longer the case.  Depending on which of the plurality 
of interpretive methods appears in the window, the same provisions of the Constitution could 
have different legal content in different cases.  If we really wanted to mix things up, we could 
have each Justice of the Supreme Court shake the Magic Eight Ball in each case.  In some cases, 
this will produce a majority opinion.  In others we might get a complex structure with pluralities, 
concurrences, concurring and dissenting opinions, and, with luck, more than one pure dissent, 
each opinion with its own method of interpretation (or quasi-interpretation). 
Of course, at this point the defender of this version of interpretive pluralism will surely object: 
interpretive pluralism will not be as unpredictable as the Magic Eight Ball.  The deployment of 
different methods will be sensitive to context, to the values of the justices, to the possible 
reactions of the political branches, and so forth; these factors will constrain interpretive 
pluralism.  But this objection must be accompanied by a concession.  No one who defends 
interpretive pluralism can affirm the proposition that the semantic content of the constitution is 
fixed.  The whole point of interpretive pluralism is to unfix the content.   Interpretive pluralism 
would not be utterly random—that much must be conceded to the defenders of interpretive 
pluralism.  But one thing we know for certain: interpretive pluralism doesn’t work like 
superglue. 
3. Writtenness 
A third standard argument for originalism focuses on the fact that the constitution is a written 
text.  Randy Barnett’s monograph, Restoring the Lost Constitution, presents one version of this 
argument.351 Barnett begins with an analogy to contract law that serves to identify the functions 
served by a written (as opposed to unwritten) constitution: (1) a written constitution provides 
evidence of what terms were actually enacted in the event of later dispute, (2) written provisions 
induce deliberation and caution in the process of constitutional amendment, and (3) formal 
processes of written amendment facilitate the amendment process by providing those who seek 
amendments with a clear set of expectations about what consequences their actions will 
produce.352, and (4) “constitutions are put in writing to better constrain the political actors that 
[the constitution] empowers.”353  Originalism serves this fourth function: “in the constitutional 
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sphere, writtenness ceases to perform its function of constraining political actors if meaning can 
be changed by these actors in the absence of an equally written modification or amendment 
whose ratification is outside their power.”354 
Why the original meaning? 
With a constitution, as with a contract, we look to the meaning established at the time of 
formation and for the same reason: If either a constitution or a contract is reduced to 
writing and executed, where it speaks it establishes or “locks in” a rule of law from that 
moment forward.  Adopting any meaning contrary to the original meaning would be to 
contradict or change the meaning of the text and thereby to undermine the value of 
writtenness itself.  Writtenness ceases to perform its function if meaning can be changed in 
the absence of an equally written modification or amendment.355 
How does Barnett’s argument from writtenness relate to Semantic Originalism?  The notion of 
“lock in” is related to the fixation thesis which asserts that semantic content is fixed at the time 
of constitutional utterance.  But Barnett is presenting the argument without a clear distinction 
between semantic and normative originalism.  When Barnett says “[a]dopting any meaning 
contrary to the original meaning would be to contradict or change the meaning of the text and 
thereby to undermine the value of the writtenness itself” he alternates between semantic and 
normative claims.  One the one hand, “change the meaning of the text” seems to assume that “the 
meaning of the text” just is its semantic content—a semantic claim.  On the other hand, phrases 
like “[a]dopting any meaning” and “value of writtenness” suggest that we make a normatively 
guided choice about what texts mean—a normative claim.  Semantic Originalism sorts out the 
precise claim being made. 
Semantic Originalism also clarifies the role that writtenness plays in fixing semantic content.  
Imagine a possible world in which the Constitution (and all other legal texts) were oral rather 
than written.  We can imagine that certain individuals in this culture specialize in the 
memorization of important texts: this would be analogous the oral transmission of Icelandic 
sagas or Homeric poetry.  The fact that the Constitution was transmitted orally rather than in 
writing would not change the fact that the semantic content: oral recitation in this case would be 
“quotation” of the original, just as printing a new copy of a written Constitution is “quotation.”  
The semantic content of the Constitution would not be changed by the fact of oral transmission.  
Of course, in the actual world oral transmission is likely to lead to the introduction of errors—
just as the copying of manuscripts by hand can lead to such introduction.  But in the case of 
written texts, errors can be corrected by comparison of copies.  In the case of orally transmitted 
texts, this is more difficult and it becomes impossible when the bearer of one copy (a human 
being) dies or becomes incapacitated.  Writtenness thus facilitates the stability of the text, but it 
does not, by itself, create fixation. 
This concludes our brief survey of normative justifications for originalism.  The point of the 
survey was not to make the case for originalism.  Rather, the point of the survey is to illuminate 
the ways in which these justifications interact with Semantic Originalism.  The thin normative 
component of Semantic Originalism is found in the contribution thesis and the fidelity thesis to 
which we now turn. 
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C. The Contribution Thesis Revisited 
The contribution thesis asserts that the semantic content of the Constitution (identified by 
fixation and clause meaning) makes some contribution to constitutional law.  Recall the 
distinction between three versions of the contribution thesis: 
• The extreme version asserts that a rule is a rule of constitutional law if and only if the 
content of the rule is identical to the semantic content of some provisions of the 
Constitution. 
• The moderate version asserts that if the content of a rule is identical to the semantic 
content of a constitutional provision, then the rule is a rule of constitutional law, 
unless some exception applies, but it does not assert that this is the only source of 
constitutional law.   
• The weak version asserts that the semantic content of the constitution makes only 
indirect contributions to constitutional law. 
There are undoubtedly other possibilities as well. 
What case can be made for the moderate version of the contribution thesis?  One approach to 
this question would take us deep into the philosophy of law and would require that a particular 
theory of the nature of law be elaborated and defended, but on this occasion we can pursue an 
alternative strategy, sketching overlapping reasons for affirming the moderate version.  The aim 
here is to make the case for the plausibility of the moderate version of the contribution thesis. 
1. The Semantic Content of the Constitution is the Supreme Law of the Law 
The first argument for the moderate version relies on conventional legal argumentation—that 
is, the first argument operates from a point of view that is internal to constitutional practice.  
From that point of view, is it fair to say that the semantic content of the Constitution is viewed as 
law?  The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution asserts that “This Constitution shall be the 
supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby."356  What does 
“this Constitution” refer to?  The use of the indexical article “this” points the reader to the 
Constitution of 1789.  Because the Supremacy Clause asserts that the Constitution of 1789 is 
law, it must be referring to the semantic content of the Constitution.  Bare typography, the set of 
marks without their meaning, cannot provide legal content, but the semantic content of the 
constitution can provide the content of legal rules.  What else could? 
Even if the Constitution of 1789 self-referentially asserts that its semantic content provides 
legal content, that fact does not entail that this assertion is correct.  It could be the case that 
agents engaged in constitutional practice (judges, officials, and citizens) do not regard the 
semantic content of the Constitution as the source of legal content.  That is, the Supremacy 
Clause could be a “dead letter” (a metaphorical representation of the state whereby a text’s 
semantic content is drained of legal force and becomes mere typographical marks or “dead 
letters”). 
Is the semantic content of the Constitution regarded as a source of legal content by judges, 
officials, and citizens today?  The first and most compelling piece of evidence that the semantic 
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content is a source of legal content comes from the manner that constitutional practice treats 
those provisions of the Constitution that are neither vague nor ambiguous.  The original public 
meaning (or conventional semantic meaning at the time of utterance) of these provisions is 
almost unfailing is treated as the content of the corresponding rules of constitutional law.  Each 
state has two senators—no state no matter how populous has more than two.  There is one and 
only one President.  Statutes are not entered into the United States Code unless the formal 
requirements of bicameralism and presentment are satisfied.  The Electoral College continues to 
meet despite the general feeling that it is utterly lacking in justification and the now obvious fact 
that its institutional structure can determine the outcome of a close election.  The Senate 
continues to tolerate the tie-breaking role of the Vice-President and to allow him to preside when 
he so chooses, although informal pressures discourage him from exercising the latter power on a 
regular basis. 
No one argues that we have a living constitution that allows us to dispense with these 
normatively unattractive features of our constitutional practice.  Even Arnold Schwarzenegger 
would not authorize an action for an injunction terminating equal suffrage of California and 
Wyoming in the Senate.  The unambiguous bright-line provisions of the Constitution provide 
rules of constitutional law that reflect their semantic content which is, as a matter of fact, their 
conventional semantic meaning at the time of constitutional utterance. 
But aren’t these examples trivial?  Not for the purpose for which they are proffered within the 
confines of this argument.  Here we are seeking to establish that the semantic content of the 
Constitution contributes to the content of the law in the way specified by the conjunction of the 
fixation thesis, the clause-meaning thesis, and the moderate version of the contribution thesis.  If 
the constitutional provisions that are neither vague nor ambiguous fix constitutional practice, this 
creates a prima facie case that the assertion made by the moderate version is true. 
But once again, this is not the end of the matter.  If the only provisions that contribute 
constitutional law were the provisions that are neither vague nor ambiguous, then the moderate 
version of the contribution thesis would be false, and some milder version would need to be 
substituted. 
2. Consistency of Constitutional Practice with the Moderate Version of the Contribution 
Thesis 
Is Semantic Originalism consistent with current constitutional practice with respect to those 
Constitutional provisions that are either vague or ambiguous?  To answer this question, we need 
an account of consistency.  As is usually the case in constitutional theory, the requirements of the 
theory are two dimensional.  For a given constitutional practice, for example an action by the 
Senate or a Supreme Court decision to be fully consistent with the semantic content of the 
Constitution, the outcome must actually be consistent with the semantic content and reason for 
the action must be fairly traceable to the legal contribution of the content. 
This point about tracing is important and it points two different ways in which the semantic 
content could shape outcomes.  The first and most obvious way is that the agent engaging in a 
given constitutional practice could engage in deliberation that incorporates the original meaning.  
But there is a second, less obvious, and more pervasive way that semantic content shapes 
meaning: constitutional issues are frequently resolved at one point in time, T1 on the basis of 
deliberation that incorporates the semantic content of the text as a reason for action.  This 
resolution then may become settled practice, such that a constitutional actor at a subsequent point 





in time, T2, follows the settle practice without deliberating at all or by deliberating about the 
practice itself without explicit consideration of the semantic content of the text.  These settled 
practices may themselves be embodied in subordinate legal rules—precedents, statutes, rules of 
procedure, etc., or they may simply be customs.  A decision that is made on the basis of a settled 
practice that connects in the right way to the original meaning is fairly traceable to the semantic 
content, and such a decision is fully consistent with the moderate version of the contribution 
thesis. 
In the cases in which the agent engaged in constitutional practice deliberates, the requirement 
is that the deliberation incorporates the original meaning.  Deliberation is rarely fully explicit.  In 
unusual cases, the constitutional agent might actually deliberate on the basis of an explicit theory 
of original meaning.  But explicit articulation of a theory is not required for full consistency.  
The theory offered here suggests that competent language users have an intuitive grasp of the 
ideas of conventional semantic meaning, context, implicature, and the division of linguistic 
labor.  They act on the basis of these ideas when they read and write ordinary nonlegal texts.  
Given this intuitive grasp, the normal case of full consistency will involve unconscious 
adherence to the fixation thesis and the clause-meaning thesis.  Conscious resort to these theories 
should occur only when things are not going in the usual way and the semantic content has been 
problematized.  In the legal context, this can occur because an adversary system is likely to result 
in attempts by lawyers to convince judges to ignore or contradict meanings that are unfavorable 
to the interests of the lawyer’s client.  All that is required for full consistency (in the case of 
deliberation, as opposed to the case of historical practice discussed in the prior paragraph) is that 
the agent engaged in constitutional practice incorporate the semantic content explicitly or tacitly, 
and then reach a decision that comports with the semantic content. 
Full consistency can be contrasted with partial consistency and total inconsistency.  Partial 
consistency can occur in a variety of ways.  One form of partial inconsistency occurs when an 
agent engaged in constitutional practice engages in deliberation aims at fidelity to the original 
meaning of the text, but the agent misunderstands the text.  Misunderstanding can occur for a 
variety of reasons.  The text may be ambiguous, and the agent may assume without adequate 
deliberation that one sense provides the semantic content, when consideration of the publicly 
available context of constitutional utterance would have lead the agent to reach the opposite 
conclusion.  The agent may simply be mistaken about the meaning of a term.  For language to 
work, most agents must get most meanings most of the time, but this is fully consistent with the 
fact that almost all speakers will have false beliefs about the meanings of some words.  Some of 
the language in the constitution is archaic, and the agent could simply make an erroneous guess 
about the original meaning.  This sort of partial inconsistency does not undermine the moderate 
version of the contribution thesis.  Legal rules can be misunderstood, but that fact doesn’t entail 
that they aren’t legal rules. 
Another form of partial inconsistency occurs when an agent engaged in constitutional practice 
acts in a way that is consistent with the semantic content of the text, but does so on the basis of 
reasons that display indifference or hostility to original meaning.  This form of inconsistency is 
more troubling from the point of view of the moderate contribution thesis: indifference or 
hostility to the semantic content is an indication that the agent has not internalized the 
requirements of the contribution, at least in the particular case, but the extent of the trouble will 
depend on context. 
For example, given the complex power-conferring rules that constitute define the authority of 





decisions of the Supreme Court on constitutional question: such rules include the institution of 
judicial review and doctrine of vertical stare decisis.  For this reason, focus by these actors on 
Supreme Court decisions (as opposed to the semantic content of the constitutional text) may not 
be evidence that the subordinate agent is truly indifferent to the semantic content of the text.  
Such agents might, if asked about their seeming indifference, reply: “I’m legally obligated by the 
Supreme Court precedent, but if the Supreme Court disregarded the semantic content of the text 
when it set the precedent, then that precedent is incorrect as a matter of law.”  On the other hand, 
the agent might say, “I’m legally obligated by the Supreme Court precedent, and the Supreme 
Court has fully legal authority to disregard the semantic content of the Constitution and create 
rules of constitutional law that directly contravene that content.  There is no such thing as a legal 
mistake when it comes to Supreme Court constitutional decisions.”  Such fully explicit 
articulations are rare, and explicit disavowals of the moderate version of the contribution thesis 
are very rare indeed. 
Finally, there is the case of full inconsistency—paradigmatically a decision of the Supreme 
Court that explicitly acknowledges that the outcome is inconsistent with semantic content of the 
Constitution in a context where that inconsistency is not required by some constitutionally 
sanctioned power-conferring rule (such as textual commitment of an issue to a coordinate branch 
of government). 
Remember that Semantic Originalism acknowledges that the semantic content of the 
Constitution underdetermines outcomes in a wide range of particular cases, so there will be a 
variety of circumstances in which a range of outcomes is consistent with the semantic content of 
the Constitution.  In such cases, the outcome depends on construction and not interpretation.  
Constructions of vague provisions that operate within the zone of underdetermination are not 
examples of full inconsistency—even if the opinions of the justices are confused about the line 
between interpretation and construction, and even if the reasoning of the opinion mistakenly 
identifies semantic content, by identifying original meaning with framer’s intent or original 
expected applications. 
If constitutional practice is pervasively characterized by full inconsistency, then the case for 
the moderate version of the contribution thesis would face a very substantial obstacle.  If a 
pattern of fully inconsistent decisions triggered persistent criticism from outside the Supreme 
Court, such that the best characterization was something like, “The legal culture agrees that this 
pattern of Supreme Court decisions (that willfully disregard the original meaning to reach 
outcomes) is lawless and the decisions are legally incorrect, the moderate version of the 
contribution thesis might be saved. 
This abstract discussion can be made more concrete by schematic discussion of some 
examples.  My aim is not to convince by offering detailed exegesis.  Instead, the idea is to 
illustrate the view by simply stating its possible and plausible implications: 
• The Supreme Court applied the first amendment freedom of the press as a limit on 
judicial power in New York Times v. Sullivan,357 but the text says “Congress shall 
make no law . . .”  This is an example of partial inconsistency.  The original meaning 
relevant to this case is located in the privileges or immunities clause of the 14th 
Amendment and this case would be located in the zone of underdeterminacy.  The 
partial inconsistency stems from the Slaughterhouse Cases358 and the Court’s 
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incorporation doctrine which is inconsistent with the text of the due process clause of 
the 14th, but which had been entrenched by precedent. 
• The Supreme Court applied equal protection clause doctrine to the District of 
Columbia in Bolling v. Sharpe359 via the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.  
This is an example of partial inconsistency.  The original meaning that might have 
justified the outcome in Bolling v. Sharpe results from the implication in the Ninth 
Amendment that fundamental natural rights are retained by the people.  The content of 
such rights is vague or ambiguous, so this case requires constitutional construction. 
• The Supreme Court upheld the application of the Controlled Substances Act to 
intrastate, home-grown, marijuana in Gonzales v. Raich,360 despite the limitation of 
Congress’s power to commerce among the several states.  This may not even be an 
example of partial inconsistency, because the court’s foundational rationale relies on 
the necessary and proper clause and a theory of deference to the legislative power of 
Congress, involving abstract and general provisions, the vagueness of which creates a 
substantial zone of underdetermination. 
The point of these highly schematized and incompletely explicated examples is to illustrate the 
paucity of evidence that points to clear cut cases of full inconsistency.  When this fact is 
combined with the very substantial evidence of large zones of full consistency, the pattern of 
evidence suggests strong support for the moderate version of the contribution thesis. 
This same point can be made more plainly.  “Originalism” may have been hugely 
controversial, but much of the controversy was motivated by crude versions of originalism in the 
academy or nonacademic use and misuse of “originalism” in ideological and political struggles.  
But the idea that the meaning (semantic content) of the constitution contributes in an important 
way to the content of constitutional law—that’s not controversial among judges, officials, and 
lawyers.  It takes a fancy theory or politically motivated resistance to get an argument going that 
seriously challenges the contribution thesis. 
Constitutional practice is based on the premise that the semantic content of the constitution 
constrains constitutional law.  When courts ignore the original meaning or get it wrong, they 
make legal mistakes.  The Supreme Court’s decisions may be final, but hardly anyone believes in 
what we might call the Doctrine of Supreme Inerrancy.  But even those who believe in the 
inerrancy of the United States Reports, are likely to recoil at the logical implication of their 
positions—that decisions of the United States Supreme Court cannot be overruled by 
constitutional amendment.  Does anyone really think the Supreme Court would have been legally 
correct to declare the Eleventh Amendment null and void on the ground that it was directly 
contrary to a Supreme Court decision?  Whatever else the Eleventh Amendment did, it surely 
overturned the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm v. Georgia.361  Were the Supreme Court to 
assert a power to ignore constitutional amendments, this assertion would be incorrect as a matter 
of law. 
One final point of clarification.  The moderate version of the contribution thesis does not 
entail the claim that the Supreme Court (or other institutions and officials, including lower court 
judges and officials in the political branches) have no power to adopt supplementary rules of 
constitutional law that are inconsistent with the semantic content of the Constitution.  The claim 
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made here is that there is no power of wholesale revisions.  That claim is consistent with the 
possibility that there are limited and exceptional circumstances in which a departure from the 
semantic content might be required—for example, where a mending construction is required to 
prevent a tear in the constitutional fabric.  (Such a mending construction might be required to 
permit continuity in the case of a catastrophic event that deprived Congress of the ability to 
continue effective functioning, or a plague that resulted in the death or incapacity of every person 
who met the requirement that the President be at least age 35.)  Nor does the moderate version of 
the contribution thesis require the immediate correction of all constitutional mistakes: a variety 
of supplementary constitutional transition rules (including rules of stare decisis) might allow for 
the gradual correction of constitutional errors over an extended period of time when immediate 
correction would disrupt settled expectations and undermine the rule of law.  In “Semantic 
Originalism,” I do not offer a full account of mending constructions or other circumstances in 
which constitutional practice authorizes temporary (or even permanent) deviation from the 
semantic content of the Constitution. 
3. Semantic Content and Legal Positivism 
Thus far the argument for the moderate contribution thesis has been stated from within the 
conventions of legal practice.  In other words, the argument has been a lawyer’s argument.  The 
next stage in the argument steps outside of the conventions of legal argument and enters the 
arena of analytic legal philosophy. 
a) Stating the Positivist Case for the Contribution Thesis 
So far, the argument for the contribution thesis has been advanced without deploying the 
technical machinery of analytic legal positivism.  In this section, I will provide a brief 
description of the relationship between the contribution thesis and positivist accounts of the 
nature of law.  Legal positivism comes in many flavors—Hartian, Razian, Colemanical, and 
Shapiroesque, inclusive and exclusive, and so forth.  The story told here will be simple and 
perhaps simplistic and it will proceed in two stages.  The first stage will use Hart’s idea of a rule 
of recognition;362 the second stage will view legal positivism as a distinctive claim about the 
relationship between moral facts and legal content. 
If John Austin’s legal positivism asserted that the criteria for legality were provided by the 
notion of a sovereign command backed by the threat of punishment, Hart thought the defects in 
Austin’s view could be remedies by the idea of a rule of recognition—a social rule that identifies 
the criteria for legality in a given society.363  Does the rule of recognition for the United States 
confer legality on the semantic content of the United States Constitution?364  There is many a slip 
between the cup and the lip, and many mistakes that could be made in articulating the rule of 
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recognition for the United States.  But whatever formulation of the rule we might ultimately 
adopt, it seems unlikely that a plausible version would deny legal status to the content of the 
Constitution.365  Indeed, consistency the content of the Constitution might be thought to supply or 
be a component of the rule of recognition itself.  Hart wrote, the “criteria provided by the rule of 
recognition . . . may . . . be substantive constraints on the content of legislation such as the 
Sixteenth or Nineteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution respecting the 
establishment of religion or abridgements of the right to vote.”366  Brian Leiter writes that a “rule 
is a valid rule of law in the United States if it has been duly enacted by a federal or state 
legislature and it is not inconsistent with the federal constitution.”367  We do not need to endorse 
these very strong views of the relationship of the Constitution to the rule of recognition in order 
to find support for the moderate contribution thesis.  The essential point is that any plausible 
candidate for the rule of recognition will lend support to something approximating the moderate 
version of the contribution thesis. 
Another way to approach legal positivism is via an understanding of the relationship between 
moral facts and legal content.  Natural lawyers might be understood as asserting that it is 
necessarily the case that moral facts contribute to legal content.  Exclusive legal positivists could 
be understood as making the claim that it is necessarily the case that only social facts can 
contribute to legal content, and hence that it is not possible that moral facts contribute.  Inclusive 
legal positivists would then claim that it is possibly but not necessarily the case that moral facts 
determine legal content—moral facts can be incorporated into legal content, but only in virtue of 
some social fact about them. 
Both exclusive and inclusive legal positivists agree that social facts determine legal content.  
So if the social facts that determine legal content do so via the semantic content of the 
Constitution, then the contribution thesis is correct.  But if the social facts that determine legal 
content cut the semantic content of the Constitution out of the picture, then the contribution 
thesis is false.  But for a legal positivist, it cannot be the case that moral facts necessarily 
determine moral content.  This means that the question whether the semantic content of the 
Constitution determines legal content cannot be normative “all the way down.”  If the question 
were normative, all the way down, then moral facts would necessarily determine legal content.  
Natural lawyers could embrace this view, but not legal positivists. 
Both exclusive and inclusive legal positivists can embrace the idea that the contribution thesis 
might not hold in a possible world that is close to ours.  For example, we can imagine a possible 
world that shares the history of the actual in which the constitutional text becomes a dead letter 
and the social facts pick out the content of the decisions of the Supreme Court as the facts that 
fix the content of constitutional law.  In other words, the contribution thesis is nothing remotely 
like a necessary truth: it would be false in possible worlds are very close to the actual world. 
From the perspective of contemporary analytic legal positivism, the truth or falsity of the 
contribution thesis depends on nonmoral facts: “Just the social facts, ma’am.”  The sorts of facts 
that would be relevant are the same kinds of facts that were discussed in the immediately prior 
subsection—facts about legal practice.368  We have already examined some of the relevant 
evidence and the ways in which it would relate to the positivist case for the moderate version of 
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the contribution thesis: there is strong evidence for that case and very little or no evidence that is 
unambiguously inconsistent with it. 
b) Normativity and the Rule of Recognition 
Deep discussions of the issues raised by the positivist case for the contribution thesis are few 
and far between.  One of the best comes from Richard Fallon’s How to Chose a Constitutional 
Theory.369  Fallon’s argument is complex and I will quote at length: 
Although this chain of reasoning might draw support from an older brand of legal 
positivism that equated law with the “command” of a sovereign (such as the Framers or 
ratifiers), this equation is untenable. As modern positivists such as H.L.A. Hart have 
argued, the foundations of law (including constitutional law) do not lie in sovereign 
commands, but rather in social practices involving the acceptance of authority.  Though 
perhaps obscured in stable legal systems, the crucial role of acceptance becomes manifest 
in cases of what we call “revolution.” The commands of Parliament did not cease to be law 
in the United States because Parliament commanded that its decrees should no longer be 
law here; British enactments ceased to be law because they ceased to be accepted as such 
in the former American colonies.370 
On this score, Fallon is absolutely correct.  The argument for the contribution thesis does not, 
and should not depend on a primitive Austinian theory that law is the command of the sovereign 
backed by the threat of punishment.371  Contemporary analytic positivism relies on “social facts,” 
“social rules,” or ‘social practices,” as Fallon notes in the continuation of his argument, “the 
status of the Constitution as law depends on contemporary practices accepting it as such.”372 
Taking analytic positivisms move to social facts as premise, Fallon makes the next move: 
If the Constitution's status as ultimate law depends on practices of acceptance, then the 
claim that the written Constitution is the only valid source of constitutional norms loses all 
pretense of self-evident validity.  As originalists candidly admit, originalist principles 
cannot explain or justify much of contemporary constitutional law.  Important lines of 
precedent diverge from original understandings.  Judges frequently take other 
considerations into account.  Moreover, the public generally accepts the courts' non-
originalist pronouncements as legitimate—not merely as final, but as properly rendered.373 
This paragraph makes several different moves, and requires a good deal of unpacking.  First, 
Fallon is correct to observe that “self-evident validity” is a red herring: we need a social practice 
that recognizes the semantic content of the Constitution as law, and the text of the Constitution 
itself cannot be that social practice.  The social practice will need to include facts about how 
judges, officials, and possibly citizens treat the Constitution. 
Second, Fallon’s observation that “originalists candidly admit, originalist principles cannot 
explain or justify much of contemporary constitutional law” needs to be contextualized.  Fallon’s 
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footnote cites Raoul Berger and Robert Bork—archetypes of the “Old Originalism.”374  New 
Originalists should not make this concession, and the claim of “Semantic Originalism” is that the 
social facts do support the contribution thesis, as has been argued in detail above.375  The bright-
line unambiguous semantic content does, in fact, provide rules of constitutional law, and the 
inconsistency of doctrine with the semantic content of the text provides a basis for legal criticism 
of the doctrine. 
Third, the point about “legitimacy” is not well supported.  The sources that Fallon cites,376 
Charles Black and H.L.A. Hart, do not assert that that the public accepts nonoriginalist reasoning 
as legitimate, and the most certainly do not assert that there is a rule of recognition that 
authorizes the Court to depart from the semantic content of the Constitution. 
The next passage moves to a different argument: 
In urging that existing judicial practices should be altered, originalists are not pure 
positivists, who insist that the “rule of recognition” prevailing in the United States reflects 
originalist principles.  Rather, originalists, like all other participants in constitutional 
theoretical debates, carry a burden of normative justification. They must attempt to 
establish that the constitutional regime would be a better one--as measured by relevant 
criteria--if constitutional practice were exclusively text-based and if originalist precepts 
were consistently followed. Indeed, as I shall argue below, many originalists implicitly 
acknowledge as much: like proponents of other theories, originalists commonly appeal to 
values associated with the rule of law, political democracy, and individual rights in 
defending their interpretive methodology.377 
The premise of this passage is that originalism does not assert the moderate version of the 
contribution thesis.  While that may have been true of the Old Originalism, it is most certainly 
not true of Semantic Originalism and it need not be true of the New Originalism (which can 
incorporate Semantic Originalism).  Once this now false premise is eliminated, the rest of the 
passage becomes irrelevant.  Semantic Originalism is explicitly not an argument for a change in 
the rule of recognition, and it follows from Fallon’s own premises that Semantic Originalism 
does not bear the normative burden that advocates of a change in the rule of recognition must 
carry. 
4. Objections to the Moderate Contribution Thesis 
How might the moderate contribution thesis be resisted?  Here are some possibilities. 
a) No Contribution Claims 
Are there reasons to believe that the semantic content of the Constitution makes no 
contribution to the content of law?  It is remarkably difficult to motivate claims that the semantic 
content of the constitution makes no contribution to legal content.  To see why, we can return to 
the idea that the claims made by legal positivism can expressed as relationships between the role 
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of social facts and moral facts in determining legal content.378  Both inclusive and exclusive legal 
positivism plus some plausible assumptions about social facts support the moderate version of 
the contribution thesis, but one can imagine making a case using either form of legal positivism 
for the weak thesis as an alternative.  But it is very difficult to see how any form of positivism 
can support claims that the semantic content of the Constitution does not even make an indirect 
contribution to the content of constitutional law.  How would that go? 
What story could be told that has the content of constitutional law determined by social facts, 
with no role of the semantic content of the text?  What could possibly account for the fact that 
constitutional law tracks the semantic content of the Constitution in situations where the content 
is neither vague nor ambiguous?  If the semantic content of the Constitution makes zero 
contribution to the content of constitutional law, then what does account for the fact that the rule 
is that there are two Senators per state? 
These rhetorical questions are urgent.  We can imagine stories where the semantic content 
plays an indirect role (the content of law is directly determined by a convention that fixes 
practice and the semantic content served as a focal point that led to the emergence of the 
convention), but on that story the weak version of the contribution thesis still holds. 
 
* * * 
 
My aim in this Article has been to answer every plausible objection I can imagine.  I just 
cannot imagine any plausible argument for “no contribution” that is consistent with legal 
positivism.  If you think of one, please let me know! 
 
* * * 
 
If legal positivism is inconsistent with no contribution claims, what about antipositivism.  
Recall that antipositivism affirms the claim that it is necessarily the case that moral facts 
determine legal content.  There are two possible variants of antipositivism.  Exclusive 
antipositivism asserts that it is necessarily the case that only moral facts determine legal content.  
Inclusive antipositivism asserts that it is possibly the case that social facts determine legal 
content, but only if moral facts point to the social facts. 
Exclusive antipositivism would be consistent with denial of the contribution thesis.  The 
semantic content of the Constitution is a social fact, and therefore it cannot determine content if 
exclusive antipositivism is true.  The problem is that exclusive antipositivism is radically 
implausible.  Essentially, exclusive antipositivism goes far beyond the natural law thesis, lex 
injusta est non lex (unjust positive laws are not law), and makes the radical claim that there is no 
such thing as positive law and that legal texts play no role at all in determining the content of 
law.  This would seem to imply that none of the legal content that can only be explained (directly 
or indirectly) by the semantic content of legal texts is actually law.  Thus, there is no law 
providing that there are two senators per state, no law that one is to drive on the right hand side 
of the road, and no law that requires that testamentary contracts be in writing.  Most legal 
theorists find lex injusta est non lex implausible, troubling, or at least in need of a defense.  So 
far as I know, no one has ever argued that exclusive antipositivism is even plausible. 
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That brings us to inclusive antipositivism and the arguments for the weak version of the 
contribution thesis as an alternative to the moderate version. 
b) Arguments for Weak Contribution 
How might one argue for the weak version contribution thesis?  Recall that the contribution of 
the semantic content of the Constitution to constitutional law is weak, if and only if the meaning 
of constitutional provisions plays no direct role in providing the content of constitutional law.  
Weak versions of the contribution thesis are based on the idea semantic content plays a role in 
fixing legal content, but that role is direct.  I have already mentioned the view that only judicial 
decisions are sources of law, and provide some further discussion of that theory in a footnote.379 
(1) Greenberg’s Theory of Law 
Mark Greenberg’s theory is a form of inclusive antipositivism which maintains that the 
semantic content of legal texts contributes to legal content by changing the “moral profile”—the 
sum total of moral obligations.  Although it may usually be the case that the obligations that 
result from these changes are consonant with the semantic content, this is not necessarily the 
case.  For example, if the moral profile (taking into account the impact of the Constitution) 
contradicts the semantic content of a given Constitutional provision, then, for Greenberg, that 
provision would not have the force of law.  On Greenberg’s account, the semantic content 
contributes to the content of constitutional law—but that contribution is indirect and defeasible. 
Greenberg offers rich and sophisticated arguments in support of his theory.  Most relevant in 
this context are two claims.  First, Greenberg argues that it when we equate the semantic content 
of a rule with the law, we are speaking loosely.  Statutes and constitutional provisions are 
sources of law, but they are no law itself, Greenberg claims.  This first argument is plausible, but 
it is not quite so powerful as it might first appear.  Consider the following way of phrasing the 
relationship between constitutional meaning and legal content: 
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Yes, it is true that the text of the constitution is a source of constitutional law and not 
the law itself.  That is true for two reasons.  First, the text of the Constitution is the source 
of the semantic content and it is the semantic content of the text and not the text itself that 
provides the content of constitutional law.  Second, the conventional semantic meaning of 
the text underdetermines the content of constitutional law for a variety of reasons, 
including the fact that vague provisions require construction, that some rules of 
constitutional law arise by implicature and that in some cases the clause meaning may be 
overridden by other legal considerations. 
Once the relationship between text and content is put this way, Greenberg’s “loose talk” 
objection loses much or all of its force. 
More substantively, Greenberg argues that the semantic content of the text can be altered or 
superseded in cases where we might say that moral profile resists or bends the semantic content 
of the text.  Greenberg’s examples are not examples of constitutional law, and such examples 
would be required to make the point as an objection to the moderate version of the contribution 
thesis.  In the context of statute law, desuetude might provide an example, but it is difficult to 
find a clear cut example of constitutional desuetude.  Even the Second Amendment seems 
capable of making a comeback.  For the purposes of this article, the important point is that those 
who resist the contribution thesis on the basis of Greenberg’s theory will need to “do the work” 
and make the case for his theory in the constitutional context. 
Even if Greenberg’s theory were established as correct on the basis of good and sufficient 
reasons, it is not clear that Semantic Originalism would suffer substantial damage.  On 
Greenberg’s account, much of the semantic content of the constitution would make it into 
constitutional law via the indirect route.  Greenberg’s theory has the internal resources to argue 
that most of the semantic content of the Constitution produces changes in the moral profile that 
closely track that content.  So long as the fixation thesis and the clause-meaning thesis hold, 
Greenberg’s theory can and should accommodate a substantial role for the original public 
meaning of the Constitution in the fixation of legal content.  If opponents of originalism want to 
argue that this is not the case, then they are obliged to provide the arguments. 
One last point about Greenberg’s theory.  On his account, the fidelity thesis becomes 
unnecessary.  If we accept Greenberg’s theory, then it follows from the nature of law that law 
provides all-things-considered moral obligations. 
(2) Law as Integrity 
Yet another form of inclusive antipositivism is Ronald Dworkin’s theory, law as integrity.  
Dworkin’s hypothetical judge Hercules articulates the theory that best fits and justifies the 
institutional history (including legal texts) as a whole.  According to law as integrity, the content 
of that theory (and not the content of the texts which Hercules considers in constructing the 
theory) provides legal content.  Dworkin’s theory, like Michael Greenberg’s view, is inconsistent 
with the moderate version of the contribution thesis, but it supports what I call the weak version.  
For the purpose of this discussion, we can assume that the fixation thesis and the clause-meaning 
thesis are true. 
How would Hercules treat the semantic content of the United States Constitution?  Law as 
integrity surely would give the semantic content an important role: the Constitution of the United 
States is indubitably an important feature of the institutional history.  The theory that best fits 
and justifies that history will give pride of place to the Constitution: much of the content of 





constitutional law will be identical to the semantic content of the Constitution.  Of course, law as 
integrity may authorize substantial departures from the original meaning: the theory that best fits 
and justifies our whole institutional history might effectively nullify whole clauses of the 
Constitution, with the consequence that these clauses would not be law at all.  And in some 
cases, the theory might assign a meaning to a particular clause that is inconsistent with the 
original meaning: for example, Hercules might interpret the equal protection clause so that its 
content would correspond to: “No state shall deny to any person that treatment which is required 
by the best conception of the concept of equality,” even if this is inconsistent with the semantic 
content of “equal protection of the laws.”  For Dworkin, this would be unproblematic, but for 
Semantic Originalism, Hercules’s interpretation would be legally incorrect and would, at least 
prima facie, be inconsistent the fidelity to law. 
Two more observations.  First, just as with Greenberg’s theory, Dworkin’s theory seems to 
obviate the need for the fidelity thesis.  Law as integrity would itself provide the reasons of 
political morality for law abidance. 
5. Charity in Interpretation and Indeterminacy of Translation 
This subsection deals with the relationship between the contribution thesis and some ideas in 
the philosophy of language associated with Quine and Davidson.  Two questions arise.  First, 
what is the relationship between the idea that the constitutional text contributes to constitutional 
law and Quine’s discussion of indeterminacy of translation (from one natural language to 
another) or Davidson’s extension of that discussion to interpretation (within one natural 
language)?380  A second question arises in connection with the idea of the principle of charity in 
interpretation. 
In connection with the first question, we can ask whether Quine’s idea of indeterminacy of 
translation or Davidson’s extension to interpretation imply indeterminacy of translation between 
the constitutional text and constitutional law.  “Indeterminacy” and “charity in interpretation” 
have particular philosophical meanings that may differ from the use of these phrases in legal 
theory.  In particular, the word “indeterminacy” as used in this subsection refers to “Quinean 
indeterminacy,” the meaning of which we shall now examine. 
Moving quickly through a dense thicket of ideas, we can begin with the idea of radical 
translation.  Imagine a newly discovered natural language, and task of devising a translation 
manual.  Such a manual must satisfy two constraints: (1) sentences in the foreign language that 
are assented to only in certain observational circumstances should be translated as sentences we 
would assent to in similar circumstances, and (2) sentences that are accepted as true in foreign 
language should be translated into sentences that would be absurd in our language, and sentences 
that are rejected in the foreign language should not be translated into sentences we regard as 
obviously true.  Quine argues that these constraints do not determine a unique translation 
manual: there will be more than one manual that preserves the truth of observation sentences and 
satisfies avoids the errors of translating sentences understood as true as obviously false and vice 
versa. 
Donald Davidson extended Quine’s account from translation to interpretation (where 
interpretation means understanding within a single natural language) and he collapsed Quine’s 
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two constraints into one principle of charity which is maximize agreement.  Dagfinn Föllesdal 
correctly identified a problem with Davidson’s principle of charity, which he explained as 
follows: 
I am together with a person who speaks a language which I do not know, but would like 
to learn. He frequently uses the phrase 'Gavagai' and I have formed an hypothesis that it 
has to do with rabbits. While we are in a forest and I note a rabbit I try out the phrase 
'Gavagai'. However, my friend dissents. According to Davidson's thesis of maximizing 
agreement this would be a reason against my hypothesis that 'Gavagai' should be translated 
by 'Rabbit'. If I now discover that there is a big tree between my friend and the rabbit, I 
immediately have an explanation for our disagreement: I take it for granted that my friend, 
like me, is not able to see through trees and that he therefore does not think that there is a 
rabbit there. I even take my friend's dissent as confirming my hypothesis, I do not expect 
him to believe that there is a rabbit there.381 
Thus, we can articulate a modified principle of charity as follows: “Maximize agreement 
where you expect to find agreement.”382  One more point: all of this discussion is in the context 
of sentences that make assertions about the world that are true or false, but legal interpretation 
takes place in a context where many of the crucial sentences to be interpreted are legal rules of 
the familiar sorts, prohibiting, conferring powers, and so forth.  Moving from the context of 
assertions to the context of legal rules is nontrivial. 
The idea of charity in interpretation is familiar to lawyers.  When we attempt to glean the 
semantic content of a legal text, we avoid absurd interpretations, but the principle of charity in 
interpretation does not lead us to assume that we always agree with the meaning of legal texts.  
Most constitutional provisions were uttered long ago in circumstances that differ from 
contemporary circumstances and were framed and ratified by persons who had background 
beliefs and values that vary systematically from our own.  Given our knowledge of the publically 
available circumstances of constitutional utterance, an interpreter (or translator) should not 
expect that the original meaning of the Constitution is identical to the content of the Constitution 
that the interpreter would utter knowing the publicly available context if the interpreter were in 
the circumstances of constitutional utterance. 
Now back to indeterminacy of translation.  If Quine’s notion carries over to the legal context, 
we could formulate it as follows.  Let us imagine that a legal interpreter is given the task of 
writing a translation manual that translates sentences in the text of the Constitution into sentences 
of constitutional law, and that the translation manual must comply with Föllesdal’s modified 
principle of charity.383  To make this imaging vivid, we can describe the same situation using 
conventional legal terminology: 
A legal scholar is asked to write a treatise of constitutional law that formulates the 
semantic content of the constitutional text expressed in the language used when in each 
provision was framed and ratified as a set of legal rules expressed in contemporary 
American English.  (This special treatise only deals with the semantic content of the text; it 
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does not constructions except to note the need for constructions when the text is vague.)  
The treatise translates each sentence of constitutional text into a rule of constitutional law. 
Indeterminacy of legal interpretation, in the special sense we are using the word 
“indeterminacy,” implies that there could be many treatises of constitutional law that would 
comply with the modified principle of charity.  Many sets of legal rules could accurately express 
the semantic content of the constitution in contemporary English, if by “accuracy” we mean 
compliance with the modified principle of charity. 
If Quinean indeterminacy were to hold for the case of constitutional law treatises, this would 
not entail the strong indeterminacy thesis discussed in connection with debates associated with 
the Critical Legal Studies movement.384  Even if there are many (or even a vast number) of such 
treatises, it does not follow that every possible treatise would provide an accurate translation.  
Many treatises (or a vast number) will violate the modified principle of charity. 
At this point, some readers may draw the conclusion that Quinean indeterminacy adds nothing 
to our understanding of legal interpretation, but that conclusions would be incorrect.  If Quine is 
right and if legal translation is indeterminate in the Quinean sense, then it follows that even with 
knowledge of the full circumstances of constitutional utterances, there can be more than one 
correct version of the clause meaning of the Constitution.  Putting it more crudely, we could 
express this point as follows: the semantic content of the Constitution is irreducibly ambiguous, 
but in ways that satisfy the modified principle of charity. 
How would New Originalists handle irreducible ambiguity of the Quinean sort?  The answer 
is, “The same way they would handle the less fancy sort of ambiguity that results from 
epistemological problems such as our lack of complete knowledge of the patterns of 
conventional usage at the various times constitutional provisions were uttered.”  Irreducible 
ambiguity requires construction.  If Quinean indeterminacy holds of a constitution, then even a 
constitution that had only bright-line provisions (and therefore had no vague provisions) would 
require constructions.  When it comes to application, many of the permissible constructions 
would produce identical outcomes, but it seems likely (and at least possible) that in at least some 
cases the outcomes would differ. 
We are now in a position to answer the question whether Quinean indeterminacy threatens the 
moderate version of the contribution thesis.  The answer is clearly “no.”  Indeed, Quine’s picture 
of radical translation and Davidson’s extension of that picture to interpretation assumes that 
something analogous to the moderate version of the contribution thesis holds in the case of 
sentences that make assertions.  For this reason, it is difficult to see how Quinean indeterminacy 
could pose a threat to the contribution thesis in the context of law. 
 
* * * 
 
Recall that Semantic Originalism embraces four theses: (1) the fixation thesis, (2) the clause-
meaning thesis, (3) the moderate version of the contribution thesis, and (4) the fidelity thesis.  
The first three theses have now been articulated, motivated, and defended against a series of 
possible objections.  With some minor exceptions, all of this has been accomplished without 
recourse to arguments of political morality.  One way that we can summarize the argument so 
far is this: “The original meaning of the constitution is the law.”  The remainder of this part 
                                                






adds the following: “. . . and because it is the law we have good reasons to follow it.”  Those 
“good reasons” are provided by the fidelity thesis. 
 
* * * 
D. The Fidelity Thesis Revisited 
The fidelity thesis asserts that there is a principle within political morality of fidelity to law.385  
The basic idea is simple and familiar.  In a reasonably just society, we have good reasons to 
abide by the law.  In this section, we will elaborate on the content of the fidelity thesis and then 
make the case for its acceptance. 
Before we proceed any further, the purpose of this inquiry should be clarified.  Our aim is not 
to produce the best account of the moral relationship between constitutional law, on one hand, 
and the obligations or virtues of citizens, officials, and judges, on the other hand.  That task is too 
large.  Instead, the more limited goal of this subsection is to articulate a minimalist conception of 
fidelity to law.  The minimalist conception can be articulated as follows: in a reasonably just 
society, citizens, officials, and judges should adopt an attitude of loyalty towards the law and 
comply with a corresponding obligation to comply with the law absent overridden reasons of 
morality. 
1. The Fidelity Thesis: Law Obligates Citizens, Officials, and Judge Absent an 
Overriding Reason of Morality 
What is “fidelity to law”?  Under what circumstances does morality authorize disobedience?  
Who owes fidelity to law? 
a) Fidelity to Law 
Fidelity to law can be understood in various ways.  One understanding focuses on the idea of 
fidelity as an orientation towards the law as a source of reasons for action.  One such orientation 
could be an attitude of loyalty and respect to the law.  A second orientation could be conceived 
dispositionally: in aretaic terms, we can think of a virtue of lawfulness.  Another way of 
understanding fidelity to law is in terms of obligation or duty.  We can imagine various 
conceptions of the obligation to obey the law.  There could be a very strong obligation that 
overrides both self-interest and individual beliefs about morality in all but the direst 
circumstances, or a very weak obligation, that provides only a bursting-bubble presumption in 
favor of law abidance. 
Let us stipulate that fidelity to law consists of both an orientation of respect towards the 
reasons for action that law provides and an obligation (with appropriate force) to obey the law.  
To have fidelity to law is to respect the reasons the law provides and to acknowledge that law 
obligates. 
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b) The Overriding Reasons Proviso 
One understanding of the authority of law is that the reasons that law provides must displace 
moral reasons.  This understanding is usually accompanied by an account of legitimate authority, 
such that one has reason to acknowledge authority as legitimate only if acting in compliance with 
the authority results in a greater likelihood of acting in accord with the overall balance of reasons 
than would direct reliance on the reasons themselves.  A quite different account of obligation to 
obey the law assumes that the obligation obtains in normal circumstances, but that it is defeasible 
and can be overridden or displaced by reasons of the right kind and force.  The former account 
gives law’s authority the ability to preempt direct reliance on moral reasons, but imposes strict 
conditions on its legitimacy.  The latter account lacks preemptive force, but imposes less 
stringent conditions on legitimacy. 
Let us assume the weaker account of law’s authority, which allows agents who affirm fidelity 
to law to engage in disobedience for overriding reasons of morality.386  Some may argue that this 
idea denies to law the full authority it claims and ought to have, but for our purposes on this 
occasion, this weaker conception of obligation is sufficient to the task at hand. 
What then would count as an overriding reason of morality?  One type of case involves 
systematic failure of the legal system as a whole to meet minimum standards of morality and 
justice: wicked legal regimes like Nazi Germany and Apartheid South Africa are of this type.  A 
second type of case involves a reasonably just and moral legal regime in which the content of a 
particular law or cluster of laws is substantial unjust or immoral: Jim Crow laws might be 
described as a cluster of injustice embedded in reasonably just society.  A third type of case 
involves the application of a law with reasonably just content, the application of which to 
particular circumstances would work a substantial justice. 
The minimalist conception of fidelity to law that is offered here acknowledges that there can 
be overriding reasons of morality in each of the three kinds of cases.  Such reasons of morality 
must be serious and substantial to be overriding.  For an agent to reach the conclusion that the 
reason truly overrides, the agent must give due regard to the reasons of the law and the great 
value of the rule of law.  In particular, it is never enough to say, “This rule of law is not the best 
rule of law.  I can imagine a better rule.  Therefore, I am excused from compliance with the law.”  
That kind of reasoning is inconsistent with fidelity to law because it displays an orientation 
towards the reasons that law provides that does not incorporate an attitude of respect or a virtue 
of lawfulness.  
c) Who Owes Fidelity to Law? 
Recall the distinction between general and special constitutional fidelity.  General 
constitutional fidelity applies to all citizens; special constitutional fidelity applies only to 
officials.  The conventional wisdom is that judges owe fidelity to law for reasons and with a 
force that do not apply to other officials and citizens.  Judges voluntarily assume their office and 
typically swear an oath of fidelity to the Constitution and laws.  If judges lack respect for the law 
and the virtue of justice, then the power the law gives them may be the power act despotically or 
arbitrarily.  The role of judge involves a special relationship to the law: the job of the judge is to 
correctly identify and apply the law to particular disputes.  Fidelity to law is thought to be 
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especially important for doing this job well.  Moreover, the conditions for the exercise of judicial 
power are especially conducive to deliberation that fully considers and incorporates 
constitutional law in judicial action.  This is especially true of appellate judges who act after 
adversary contestation and collegial deliberation resulting in opinions that make explicit their 
reasons for decision. 
Some of these same special reasons for fidelity to law also apply to other officials.  
Legislators and the occupants of high executive office also swear an oath of fidelity and choose 
their offices voluntarily.  They exercise power over others, and one of the functions of 
constitutional law is to constrain them.  Nonetheless, it might be argued that the ties that bind 
officials to fidelity are less constraining than those that bind judges.  Executive officials must act 
in real time: they sometimes need to act expeditiously, without the opportunity for full 
deliberation and the light that might be shed by the adversary process.  Legislators have more 
opportunity for deliberation, and the institutional mechanisms for seeking broad public input on 
constitutional questions.  Both types of officials may believe that they may appropriately defer to 
judicial judgments on some constitutional questions given the institution of judicial review. 
More controversially, but in my opinion rightly, good citizens in a reasonably just society 
with legitimate institutions owe fidelity to law.  Citizens may be born into citizenship and exit 
may be costly.  Moreover, it is widely believed that citizens have the right to change the regime 
through legal or extralegal processes under at least some circumstances.  Moreover, individual 
citizens ordinarily have only imperfect knowledge of the content of constitutional law.  Given 
these caveats, fidelity to law in the case of individual citizens may have a different shape and 
force than it has for judges and officials. 
2. Reasons for Affirming the Fidelity Thesis 
So far, we have investigated the content, force, and scope of fidelity to law.  The next task is 
to survey the reasons that judges, officials, and citizens might have for adopting the attitudes and 
duties implied by fidelity.  These reasons can be divided into two kinds, public reasons and 
reasons provided by comprehensive moral doctrines. 
a) Public Reasons for Fidelity to Law 
The familiar idea of public reasons is strongly associated with John Rawls and resembles the 
idea of an incompletely theorized agreement found in the work of Cass Sunstein.  Rawls’s notion 
of public reason “Public reason” is the common reason of a political society; it is the shared 
capacity of citizens to engage in political deliberation. An ideal of public reason provides a 
systematic answer to the following question: what limits does political morality impose on public 
political debate and discussion by the citizens of a modern pluralist democracy?387 
Rawls’s idea of public reason is marked by three features. First, Rawls understands public 
reason as the common reason of a political society. A society’s reason is its “way of formulating 
its plans, of putting its ends in an order of priority and of making its decisions accordingly.”388  
Public reason contrasts with the “nonpublic reasons of churches and universities and of many 
other associations in civil society.”389  Both public and nonpublic reason share features that are 
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essential to reason itself, such as simple rules of inference and evidence.390  Public reasons, 
however, are limited to premises and modes of reasoning that are accessible to the public at 
large. Rawls argues that these include “presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning 
found in common sense, and the methods and conclusions of science when these are not 
controversial.”391 By contrast, the nonpublic reason of a church might include premises about the 
authority of sacred texts and modes of reasoning that appeal to the interpretive authority of 
particular persons. Nonpublic reasons are not, however, limited to religious reasons. The deep 
and controversial premises of any comprehensive moral conception, such as utilitarianism or 
Kantian deontological ethics, are also nonpublic reasons. 
Are there public reasons for fidelity to law?  One answer to this question might appeal to the 
very great value of the rule of law as value is both embedded in the public political culture and 
that it is not disqualified as a public reason because it is inaccessible to reasonable citizens by 
virtue of its incorporation of the deep and controversial premises of a comprehensive moral 
doctrine.  That is, one can affirm the very great value of the rule of law without affirming any 
particular comprehensive doctrine.  The values of certainty, predictability, and stability, which 
allow humans to coordinate their behavior, make plans, avoid getting in trouble, and so forth, do 
not depend on any particular comprehensive conception of morality. 
More directly the idea that judges, officials, citizens owe fidelity to law is itself strongly 
embedded in the public political culture.  Not only is this idea explicitly articulated, it is also a 
presupposition of a wide variety of legal practices.  Judges, officials, and citizens are expected to 
follow the law: they are taken to be acting badly when they break the law.  Oaths that pledge 
fidelity to law are direct evidence that fidelity is entrenched in the public political culture. 
Of course, even if fidelity to law is a public value, it does not follow that the public political 
culture is right in this regard.  We could query the public political culture in at least two 
distinctive ways.  One query would operate from within the public political culture and it would 
ask whether our commitment to lawfulness is consistent with our other deep commitments.  If it 
could be shown that fidelity to law is inconsistent with those commitments, then it might be the 
case that we could be induced to give up our commitment to fidelity to law on the basis of public 
reasons. 
b) Reasons Grounded in Comprehensive Moral Doctrines 
There is a second way in which we could query the public political culture.  Each of us might 
ask whether the duty of fidelity is consistent with the deeper commitments of her own 
comprehensive doctrine.  This query would operate from outside the public political culture, but 
could form the basis for an “overlapping consensus” or “incompletely theorized agreement” on 
fidelity to law.  This subsection sketches some possible arguments for fidelity to law from 
comprehensive doctrines. 
Our aim here is not to produce knock-down arguments that demonstrate that each 
comprehensive doctrine necessarily leads to fidelity to law.  Rather, the aim is to show how a 
variety of doctrines could be consistent with fidelity to law.  Given that the public political 
culture includes the rule of law as a very great value and demands fidelity to law of judges, 
officials, and citizens, this modest showing is sufficient for the purpose at hand—which just is 
                                                
390 Id. at 220. 





establishing the plausibility of the minimalist normative case for adherence to the law as 
component of Semantic Originalism. 
(1) The Deontological Argument: Duties of Officials, Duties of Citizens 
From a deontological perspective, morality is seen as a system of moral rules, creating duties, 
rights, and permissions.  For a deontologist, the question is whether there is a duty to obey the 
law, and if there is some such duty, what are its limitations?   There are many versions of 
deontological theory, including, for example, Kant’s theory,392 contractarianism (associated in 
contemporary philosophy with Thomas Scanlon393), and Stephen Darwall’s theory, which 
emphasizes the second-person standpoint.394  A variety of arguments can be made for and against 
a general duty of law abidance.395 
The conventional wisdom is that the case for an obligation to obey the law is more easily 
made for officials, including judges, that for citizens.  Officials voluntarily choose to be bound 
by the legal system by entering their offices: frequently officials swear an oath of office that 
explicitly promises obedience.  Officials directly benefit from the law, and as a matter of fair 
play (or reciprocity) may be obligated to respect the rules that create these benefits.  Most issues 
of constitutional interpretation come to officials.  Judges engage in judicial review.  Legislators 
consider constitutionality when they decide whether to enact statutes.  Executives consider rules 
of constitutional law as defining and limiting their powers.  Even if the duty to obey the law were 
limited to officials, as a practical matter this would be sufficient for the limited purposes of 
Semantic Originalism. 
The question whether there is a general duty for citizens to obey the law is difficult, and 
respected philosophers doubt whether the case has been or can be made.  Citizens do not 
explicitly consent to obey the law, and tacit consent is problematic because the only alternative is 
exit (emigration), expressive for all and practically unavailable to some.  There are, however, 
several promising lines of argument.  For example, John Rawls has argued for an obligation to 
obey the law based on the ideas of fair play and reciprocity: citizens who receive the benefits of 
compliance by others would act unfairly (as free riders) if they were to disobey the laws for 
reasons of self-interest.  Kant famously argued for a very strict duty of obedience to law. 
(2) The Consequentialist Argument: The Law as a Coordination Mechanism 
Can consequentialism provide the foundations for respect for law?  At first blush, this looks 
like a difficult task.  Take act utilitarianism.  For the act utilitarian, evaluations of the decisions 
to obey the law are made one act at a time.  In any given case, the harms generated by complying 
with the law may exceed the benefits.  This suggests that there is no general obligation to obey 
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the law: indeed, on this reason, there are no general obligations of any kind.  Of course, this point 
about act utilitarianism could be advanced as a criticism rather than a consequence.  One 
standard utilitarian line of reply appeals to a two-level view of morality.  Utilitarianism operates 
at the level of ultimate evaluation: applying the utilitarian calculus is something we do after the 
fact with time for reflections.  When individuals make actual decisions, they rely on rules of 
thumb because it would be impractical, costly, and likely harmful to engage in a utilitarian 
calculus. Thus, the obligation to obey the law could be seen as a rule of thumb—subject to 
override when the disadvantages of law compliance clearly outweigh the advantages.396 
A different sort of consequentialist argument for fidelity to law might utilize the resources of 
rational choice theory to show that a system of law can provide a coordination mechanism that 
creates good consequences.  This story would should that laws create a focal point for 
coordination, and that legal sanctions and rewards prevent free rider problems.  One way of 
understanding this story is that it explains the rationality of complying with the law in a way that 
does not require the notion of fidelity to law, but another way to understand the story is that it 
offers an interpretation of what “fidelity to law” means that avoids reliance on what the 
consequentialist sees as obscure deontic intuitions.  The rule-of-thumb story of the two level 
view, and the focal point for coordination story of the rational choice view, might be seen as 
complimentary, with the latter providing a theoretically robust foundation for the former. 
(3) The Aretaic Argument: Virtue of Justice as Lawfulness 
Deontological theories focus on right action.  Consequentialist theories focus on good states 
of affairs.  Aretaic theories focus on excellence of character.  There are a variety of aretaic 
theories, but the most prominent of these is neoAristotelian virtue ethics.  For virtue ethics, the 
question to ask is whether fidelity to law is a virtue or entailed by one of the virtues.  There are 
two strategies that might be pursued here.  One strategy, associated with William Edmundson, is 
to argue for a distinctive virtue of law abidance.397 Edmundson’s argument is elegant and 
persuasive, and shall not be repeated here.  A second strategy, associated with virtue 
jurisprudence, focuses on the virtue of justice.  Does the virtue of justice require fidelity to law?  
There are two different conceptions of the virtue of justice: justice as lawfulness and justice as 
fairness.  The better understanding is that the virtue of justice requires lawfulness: justice as 
lawfulness supports the fidelity thesis. 
One influential conception of the virtue of justice is based begins with the premise that the 
just and the lawful are separate and distinct.  If this were so, then the virtue of justice as fairness 
might be articulated as a disposition to act in accord with the best conception of fairness.  One 
might think that someone who possessed this virtue would act solely on the basis of fairness398 
with reference to the law, but this is not the case.  If this were true, it would provide the basis for 
a devastating objection to the fairness conception—because it would require each individual to 
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substitute her private judgments about what fairness requires for the duly enacted constitutions, 
statutes, and rules.  It seems plain that this would be a recipe for chaos.  For that reason, persons 
with the virtue of justice as fairness would take the positive laws into account—complying with 
the law when doing so would be fair under the circumstances. 
But even if individuals with the virtue of justice as fairness take law into account, they only 
do so for content-dependent and situation specific reasons.  Their primary disposition is to 
exercise their own private judgment about first-order questions of fairness.  The objection to the 
fairness conception of the virtue of justice is that disagreements in private judgments about 
fairness would undermine the very great values that we associate with the rule of law.  How bad 
this would be is a matter of dispute.  A Hobbesian answer to this question is very bad indeed—in 
the absence of coordinating authority, life would be “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”399  
A Lockean answer is that reliance on private judgment leads to “inconveniences,”400 but even an 
optimist about the state of nature would surely concede that the inconvenience of a society that 
cannot secure the rule of law would be serious.  Given the fact that individuals will disagree 
(sometimes radically) in their judgments about fairness, a society composed of individuals with 
this version of the virtue of justice would have great difficulty achieving the rule of law. 
If the fairness conception of the virtue of justice is unsatisfactory, is there an alternative?  In 
the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle suggests an alternative understanding of justice as lawfulness, 
but to understand Aristotle’s view, we need to take a look at the Greek word nomos which is 
usually translated as “law.”  For the ancient Greeks, nomos had a broader meaning that does 
“law” in contemporary English.  Richard Kraut, the distinguished Aristotle scholar, explained the 
difference as follows: 
[W]hen [Aristotle] says that a just person, speaking in the broadest sense is nomimos, he 
is attributing to such a person a certain relationship to the laws, norms, and customs 
generally accepted by some existing community.  Justice has to do not merely with the 
written enactments of a community’s lawmakers, but with the wider set of norms that 
govern the members of that community.  Similarly, the unjust person’s character is 
expressed not only in his violations of the written code of laws, but more broadly in his 
transgression of the rules accepted by the society in which he lives. 
There is another important way in which Aristotle’s use of the term nomos differs from 
our word ‘law’: he makes a distinction between nomoi and what the Greeks of his time 
called psēphismata—conventionally translated as ‘decrees’.  A decree is a legal enactment 
addressed solely to present circumstances, and sets no precedent that applies to similar 
cases in the future.  By contrast a nomos is meant to have general scope: it applies not only 
to cases at hand but to a general category of cases that can be expected to occur in the 
future.401 
If officials and judges were to rely on their own private, first-order judgments of fairness as the 
basis for the resolution of disputes, then it follows inexorably that their judgments will be 
decrees (psēphismata) and not decisions on the basis of a second order, public judgment—in 
other words, not on the basis of a nomos.  In other words, a judge who decides on the basis of her 
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own private judgments about which outcome is fair—all things considered—is making decisions 
that are tyrannical in Aristotle’s sense. 
“How can this be?,” you may ask.  “Aren’t decisions that are motivated by fairness the very 
opposite of tyranny?”  But framing the question in this way obscures rather than illuminates the 
point.  Of course, if there were universal agreement (or even a strong consensus) of first-order 
private judgments about fairness, then decision on the basis of such judgments would be nomoi 
and not psēphismata.  But our private, first-order judgments about the all-things-considered 
requirements of fairness do not agree.  So in any given case, a decision that the one person 
believes is required by fairness will be seen by others quite differently—as biased, mistaken, or 
arbitrary. 
We are now in a better position to appreciate why rule by decree (psēphismata) is typical of 
tyranny.  Decision on the basis of private, first-order judgments about fairness is the rule of 
individuals and not of law.  From Aristotle’s point of view, a regime that rules by decree does 
not provide the stability and certainty that is required for human communities to flourish.402  
Kraut continues: 
We can now see why Aristotle thinks that justice in its broadest sense can be defined as 
lawfulness, and why he has such high regard for a lawful person.  His definition embodies 
the assumption that every community requires the high degree of order that that comes 
from having a stable body of customs and norms, and a coherent legal code that is not 
altered frivolously and unpredictably.  Justice in its broadest sense is the intellectual and 
emotional skill one needs in order to do one’s part in brining it about that one’s community 
possesses this stable system of rules and laws.403 
And with that point in place, we can now formulate the lawfulness conception of the virtue of 
justice: an individual possesses the virtue of justice as lawfulness if the individual is disposed to 
act in accord with the nomoi (positive laws and widely shared and deeply held social norms of 
the community). 
The virtue of justice does not dispose its possessors to conformity with their private, first-
order judgments of fairness.  Someone with the virtue of justice is disposed to act on the basis of 
the nomoi—which are shared public norms.  In other words, the lawfulness conception holds that 
someone who has the virtue of justice is a nomimos, someone who grasps the importance of 
lawfulness and is disposed to act on the basis of the laws and norms of her community.  
Someone who is nomimos is disposed to fidelity to law, because she respects and internalizes the 
positive laws of her community.  Judges, officials, and citizens who are nomimos will internalize 
the rules and values of constitutional law: the contribution thesis establishes that those rules and 
values reflect the original public meaning of the Constitution. 
In sum, fidelity to law finds support in aretaic moral and political theory.  That support can be 
articulated in two ways, via Edmundson’s idea of a virtue of law abidance or by interpreting the 
virtue of justice as a virtue of lawfulness.  Both articulations show that a morality of virtue can 
support the fidelity thesis. 
                                                






c) The Relationship Between Public and Comprehensive Reasons: Overlapping 
Consensus on Fidelity for Law 
Our brief survey of the reasons for fidelity to law that are grounded in comprehensive 
doctrines is intended to demonstrate the plausibility of an overlapping consensus on fidelity to 
law as a public reason.  The brief survey is not a demonstration: I have not claimed to have 
demonstrated that there is an overlapping consensus because each of the comprehensive 
conceptions held by reasonable citizens does endorse fidelity to law.  Rather, my much more 
modest aim was to argue that the public values of the rule of law and fidelity to law are not 
obviously inconsistent with a variety of comprehensive doctrines, and thus the notion of an 
overlapping consensus or incompletely theorized agreement on these values is not implausible. 
Readers who reject the Rawlsian notions of public reason and overlapping consensus and 
Sunstein’s idea of incompletely theorized agreement will believe this stage of the argument as 
unnecessary.  For these readers, the only question will be, “Does the true or correct 
comprehensive doctrine support fidelity to law?”  Obviously readers will differ in their beliefs 
about which comprehensive doctrine is true or correct, and I cannot hope to canvass all the 
doctrines or resolve the enduring questions of political and moral philosophy in a footnote or 
appendix.  The strategy that is pursued here is the only possible strategy given the fact of 
pluralism. 
3. Fidelity to Law, the Supreme Court, and Original Meaning 
Assuming that fidelity to law is plausible, how does it apply to the claims made by Semantic 
Originalism?  What is the significance of the fidelity thesis?  We answer those questions in a 
concrete way by asking how fidelity to law would operate for the Justices of the Supreme Court 
when they consider constitutional questions. 
a) The Justices and Fidelity 
At this stage in the argument, we are assuming that the fixation thesis, the clause-meaning 
thesis, and the moderate version of the contribution thesis are correct.  That is, we are assuming 
that the content of constitutional law includes the semantic content of the Constitution, which is 
its original public meaning (with four modifications).  Legally correct interpretations of the 
Constitution track original meaning; constructions of the Constitution supplement that meaning 
by resolving vagueness. 
Fidelity to law by Supreme Court Justices would require that their constitutional decisions 
both comply with and be grounded on the semantic content of the Constitution.  Decisions that 
are inconsistent with the semantic content should be considered “out of bounds” and opinions 
that do not respect the legal force of the original meaning are illegitimate.  These conclusions are 
qualified, however.  One source of qualification is the doctrine of precedent or stare decisis.  A 
second qualification is introduced by the possibility of constitutional evil: semantic content that 
would trigger the overriding reasons proviso that is a component of the ideal of fidelity to law.404 
The overriding reasons proviso will be discussed below.405  What about the first qualification?  
May Justices make decisions and write opinions that contravene or ignore the original meaning if 
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the prior decisions of the Court are inconstant with that meaning?  There is more than one 
plausible answer to these questions.  One view is that concern for the rule of law (and especially 
for reasonable reliance) justifies the Court in relying on its own prior decisions, even when they 
are in error.  Another view is that such reliance is never or almost never justified: both Randy 
Barnett406 and Kurt Lash407 have argued for variations of this view.  My own view is that the 
Court can and should properly consider itself bound by the narrow holdings of its own prior 
decisions when such decisions represent good faith attempts to interpret the Constitution’s 
original meaning.  Such errors can be corrected over time as decisions based on the better 
understanding accumulate, and a pattern of such holdings could eventually lead the Court to 
properly overrule its prior decision—on the ground that the decision is inconsistent with the 
whole body of precedent.408 
Whatever view one takes of the role of precedent, fidelity to law suggests that prior decisions 
that are inconsistent with the original meaning should not be given generative force, and used as 
the basis for extending the error outside the scope of the precedent. 
b) Transparency and Sincerity 
The claim that judicial reasoning should be transparent and sincere seems plausible.409  Absent 
extraordinary circumstances, judges should state the reasons for their decisions, and these 
reasons should be the real reasons.  Transparency and sincerity are limited to factors relied upon 
in conscious deliberation: the idea is not that judges should reveal all the causal influences (that 
would be impossible) or all the notions that they considered and then rejected as the basis for 
their decisions. 
If transparency and sincerity are combined with fidelity to the original meaning, there are 
implications for constitutional opinion writing.  Supreme Court Justices have a special obligation 
to identify the relevant provisions of the Constitution when they write their opinions.  Their 
opinions should explain how the semantic content (the text) either requires or allows the result 
reached in the case.  If the opinion departs from original meaning, it should explain why and 
offer a justification.  These requirements may sound minimal and trivial, but any serious student 
of constitutional law knows that it is possible for the Justices to write opinions that decide a 
question of constitutional law that never even mentions the relevant provision of the 
Constitution, much less the implications of its original meaning for the case at hand. 
This means that if the opinion calls for an amending construction of the Constitution (a 
construction that alters the original public meaning), the opinion should identify the amending 
construction, state the inconsistency, and then offer a justification for the departure from original 
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meaning.  Most judges were lawyers, and this frequently results in the writing of persuasive 
judicial opinions (opinions that present the most persuasive case for the result and therefore do 
not disclose the judge’s actual beliefs or carefully distinguish between plausible arguments and 
reasons that are true).  A persuasive opinion might conceal the inconsistency between the result 
and the original meaning, or dissimulate by making an insincere argument that an amendment 
construction is actually consistent with the original meaning.  Persuasive opinions with this 
feature are inconsistent with transparency and sincerity, and should be eschewed without 
extraordinary justification.  If the constitution is interpreted in a way that is inconsistent with the 
original meaning, the opinion should offer a transparent amending construction (a frank 
acknowledgement that the construction is inconsistent with the original meaning). 
Of course, it is possible that transparent amending constructions will stretch the court’s 
legitimacy, fail to gain votes from other justices, and result in normative criticism to which the 
court may be sensitive.  For these reasons and others, justices who adhere to a norm that requires 
that amending constructions be transparent may be more reluctant reach results that require 
disclosure of departures from original meaning.  That is, observation of norms of transparency 
and sincerity might actually affect the content of constitutional doctrine as it binds lower courts. 
c) Justifications for Opaque Amending Constructions 
Even if there is a general obligation to write transparent and sincere opinions, it is at least 
possible to imagine circumstances in which there would be moral justification for rendering an 
opaque amending construction (an amending construction that is opaque in the sense that it is not 
transparent or disclosed).410  This could be done by avoiding the text entirely, or by dissimulating 
about the original meaning of the text.  Vagueness can be exaggerated and ambiguity can be 
manufactures. 
What circumstances could justify opaque amending constructions?  The clearest cases involve 
wicked legal cultures, such as that of Nazi Germany.  In a wicked legal system, there is not 
obligation of fidelity to law and judges are free moral agents, who ought to do the most good 
they can under very bad conditions.  If a Nazi judge had to dissimulate to avoid the evil 
consequences of the racial laws, that (and obviously much more) would have been justified.  
Perhaps less clear is the case of a zone of substantially evil law in an otherwise reasonably just 
legal system: the evil laws that institutionalized segregation may be examples of this kind.  In my 
opinion, the result in Brown v. Board of Education can be squared with the original meaning of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but it may be that the Court 
itself believes that it could not have defended its decision on originalist grounds.  If this was the 
case or if there were good reasons to believe that it was the case, then the Justices may have been 
justified in concealing this fact in order to provide their decision greater legitimacy.  Suppose 
that this (possible) interpretation of Brown v. Board of Education is correct: from that 
supposition, it would not follow that the Court should adopt the method of dissimulation through 
opaque amendment constructions as its ordinary mode of doing business. 
 
* * * 
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Opponents of Semantic Originalism may be tempted to fall back on the argument that there 
neither citizens nor officials owe fidelity to law, but if they do so, they need to be aware of the 
implications of their argument.  Suppose that infidelity is morally permissible as a general 
matter.  The implication is that neither the original meaning nor a living constitution generates 
obligations.  Lower court judges are not obligated to respect the decisions of the Supreme Court.  
Officials are not obligated to respect judicial decisions.  If the aim of a critique of originalism is 
to defend the moral authority of the living constitution, then embracing infidelity to law can 
hardly do the job. 
 
* * * 
E. Triviality, Take Two: Normative Argument and Constitutional Practice 
We now have the minimalist normative component of Semantic Originalism in view.  Taken 
as a normative theory, are the commitments of Semantic Originalism so thin as to render it 
trivial?  Recall that we have already seen one respect in which these minimal commitments are 
not trivial at all.  They provide the normative warrant for adhering to the bright line rules that 
define the basic constitutional structure.  That is not trivial.  It is a normative implication of 
fundamental significance.  It might be objected that this implication of Semantic Originalism 
doesn’t result in change, but that is no objection at all.  The triviality of normative arguments is 
entirely distinct from their vector.  If change were required for normative arguments to be 
nontrivial, then Hobbes’s argument for an absolute sovereign would have been trivial so long as 
the existing sovereign were close to absolute.  There is no good reason to think that defense of 
the status quo is always trivial. 
There is a second respect in which Semantic Originalism is nontrivial: it calls for substantial 
revision in interpretive methodology.  When Semantic Originalism is combined with plausible 
views about transparency and sincerity, it suggests revision in the criteria by Supreme Court 
opinions should be judged.  This is no small matter, given the important role of Supreme Court 
opinions in our constitutional system.  They cast a long “shadow of the law” and if they refocus 
the attention of other constitutional actors on original meaning, the implications (although not 
subject to precise prediction) will surely be significant. 
There may be a third respect in which Semantic Originalism will have nontrivial normative 
implications.  The stance of this article is neutral towards constitutional substance.  I take no 
committed position towards the actual substance of particular constitutional provisions, much 
less their application to concrete constitutional controversies.  But consistent with that stance, we 
can at least speculate about some of the ways in which Semantic Originalism might put existing 
constitutional doctrine on new and more reliable foundations.  One example may be a possible 
new role for the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in fundamental 
rights jurisprudence.  If the doctrine of substantive due process is inconsistent with the semantic 
content of the text of the Due Process Clauses, then the reasoning of the Court would shift as 
new fundamental rights were claimed and either recognized or rejected by the Court.  Eventually 
this would result in a complete redescription of the rationales for implied fundamental, as old 
areas were revisited in light of the new doctrine. 
The third respect in which Semantic Originalism may have nontrivial implications might lead 
to a fourth.  Semantic Originalism might result in substantial revisions in the content of 





possible that “privileges or immunities” is such an abstract, general, and vague phrase, that 
almost all of the work that it does is produced by constitutional construction.  If this were the 
case, then even the Supreme Court’s decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases might be defended as 
a construction that gives the clause the narrowest construction that is consistent with its minimal 
semantic content.  Or it is possible that “privileges or immunities” would have been understood 
as a term of art, referring the general public on to Justice Bushrod Washington’s opinion Corfield 
v. Coryell411 and to Blackstone’s formulation in his Commentaries on the Laws of England.412  In 
that case, Semantic Originalism, if actually put into practice, could result in substantial changes 
in constitutional doctrine. 
For all these reasons, the charge of triviality, if levied against Semantic Originalism, would 
not be well founded.  To put the point more bluntly, Semantic Originalism makes ambitious 
claims about how constitutional business should be done.  For this reason, Christopher Eisgruber 
is simply wrong when he states, “Everyone agrees that interpreters must respect the framers’ 
linguistic intentions.”413  (I think it is fair to substitute “linguistic meaning” for “framers’ 
linguistic intentions.”)  Not everyone thinks that the original public meaning of the Constitution 
must be respected.  In fact, it is not even clear that Eisgruber thinks that.  What if it turned out 
that the original public meaning (or “framers’ linguistic intentions”) actually referred to a 
particular conception of some moral or political concept?  The question whether this is so is a 
factual question—Eisgruber cannot rule this possibility out on conceptual or a priori grounds.  
Would Eisgruber agree that we are then bound by the original public meaning?  If so, the 
Eisgruber is properly described as an originalist, and if he disagrees then he surely must admit 
that originalism is not trivial in its normative implications. 
F. What’s in a Name, Take Four: The Family of Normative Originalisms 
Now that both the conventional justifications for originalism and the minimalist normative 
claims of Semantic Originalism are on the table, we can revisit the question whether Semantic 
Originalism is properly understood as a form of originalism.  Up to this point the following four 
points have been establish: 
• Semantic Originalism affirms the fixation thesis, which provides the core content 
around which all or almost all originalist theories are organized.414 
• The clause-meaning thesis is a particular formulation of original public meaning 
originalism, a view that is clearly in the mainstream of originalist theory.415 
• Semantic Originalism traces its intellectual history through the New Originalism 
which resulted from criticism and reform of the Old Originalism.416 
• The claim that the term “originalism” should be reserved for what might be called 
“strong originalism” is based on an argument that is both invalid and based on false 
premises.417 
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We are now in a position to integrate our understanding of the normative implications of 
Semantic Originalism into our analysis of the terminological dispute.  Critics of originalism 
themselves emphasize the idea that the normative case for originalism sometimes seem to rest on 
the claims that the meaning of the Constitution just is the original meaning and that just is the 
law: Semantic Originalism provides a full explication of these claims and explains their minimal 
normative significance via the fidelity thesis. 
In addition, we can now see that Semantic Originalism allows for a reinterpretation and 
absorption of the other main normative arguments for originalism (popular sovereignty,418 the 
rule of law,419 and writtenness420).  Each of these arguments depends for its validity on the 
fixation thesis and some version of the clause-meaning thesis (or an originalist substitute such as 
framers meaning), and the minimalist normative component of Semantic Originalism relates to 
those two theses in the same way.  Each of the leading versions of normative originalism can be 
reinterpreted as a member of a well defined type of theory, which we can call the family of 
Semantic Originalisms.  Putting it another way, there is a family of normative originalisms, and 
members of the family have more in common than mere resemblance. 
G. Monsters and Apparitions, Take Two: The Constitutional Big Bang 
Opponents of originalism might argue that its implications are too radical and therefore it is 
normatively unattractive.  Sometimes this charge is made as the charge that originalists want to 
return to “the constitution in exile.”421  Cass Sunstein articulated a version of this charge in a 
different context422 as follows 
There is a genuine Constitution in Exile movement, in the form of an effort to make 
radical revisions in constitutional understandings to recover some "lost" document. For two 
decades and more, a number of people, parsing text and mining history, have claimed that 
the Constitution requires a set of identifiable outcomes: It invalidates some or many 
affirmative action programs, campaign finance reforms, gun control laws, environmental 
laws, congressional grants of standing to ordinary citizens, and restrictions on commercial 
advertising. It contains no right of privacy. It invalidates independent agencies, forbids 
regulatory agencies from exercising broad discretionary power, and bans many post-New 
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Deal exercises of congressional power. It might even throw civil rights laws into 
question.423 
If originalism really had these implications and if the term “Originalism” 
only refers to what Berman calls “strong originalism,” the result of an 
originalist constitutional practice might be a “constitutional big bang”424 
with radical changes in the constitutional order implemented in a single 
term of the Supreme Court.  It as if Godzilla were to stride through 
Washington DC breathing originalist fire that incinerates the FCC, SEC, 
NLRB, CPSC, and the FTC and whole titles the United States Code.  The 
entire contents of the Federal Register might be entirely consumed in the 
resulting inferno.  Only the national archive would be unscathed! 
Even the strongest version of the most doctrinaire originalism would not be committed to this, 
and Semantic Originalism has not been demonstrated to have these implications.  First, even if 
originalism had these implications and even if “strong originalism” were the only steady state 
originalist theory, hard originalists could adopt transition rules for the gradual transition to 
originalism.  During the transition, constitutional amendments and adaptive legislation would 
undoubtedly mitigate the transitional effects.  Second, many originalists believe that originalism 
is consistent with a role for constitutional stare decisis and respect for historical practice.425  
Third, the premise of the argument assumes that the semantic meaning of the constitution 
requires these radical implications, but this cannot be assumed, it must be demonstrated: 
Semantic Originalism is a member of the originalist family, but it has its own identity.  Many of 
the supposedly radical implications of originalism are premised on the idea that original expected 
applications fix constitutional meaning, but Semantic Originalism explicitly rejects this 
conclusion. 
 
* * * 
 
Debates over originalism have taken a number of wrong turns, and on more than one 
occasion, originalists themselves have been behind the wheel.  One of these wrong turns involves 
affirming originalism for the wrong reasons.  Some originalists seem to support originalism 
because they believe it compels judges to reach results they find normatively attractive.  Such 
originalists may be especially to the idea that “original expected applications” directly 
determine the meaning of the constitution.  This involves a fundamental mistake.  The real 
attraction of originalism is that it aims to get the meaning right, and not that it just so happens to 
get the right meaning.  The normative foundation of originalism is fidelity to law, and not fidelity 
to particular outcomes. 
Antioriginalists are the ones behind the wheel when a second wrong turn is taken.  Here is 
how they get lost.  An antioriginalist might reason as follows.  The motivation for some 
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originalists is find theoretical support for their constitutional agenda—for example, they may be 
in favor of overruling Roe v. Wade or against the expansion of Congress’s Commerce Clause 
Power.  Therefore, the essence of originalism, the theory, just is the constitutional agenda of 
these originalists.  This wrong turn involves a simple fallacy—equating the psychology 
motivation for a theory with the content of the theory. 
 
* * * 
V. CONCLUSION: SEMANTIC ORIGINALISM AND LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The semantic and normative case for Semantic Originalism has now been articulated and 
defended in depth.  We can now step back and look at theory as a whole, the role it might play in 
the ongoing contest between originalism and living constitutionalism, and the criteria by which 
the Semantic Originalism might be evaluated. 
A. Is Originalism Compatible with Living Constitutionalism? 
What about the relationship between Semantic Originalism and the theory that is sometimes 
called “living constitutionalism”?  There is a preliminary difficulty in answering this question.  
Just as “originalism” is a family of theories, there are disagreements among scholars about the 
meaning of “living constitutionalism.”  The roots of living constitutionalism might be found in 
Chief Justice Hughes's opinion in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell:426 
It is no answer to say that this public need was not apprehended a century ago, or to 
insist that what the provision of the Constitution meant to the vision of that day it must 
mean to the vision of our time. If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the 
time of its adoption it means to-day, it is intended to say that the great clauses of the 
Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions 
and outlook of their time, would have placed upon them, the statement carries its own 
refutation. It was to guard against such a narrow conception that Chief Justice Marshall 
uttered the memorable warning--“We must never forget that it is a constitution we are 
expounding”--“a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be 
adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”427 
Hughes doesn’t use the phrase “living constitution” and because of the ambiguities in the word 
“interpretation” it isn’t clear whether he means to claim that the Court can change the semantic 
content or whether he is arguing for flexible constructions within meaning that is fixed. 
Another important formulation was provided by Charles Reich in his 1963 article, Mr. Justice 
Black and the Living Constitution:428 
[I]n a dynamic society the Bill of Rights must keep changing in its application or lose 
even its original meaning. There is no such thing as a constitutional provision with a 
static meaning. If it stays the same while other provisions of the Constitution change and 
society itself changes, the provision will atrophy. That, indeed, is what has happened to 
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some of the safeguards of the Bill of Rights. A constitutional provision can maintain its 
integrity only by moving in the same direction and at the same rate as the rest of society. 
In constitutions, constancy requires change..429 
It is apparent that the meaning of the word “meaning” in this definition of living 
constitutionalism is ambiguous. Recall that the word “meaning” has (1) a semantic sense, 
referring to semantic content, (2) an applicative sense, referring to applications, and (3) a 
teleological sense, referring to purposes or functions.  Reich could be asserting: “The application 
meaning of the Constitution must change in order for the semantic content to remain the same.”  
Or he might be asserting: “The semantic content of the Constitution must change in order for the 
teleological meaning to remain the same.” 
A third influential formulation of living constitutionalism was offered by Justice William 
Brennan: 
To remain faithful to the content of the Constitution, therefore, an approach to 
interpreting the text must account for the existence of the substantive value choices and 
must accept the ambiguity inherent in the effort to apply them to modern circumstances.  
The Framers discerned fundamental principles through struggles against particular 
malefactions of the Crown: the struggle shapes the particular contours of the articulated 
principles.  But our acceptance of the fundamental principles has not and should not bind 
us to those precise, at times anachronistic, contours.430 
Brennan’s formulation could be glossed in a variety of ways.  One natural reading is the 
following: 
In order to remain faithful to the semantic content of the constitution, principles 
(understood as animating purposes or values) must guide the application of vague 
constitutional provisions to contemporary circumstances.  The precise formulations of 
constitutional purposes by the framers were made in the context of specific disputes.  
When we apply the purposes to contemporary circumstances we should not be bound by 
those precise formulations. 
But this passage could be read differently, because “articulated principles” could refer to the 
constitutional text (the text could be the articulation of the principles).  On that reading, Brennan 
is suggesting that the semantic content of the Constitution may need to be altered in order to be 
faithful to purposes for which that content was articulated. 
Not only are Brennan and Reich’s formulations ambiguous, there are other ways we could 
formulate the idea of living constitutionalism.  Some of the possibilities include: 
• Living constitutionalism is the view that constitutional law evolves to adapt to 
changing circumstances and values. 
• Living constitutionalism is a political theory that aims to justify New Deal national 
bureaucratic welfare state.431 
• Living constitutionalism is the view that the semantic content of the constitutional text 
changes to adapt to changing circumstances and values. 
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• Living constitutionalism is the view that constitutional constructions change to adapt 
to changing circumstances and values. 
• Living constitutionalism is the view that functions or purposes attributed to 
constitutional provisions change to adapt to contemporary values, and these purposes 
should guide constitutional construction. 
And so forth. 
To get clear about living constitutionalism, we would need to undertake a project similar in 
scope to that which this article has undertaken for originalism.  Rather than pursue that project 
on this occasion, I will articulate two different accounts of the possible relationships between 
living constitutionalism and originalism.  Both accounts are heavily indebted to the work of Jack 
Balkin, who should be credited for seeing the possibility of a compatabilist account of the 
relationship.432 
The compatabilist story about the relationship between living constitutionalism and 
originalism can be articulated via the distinction between constitutional interpretation and 
constitutional construction.  Compatibilism could be the view that originalism and living 
constitutionalism have separate domains.  Originalism has constitutional interpretation as its 
domain: the semantic content of the constitution is its original public meaning.  Living 
constitutionalism has constitutional construction as its domain: the vague provisions of the 
constitution can be given constructions that change over time in order to adapt to changing 
values and circumstances.  A fully specified living constitutionalism would have to provide a 
theory of constitutional construction that satisfies this description, and we can imagine that there 
could be a variety of such theories. 
If living constitutionalism accepts the fixation thesis, some theory of semantic content, and 
some version of the contribution thesis, then living constitutionalism is committed to the idea 
that the Constitution provides constitutional law a hard core.  Metaphorically, the idea of a hard 
core might be expressed in terms of materials.  Living constitutionalists might see the hard core 
as made of wood, hard enough to constrain and bind but capable of change in response to the 
saws of amendment and the chisels of enduring constructions.  Let us call this kind of living 
constitutionalism hard core living constitutionalism. 
Jack Balkin has demonstrated that hard core living constitutionalism is compatible with 
originalism.  But some living constitutionalist may deny that there is a hard 
core.  They might believe that even the core of constitutional law is 
malleable and subject to manipulation.  That is, they might assert that the 
living constitution has a soft core.  Once again, we might express this idea 
through a metaphor.  We can think of a soft core in terms of silly putty433 
and not wood: silly putty can take on a shape in response to manipulation, 
but it offers only slight resistance, easily giving way to the warm hands of 
the Justices.  We can call this version of living constitutionalism soft core 
living constitutionalism. 
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What then about incompatibilism?  The incompatibilist story assumes that originalism and 
living constitutionalism compete for the same domain.  In the case of Semantic Originalism, that 
domain must be limited to constitutional interpretation.  Hence, the incompatibilist story must 
interpret living constitutionalism as a theory of content.  There are, however, at least two 
different ways in which living constitutionalism could be viewed as a theory of content. 
One possibility is that living constitutionalism is a theory of semantic content.  That is, living 
constitutionalists could be understood as denying the fixation thesis and asserting that the 
semantic meaning of a given constitutional provisions changes in response to changing 
circumstances.  If the argument made in this Article is correct, then semantic-content soft core 
living constitutionalism is simply false as a matter of fact.434 
But there is a more charitable interpretation of living constitutionalism that would result in 
incompatibilism.  The more charitable interpretation would view living constitutionalism as a 
theory of legal content.  Articulation of a full version of what we can awkwardly label legal-
content soft core living constitutionalism would require the articulation of a theory of the 
relationship between semantic content and legal content.  That account might deny the 
contribution thesis, or more plausibly it might be based on some version of the weak contribution 
thesis.  We have already rehearsed many of the arguments for modest, and against weak, 
compatibilism.435  If living constitutionalists want to affirm soft core living constitutionalism, 
they have a good deal of work to do. 
Jack Balkin argues persuasively that living constitutionalists should opt for compatabilism.  
Semantic Originalism supports that argument and provides foundations for its semantic 
component by providing a theory of constitutional meaning.  But the relationship between living 
constitutionalism and originalism is a two-way street.  Originalists can embrace hard core living 
constitutionalism without abandoning originalism.  Whether they should do so depends on the 
best theory of constitutional construction, and on that subject “Semantic Originalism” is silent. 
B. What’s in a Name, Take Five: The Topography of Constitutional Theory 
One last time.  Does it matter what theories are attached to the labels “originalism” and 
“living constitutionalism”?  So long as we are clear, it should not matter to the substance of the 
arguments.  One of the main purposes of the title to this article is mark off a distinctive position 
and to give that position a name, “Semantic Originalism,” that will avoid the confusion that 
might be generated by the assertion this position is simply “true originalism” or “real 
originalism” or “the New Originalism” or “Originalism with a capital O.” 
Nonetheless names matter, because the names for theoretical positions resonate and ramify 
throughout the space of theoretical discourse.  This creates a temptation that should be avoided.  
Scholars should not attempt to manipulate terminology with the undisclosed purpose of recasting 
the topography of theoretical space to gain the high ground and force their opponents into an 
indefensible position.  For example, an opponent of originalism might attempt to define 
originalism as the theory that the original intentions of the framers fully determine the content of 
constitutional doctrine and its applications and that original intentions should trump all other 
considerations in all imaginable circumstances.  This move simply stipulates that originalism is 
an indefensible position.  If the party that makes this move then attempted to declare victory, that 
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declaration would be hollow at best and disingenuous at worst.  What is good for the goose is 
good for the gander.  If proponents of originalism were to attempt to define originalism as the 
view that original public meaning sometimes makes some contribution to legal content and that it 
should on some occasions be given some normative force, then originalism would almost surely 
be true. 
Semantic Originalism is a robust theory that makes strong claims.  The fixation thesis claims 
that semantic content is fixed at the time of constitutional utterance.  The clause-meaning thesis 
fully specifies the determinants of this content with original public meaning doing the work.  The 
moderate version of the contribution thesis claims that the constitutional law always or almost 
always includes this content.  The fidelity thesis claims that we owe fidelity to this content.  The 
relationship of these claims to other versions of originalism and to the historical development of 
originalism has been fully specified, and good and sufficient reasons have been advanced for the 
fixation thesis as the focal point for the family of originalist theories.  Given the work that has 
been done, a great deal would have to be said to justify the claim that Semantic Originalism 
doesn’t lie near core of originalist theory.  If the arguments offered here are not refuted, then 
Semantic Originalism is the unifying focal point around which originalist theories cluster. 
C. Triviality Take Three, Truth as the Telos of Legal Scholarship 
Again, one last time.  Semantic Originalism is not trivial in the claims it makes or in its 
normative implications, but there is one more sense in which it would not be trivial even if it did 
not have significant normative implications.  The significance or triviality of legal theories 
should not be judged solely or even primarily by the scope of their normative implications.  
Legal theories should be judged by the contribution they make to truth—to the fund of 
theoretical knowledge about the law.  Legal theories answer to the virtue of sophia—theoretical 
wisdom.  Legal practice answers to the virtue of phronesis—practical wisdom. 
The claim that legal theories should be judged by their contribution to truth may be 
controversial.  Some legal scholars may believe that legal scholarship is primarily a practical 
activity with the aim of telos of making the world a better place.  There may be room for this 
kind of “advocacy scholarship,” but I am doubtful.  The primary goal of legal scholars is not to 
persuade, it is to enlighten.  Advocacy scholarship must, by definition, be on a political, 
ideological, or legal side.  Advocates must make arguments on the basis of their ability to 
persuade the reader that their side should win. 
Let me be clear, I am not claiming that advocacy scholars are insincere, that they distort 
evidence, or that they dissimulate.  But for effective advocacy, weaknesses cannot be brought to 
the fore, counter arguments cannot be cast in their strongest and most defensible forms, and gaps 
in the argument cannot be highlighted.  Again let me be clear: I am not claiming that any group 
of scholars is immune from the temptation to persuade rather than enlighten.  Nor am I claiming 
that persuasive prose is inimical to the conception of legal scholarship as aiming at truth.  
Persuasion that is oriented toward truth can be the engine of enlightenment.  One last time, let 
me be clear: I am certainly not claiming that advocacy scholarship is limited to one side of the 
debate over originalism. 
What I am claiming is that the significance of theoretical legal scholarship should be judged 
by the contribution it makes to truth.  If the fixation thesis, the clause-meaning thesis, and the 
contribution thesis contribute to our understanding of constitutional theory, then Semantic 





of theorizing about law.  This would be true even if Semantic Originalism left constitutional 
practice entirely unchanged.  Legal theories do not become significant because of the 
contribution they make to one side of a political, ideological, or legal struggle. 
D. Monsters and Apparitions, Take Three: The Colonization of Law by Philosophy 
One more time, one last time.  Semantic Originalism redescribes disputes in constitutional 
theory using vocabulary, concepts, and tools borrowed from the philosophy of language.  Some 
readers may resist this redescription on the ground that a line should be drawn between the 
disciplines.  I imagine that the worry might be expressed colloquially as follows: 
Our colleagues in torts and contracts have to deal with the Coase theorem, transaction 
costs, property rules and liability rules, not to mention distributive justice, option luck, 
corrective justice, moral realism, and all the rest.  If we accept the claims of “Semantic 
Originalism” (the article), then constitutional theory will be colonized by the philosophy of 
language.  We already have to know Thayer, Bickel, and Ely, and have a passing 
acquaintance with Rawls and Dahl.  Surely it cannot be the case that we also need to know 
Austin, Grice, Quine, Davidson, and Wittgenstein.  Redescribing the problems of 
constitutional theory in terms of “semantic content,” “implicature,” and “illocutionary 
force” just makes things more confusing. 
In this regard, I believe the situation of constitutional theory is no better or worse than tort 
theory, contract theory, or any other lively domain of legal scholarship.  Legal theorists must 
avail themselves of the tools that give them the best purchase on the problems at hand.  In this 
day and age, I venture to guess that no one would attempt to do serious torts scholarship without 
mastery of the Coase Theorem or the notion of a transaction cost.  Even those who reject the 
economic approach need to be able to discuss the issues that it raises intelligently. 
Whether a particular set of theoretical tools illuminates rather than obfuscates is not a 
question that can be settled a priori.  The proof of the pudding is in the eating.  If philosophical 
tools make significant contributions to fundamental issues of constitutional theory, then 
constitutional theorists must master them. 
But constitutional theory and constitutional practice are two different activities: officials 
(including judges) and citizens need an intuitive understanding of the basic principles of 
constitutional theory, but there understanding can be shallow and not deep.  For example, the 
ideas contained in the fixation thesis and the clause-meaning thesis can be expressed in language 
that is easily accessible to both judges and ordinary citizens: look to the meaning of the text for 
ordinary people at the time it was written.  The theoretical apparatus of the philosophy of 
language provides foundations for a practical imperative accessible to common sense.  In this 
regard, Semantic Originalism surely fares no worse (and likely does better) than its rivals.  
Pluralism, with its emphasis on multiple modalities, whatever its merits, is hardly a simpler 
view.436 
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* * * 
 
In the culture of the legal academy, one of the most frequent reactions to theoretical claims 
and arguments is “I don’t buy it.”  This comment may, on the surface, seem innocuous, but it is, 
in fact, a symptom of deep dysfunctionality among academic lawyers.  “I don’t buy it,” assumes 
that theoretical claims are accepted or reject on the basis of evaluative attitudes.  “I buy it” 
equals “I like this idea and its normative implications and therefore I am willing to be 
persuaded.”  “I don’t buy it” equals “I don’t like this idea or its normative implications and 
therefore I refuse to be persuaded.”  Taking up this stance towards theoretical discourse is to 
abandon the search for truth.  To paraphrase, Clausewitz, “Scholarship becomes the 
continuation of politics by other means.” 
A reorientation towards truth would involve a different attitude towards theoretical claims 
and arguments.  One can say, “That argument is invalid—the conclusions do not follow from the 
premises, and here’s why.”  Or, “The premises of the argument are false, and here’s why.”  
Moreover, reorientation towards truth allows for suspension of judgment.  Arguments that 
appear on their surface to be sound may after reflection and investigation be invalid or rest on 
false premises.  But suspension of judgment is not refutation. 
“I don’t buy it” will not do. 
 
* * * 
E. Overcoming the Hermeneutics of Suspicion 
Can we make progress in constitutional theory?  It may be that the lay of land is such that an 
affirmative answer to this question will require a change in attitude on the part of constitutional 
scholars.  It is possible that constitutional theory is pervasively characterized by what might be 
called “the hermeneutics of suspicion” following Ricouer.437  Theoretical arguments are 
construed as disguised politics.  Consider the following imaginary internal dialog of a 
constitutional theorist: 
When my ideological enemy makes a theoretical move, I should resist, because it is 
likely to be the thin end of the wedge and the thick end will surely be something that is 
normatively unattractive.  If my ideological friend embraces a position shared by my 
enemies, then one of two possibilities obtain.  Either my friend has gone over to the dark 
side and is my friend no longer.  Or my friend has seen a strategic opportunity to turn my 
enemies’ arguments against them.  My attitude should be “wait and see.”  If it turns out 
that the former possibility obtains, then I will have avoided embarrassment.  If the latter 
turns out to be the case, and if my friend is right, I can jump on the bandwagon once the 
political consequences are clear.  In no event should my attitude towards theoretical moves 
be detached.  I must always be on my guard. 
If the hermeneutics of suspicion becomes the operating principle for discourse in 
constitutional theory, then progress seems unlikely. 
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The alternative to the hermeneutics of suspicion involves a shift in attitude, from advocacy 
scholarship to an orientation towards truth; from a presumption of distrust to an attitude of 
constructive engagement. 
 
* * * 
 
I have been thinking about originalism for more than thirty years.  When I first wrote about 
originalism more than twenty years ago, I had an imperfect grasp of the philosophical issues, 
and reached conclusion that I now see were incorrect.  But I had the intuition that the core of 
originalism expressed a fundamental truth about the meaning of the constitutional text and its 
relationship to constitutional law.  I remember in the summer of 1986 that I started to opine, 
“Everyone will be an originalist,” and I thought that originalism would lose much of its political 
valence as a consequence of its reformulation in response to criticism.  I believe that after many 
years of work, I have a much firmer grasp on the grounds for my intuition, and I am now 
confident that the most important claims made by Semantic Originalism are supported by good 
and sufficient reasons.  But I am no longer saying, “Everyone will be an originalist.” 
 
* * * 
F. Evaluating the Argument: Demonstration or Reflective Equilibrium? 
The argument for Semantic Originalism is now complete.  Before concluding, one last topic 
needs to be put on the table.  What are the appropriate standards of evaluation?  How should 
constitutional theorists decide whether to reject or accept the four claims made by the fixation 
thesis, the clause-meaning thesis, the contribution thesis, and the fidelity thesis?  At a very high 
level of abstraction, the answer to this question is: these claims should be accepted by a 
constitutional theorist if they are true or perhaps “correct”.438  But this simply begs the question: 
under what circumstances should we accept these claims as true? 
One approach to this question might borrow the idea of reflective equilibrium from the work 
of John Rawls.439  Given the nature of the problems of constitutional theory, we should not 
expect that the claims made about constitutional meaning will usually be justified by deductive 
proof.  Of course, deductive proof is likely to play a role at the level of supporting detail.  Some 
positions in constitutional theory may involve contradictions, and these positions are 
demonstrably false.  But in other cases, our starting points will be our prereflective beliefs about 
various matters, ranging from the particular to the general.  Such starting points will include 
relatively particular beliefs like “Brown v. Board was rightly decided” and relatively abstract 
beliefs like “The Constitution of the United States serves democratic values.”  On this picture, 
the method of constitutional theory starts with an examination our prereflective beliefs and their 
relationships.  Some beliefs may be inconsistent.  In that case, one or more of the beliefs may 
need to be reexamined and revised.  Gradually, our prereflective beliefs will become more 
refined and coherent.  At some stage, the theorist will begin to regard some of these beliefs as 
considered judgments.  A successful constitutional theory will bring all of our considered 
judgments into reflective equilibrium, a relationship of consistency and mutual support. 
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So far, the description of the method of reflective equilibrium has treated constitutional theory 
as a operating within the discourse of constitutional practice.  But it is not the case that our 
beliefs about constitutional theory fall or stand independently of our beliefs about other matters.  
Consider once again the analogy to tort law.  Normative tort theory may require recourse to 
general normative legal theory which in turn must be reconciled with moral philosophy and 
political theory.  Given a consequentialist approach to tort theory, the normative evaluation of 
particular tort rules may best be accomplished by utilization of the tools of economics, which 
themselves may involve formal techniques.  Semantic Originalism makes claims about meaning 
(the fixation thesis and the clause-meaning thesis) and these claims involve issues from the 
philosophy of language and linguistics.  Likewise, the contribution thesis makes a claim about 
the relationship of the semantic content of legal texts to the content of legal rules: this claim 
involves issues of the philosophy of law as well as claims that are internal to the conventions of 
legal practice as those conventions are understood by lawyers and judges. 
Because constitutional theory is not an island unto itself, the standards for the evaluation of 
constitutional theories may incorporate the standards of other disciplines and practices.  This is 
hardly remarkable in the era of interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary legal scholarship: no one 
thinks that the methodological soundness of empirical studies should be evaluated by the 
recourse to the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Legal arguments about cognitive processes must 
answer to the standards of psychology.  In other word, the claims made by legal theorists should 
be evaluated by the standards that are appropriate to the nature of the claim. 
G. The Second Restatement of Semantic Originalism 
The arguments made on behalf of Semantic Originalism have established four theses: fixation, 
clause meaning, contribution, and fidelity. 
The warrants for the fixation thesis established the claim that the semantic content of each 
constitutional provision is fixed at the time the provision is framed and ratified: subsequent 
changes in linguistic practice cannot change the semantic content of an utterance.  “Domestic 
violence” cannot become “spouse abuse” because of a change in linguistic practice. 
The reasons adduced on behalf of the clause-meaning thesis established the claim that the 
semantic content is given by the conventional semantic meaning (or original public meaning) of 
the text with four qualifications.  The first modification is provided by the publicly available 
context of constitutional utterance: words and phrases that might be ambiguous in isolation can 
become clear in light of those circumstances of framing and ratification that could be expected to 
be known to interpreters of the Constitution across time.  The second modification is provided by 
the idea of the division of linguistic labor: some constitutional provisions, such as the “natural 
born citizen” clause may be terms of art, the meaning of which are fixed by the usages of 
experts.  The third modification is provided by the idea of constitutional implicature: the 
constitution may mean things it does not explicitly say.  The fourth modification is provided by 
the idea of constitutional stipulations: the constitution brings into being new terms such as 
“House of Representatives” and the meaning of these terms is stipulated by the Constitution 
itself. 
The conjunction of the fixation thesis and the clause-meaning thesis recovers “common 
sense” about constitutional meaning.  The terminology may be fancy but the aim is simple.  The 
text of the constitution should be read sensibly given the context, the ordinary meanings of the 





of “sentence meaning,” “illocutionary force,” and “semantics” provides a philosophical 
grounding for these simple ideas. 
The justifications offered for the contribution thesis established the claim that the semantic 
content of the Constitution contributes to the law: the most plausible version of the contribution 
thesis is modest, claiming that the semantic content of the Constitution provides rules of 
constitutional law, subject to various qualifications.  Our constitutional practice provides strong 
evidence for the moderate version of the contribution thesis.  It takes a pretty fancy argument to 
resist the idea that constitutional law should accord with the meaning of the Constitution.  In this 
regard, the Eleventh Amendment has exemplary significance: it is indisputable that the semantic 
content of the Constitution can trump constitutional doctrine as articulated by the Supreme 
Court. 
The reasons surveyed in connection with the fidelity thesis established the plausibility of the 
claim that we have good reasons to affirm fidelity to constitutional law: virtuous citizens and 
officials are disposed to act in accord with the Constitution; right acting citizens and officials 
obey the constitution in normal circumstances; constitutional conformity produces good 
consequences.  Our public political culture affirms the great value of the rule of law.    Once 
again, the idea is simple and intuitive.  Without really good reasons for doing otherwise, judges 
should follow the law, and so should other officials and citizens. 
We can summarize Semantic Originalism as a slogan.   The slogan recapitulates each of the 
claims made by Semantic Originalism, but it is potentially misleading because it does not clearly 
distinguish between the semantic claims made by the fixation and clause meaning theses, the 
legal claim made by the contribution thesis, and the normative claim made by the fidelity thesis.  
Those distinctions are important, and the slogan should not be quoted out of context.  Here is the 
slogan in the vernacular: 
The original public meaning of the constitution is the law and for that reason it should 
be respected and obeyed. 
There is nothing surprising or remarkable about this idea.  Some who resist do so because they 
misinterpret its meaning and misconstrue its implications.  Some who resist do so because they 
believe (rightly or wrongly) that it will stand in the way of their constitutional agenda.  Some 
who endorse originalism do so for the wrong reasons.  Semantic Originalism provides the correct 
interpretation, the most reasonable construal, and the right reasons.  Here is the slogan again, this 
time translated from the vernacular into the language of high constitutional theory: 
 
The semantic content of Constitution was fixed at the time of utterance by conventional 
semantic meaning, and the conventions of legal practice make that content the supreme 
law of the land to which officials and citizens owe fidelity as a matter of political 
morality. 
